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  Abstract 
     This study focuses on different aspects of fiscal policy. The second and third chapters 
investigate drivers of fiscal policy whereas the fourth chapter investigates its consequences. The 
second chapter analyses how changes in demographic structure affects policy variables. Building 
on Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) we propose a U-shape relationship between labor income tax 
rates and the share of retirees. Using data from 1991-2012 for 13 OECD countries, the results 
related to income taxes and the size of government are found to reconcile with theory after 
controlling for possible endogeneity and presence of unit roots. 
     Borrowing from Meltzer and Richard (1981) the impact of a rise in inequality on tax 
composition is examined in the third chapter. Based on median voter model we propose that 
direct (income) taxes monotonically increase with inequality, whilst indirect (expenditure) taxes 
exhibit a U-shaped relationship with inequality. Moreover, based on voters’ myopia, how 
changes in inequality affect deficits and debt is also examined. Using cross-country data for 129 
countries the empirical results are found to be consistent with theory and especially in strong 
democracies. With panel data estimates, the findings also partially support our theory. 
     The fourth chapter examines the Armey (1995) curve assessing the relationship between 
economic growth and the government size. We find strong evidence for presence of the Armey 
curve across non-OECD countries. Government expenditures are found to be optimized in terms 
of economic growth at 23.99% of GDP. Employing panel data estimation we use a recent data set 
for 79 countries from 1981-2010, taking five years averages. The results also hold for weak 
democracies whereas the OECDs and strongly democracies are found to sustain larger 
governments as findings related to them are mixed. Empirical analysis is also extended 
decomposing public expenditures, taking direct transfers and GDP per capita as policy variables. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1) Thesis Statement 
     This thesis contains three essays on the political economy of fiscal policy. The hypothesis 
under investigation in each chapter is different. In the second chapter we hypothesize how 
changes in demographic structure affect policy variables – the labor income tax rates and the 
government size measured by total taxes as a share of GDP. The third chapter assesses the 
relationship between inequality and the composition of taxes whilst the fourth chapter 
addresses how government size affects economic growth. 
 
1.2) Motivation  
     As the issues investigated in each chapter are different, the motivation is also bound to be 
different. Aging societies in the European Union have already raised concerns for policy makers. 
In the instance of chapter two, future increases in relative size of the old are projected.  
Consequently the chapter addresses how demographic choices regarding policy outcomes such 
as government size and public debt will change. 
     According to the projected trends in aging population by Brooks (2003) the ratio of the 
population aged 60 and older to those between ages 15 and 59 is predicted to rise from 35% in 
2000 to 66% in 2050 in the European Union. Germany, Italy and Spain will be amongst the most 
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aged societies with the dependency ratio projected to increase to 71, 76 and 81% respectively in 
these countries by 2050. Japan is no exception as the ratio is estimated to rise from 36 to 70% in 
the same span of time. However, the forecast figures for the US are not as alarming since the 
dependency ratio is estimated to rise from 27% in 2000 to 47% in 2050. 
     In welfare economies like the European Union the forecast increases in the aged population 
have major implications. Since the countries in the EU to varying degrees use PAYG pension 
systems, taxes will need to increase sharply to finance redistribution to retirees in the form of 
pension and other social security needs. Bongaarts (2004) predicts that the public expenditures 
on pensions might increase from 35% to 75% of earnings in Italy from 2000 to 2050. 
     Another revenue source which can be used to finance redistribution to the current old is 
public debt. According to estimates reported in the Economist (24th August, 2002, p.21), public 
debt could reach 100% of national income in the US, 150% in the EU as a whole and over 250% 
in Germany and France by 2050. The seriousness of these figures can be understood when we 
take into account the Stability and Growth Pact (1992) agreed upon by all the countries of the 
EU. This pact puts a constraint that public debt cannot increase beyond 60% of national income.1 
     The academic literature on the impact of aging societies on the policy is quite mixed. For 
example, Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) find a negative relationship between the labor income 
tax rates and the relative size of the old. On the other hand, Bryant (2003) and Shelton (2007) 
criticize Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) for not decomposing the dependency ratio into separate 
components for the youth and the aged population. They rather find a positive correlation 
between labor income tax rates and the share of retirees when they decompose the data. The 
quite contrasting results make this question worth investigating in more depth. 
     The motivation for the third chapter is to understand how political processes affect taxation 
decisions and follows Meltzer and Richard (1981). Their model proposes a positive relationship 
                                                          
1 For example the debt to GDP ratios of Belgium, Italy and the US were 98.2, 117.5 and 89.9 in 2010 respectively. 
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between inequality and the size of government. However, the empirical literature is fairly 
negative on this hypothesis. For example, Perroti (1996), Bassett et al (1999) and Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) find no support in cross country studies. On the other hand, they themselves 
find support for theory in Meltzer and Richard (1983) using state-level data from the United 
States. Similarly Borge and Rattso (2004) using data from Norway find support for the positive 
association between inequality and the demand for redistribution. They suggest testing the 
hypothesis of Meltzer and Richard (1981) in a more homogenous setting with comparable 
institutions and straight forward policy about redistribution. We extend the original model by 
adding another dimension which is indirect taxes (taxes on goods and services or expenditure 
taxes or relative taxes). 
     Moreover, we also analyse how a rise in inequality leads to affect budget deficit and debt. For 
this, we propose tentative hypotheses for public deficit and debt as shares of GDP. Based on 
voters’ myopia, a rise in inequality leads to higher budget deficits and debt levels. 
     Theory and tentative hypotheses, relating to public debt and deficit, of this chapter are 
further empirically assessed employing cross sectional, panel data and panel data in first 
differences estimations. Besides these estimations, we also split the sample into weaker and 
stronger democratic samples owing to the fact that the role of median voter is relatively more 
important in stronger democracies unlike dictatorships or weaker democracies. 
     The chapter four addresses the question of the optimal size of government. The expansion of 
government has generated both positive as well as negative effects on the economy. Hence, 
there are proponents and opponents of public expansion in economic matters who through their 
research have put forth their cases. Protection of property rights, law and order and incentives 
to save and invest are few favourable effects that proponents of government expansion 
propose. Similarly, there are adverse effects of government expansion on the economy as well. 
For example, rent-seeking activities of government officials, corruption, excessive taxation and 
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efficiency are few of them. In order to explore the optimum level of government we investigate 
it further following the Armey curve. 
     The Armey curve (1995) is a stylized representation of the relationship between economic 
growth and the size of government. According to Armey, extremes such as no government and 
complete government control are not the ideal cases. Without any government control 
problems such as the absence of rule of law, protection of property rights and incentives to 
either save or invest due to constant threat of expropriation will serve to undermine investment. 
On the other hand, there are also costs borne with government expansion. Corruption, rent-
seeking behaviour, excessive taxation, and inefficiency are all endemic in excessively large 
states. 
     Thus the Armey curve (1995) posits an inverted U-shape curve suggesting a positive relation 
between the economic growth and the size of government up to a certain level but the 
relationship becomes negative once government expands beyond that threshold. Relatedly 
there are other empirical studies which argue for an optimal government size; Radwan and 
Reiffers (2004), Pevcin (2004), Peden (1991), Scully (1994) and Herath (2012) are a few 
examples. 
     Since there are mixed findings for optimal government size suggested by the previous 
literatures, we explore the optimal size of government in an expanded and up-to-date database, 
measured by public expenditures as a share of GDP. 
     There are different components of government spending which may have positive as well as 
negative impact on economic growth. For this, we de-compose public expenditures into 
government consumption and public investment. Furthermore, we also analyse the impact of 
how changes in direct transfers are related to the efficient level of government expenditures. 
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1.3) Objective 
     There is no single objective wrapping the whole thesis since the issues taken up in each 
chapter are different. The goal of second chapter is to redefine the argument proposed in Razin, 
Sadka and Swagel (2002). They propose that the relationship between the labor income tax rates 
and the retirees share is negative. Only when the retirees make up at least 50% of the voters the 
relation will change into positive. Their rationale is due to the political power the retirees gain 
when they form the majority in a median voter model. However, in chapter two the relationship 
between the labor income tax rates and the relative size of the old changes from negative to 
positive when the aged population represents only 8.4% of the population due to potential 
empathy within families with elderly relatives. On the other hand, the empirical findings applying 
OLS, 2SLS and 2SLS in first difference estimations (2SLS+FD) support the theory and Razin, Sadka 
and Swagel (2002) to the extent that the correlation is found to be U-shaped. 
     We also extend the analysis taking youth dependency ratio as dependent variable. With 2SLS 
estimation, the results indicate a U-shaped correlation to exist between labor income tax rate 
and the share of youth reconciling with tentative hypothesis and Razin and Sadka (2007). 
     In addition, the empirical analysis is also extended taking total tax revenue as a share of GDP 
(measuring the government size) as a policy variable. The findings relating to the government 
size are in accordance with the results we get with regards to labor income tax rate. Hence, 
these results also offer some support to the theory. 
     Even when the sample size is enlarged to 16 countries including Greece, Luxembourg and 
Switzerland, the findings support the theory, Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) and the results that 
we get with smaller sample. 
     The aim of third chapter is to analyse and test a simple political-economic model of the 
composition of taxes. The theory is related to the hypothesis of Meltzer and Richard (1981) that 
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higher inequality increases the size of government measured by the extent of redistribution. In 
the theoretical framework we develop, both income and expenditures are taxed to finance 
redistribution. The power to determine the extent and the composition of taxes lies with the 
median voter. The theoretical framework proposes that an increase in inequality at any level will 
lead to higher income taxes. With regards to consumption taxes it is proposed that a rise in 
inequality is positively associated with consumption taxes at low levels of inequality. 
Nonetheless, the association between the two variables becomes negative when inequality 
reaches to a certain threshold. Moreover, relative taxes are argued to be positively related to a 
rise in inequality. The empirical findings using cross country data for 129 countries are also 
consistent with our theory across the full sample but are statistically significant for strongly 
democratic countries. 
     We also investigate the relation between inequality and budget deficit and inequality and 
public debt. Based on the assumption that the voters are short-sighted, our hypotheses are 
supported by empirical results with cross sectional estimation as we find a positive correlation 
between deficit and inequality as well as public debt and inequality. 
     In addition the panel data estimation is used to reproduce the cross-sectional analysis. Linear 
estimation with regards to direct and indirect taxes reconciles with the theory. When we assess 
the non-linearity after controlling for non-stationarity in the data, the empirical findings relating 
to both direct and indirect taxes support the theory.  Moreover, public deficit and debt are also 
found to have a positive association with inequality except when we difference the data. 
     To determine the optimal government size and test for the presence of an Armey Curve 
(1995) is the goal attached to fourth chapter of the thesis. We find empirical evidence of the 
presence of Armey Curve (1995) across Non-OECD countries. Using data set as fresh and large as 
possible and employing panel data estimates are also key objectives of this study. Panel data is 
rarely used to estimate the optimal government size in the previous literature. Besides these, 
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the comparisons of how much government expansion is beneficial for the economy between the 
OECD and non-OECD countries as well as weak and strong democracies are drawn. Strong 
evidence for the presence of the Armey Curve is found in the non-OECD and less democratic 
countries. Nonetheless, the OECD and more democratic countries are found to sustain larger 
government sizes as the results relating to these economies are also found to be both U-shaped 
and an inverted U-shape. 
     We extend the empirical analysis using log real GDP per capita. GDP per capita better 
encapsulates economic welfare than growth, and it is of interest to investigate whether 
government size affects GDP per capita in levels as well as growth. Applying 2SLS in first 
differences estimation, we find evidence for the hypothesis of Armey curve. However, the 
results are U-shaped across non-OECDs and OECDs. Following Cashin (1995) the investigation of 
changes in the government size, measured by direct transfers, is also made. We find support for 
the Armey curve in terms of direct transfers. 
     We also examine the impact of changes in the government size on current government 
consumption and public investment following Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008). Across the sample 
distinguished with the OECD countries and strong democracies, there is substantial evidence for 
the presence of Armey curve with regards to current government consumption. On the other 
hand, the results with public investment are rather fragile. 
 
1.4) Contribution 
     Since there are three different issues taken up in this thesis the contributions of each issue 
are idiosyncratic. Building on Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) we develop a theoretical model 
assuming empathy for the aged population within families with elderly relatives. Unlike Razin, 
Sadka and Swagel (2002) who argue that thelabor income tax rates increase only when retirees 
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constitute at least 50% of the total voters, we rather theorize a similar association between the 
two variables to hold once the aged population makes up 8.4% of the population. Furthermore, 
besides empirically analysing how income taxes change with demographic structure we also 
assess whether the government size is affected. In addition, how changes in the share of youth 
affect both labor income tax rate and the government size is also investigated.Furthermore, the 
data sample we collect is extended covering 1991-2012. We find empirical results related to 
labor income tax rate and the share of retirees in harmony with the theory. Similarly, labor 
income tax rate is found to have a U-shaped correlation with the share of youth when we apply 
estimations controlling for possible endogeneity. 
     As far as the findings related to the government size are concerned, these are similar to what 
we get for labor income tax rate. Thus, there is support found for the theory as well as Razin, 
Sadka and Swagel (2002). In addition, we also extend the sample size and find no substantial 
difference between the results of larger and smaller sample. 
     In the third chapter the argument of Meltzer and Richard (1981) is redefined. Their model is 
augmented with an additional policy instrument which is expendituretaxes (taxes on goods and 
services as a share of revenue). The theory is consistent at large with Meltzer and Richard (1981) 
as it proposes higher redistribution with more inequality in a median voter model. However, 
novel hypotheses are offered in relation to the composition of taxes and, in particular, 
expenditure taxes. Income and relative taxes are proposed to be positively related with 
inequality whereas a U-shape relationship between expenditure taxes and inequality is 
proposed. For the empirical analysis cross country data for 129 countries are collected. The 
findings across the full sample support the theory. In addition the theory gathers more support 
in strong democracies. Cross-sectional estimates to test the non-linearity of expenditure and 
income taxes are also used. An inverted U-shape association between consumption taxes and 
inequality as well as income taxes and inequality is found which is also in accordance with the 
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argument proposed. So we find that higher income inequality will lead to more redistribution in 
a median voter model, via a shift from expenditure to income taxes. Similarly, the theory is also 
supported when the empirical estimation is extended to apply panel data estimations applying 
first difference estimation in order to investigate non-linear relation between policy variables 
(both direct and indirect taxes) and inequality. With linear estimation, there is support found for 
the proposed argument related to expenditure taxes across full sample and stronger 
democracies. Nevertheless, the hypothesis related to income taxes is supported across weaker 
democracies. 
    Additionally, extension of empirical analysis to investigate how policy variables such as public 
deficit and debt respond to changes in income inequality is also a contribution of this chapter. 
Both cross-sectional estimation and panel data estimation for these policy variables are also 
offered. The results relating to these also support our tentative hypotheses relating to public 
debt when we control for unit roots in the data. 
     The extended range of recent data from 1981-2010 is a significant contribution of the fourth 
chapter where we investigate the optimal government size for economic growth. Moreover, the 
use of panel data is another contribution as there is not much literature in the past which have 
used panel data to analyse the Armey Curve (1995). We find substantive evidence for the 
presence of the Armey Curve (1995) across Non-OECD countries. With further decomposed 
samples between weak and strong democracies, there is considerable evidence found for the 
presence of Armey Curve (1995) in non- weak democratic samples.On the other hand, we find 
both mixed results, U-shaped and inverted U-shape, for the OECD sample which may imply that 
these countries can sustain larger governments. 
      The same methodology is used to determine the optimal government size for real GDP per 
capita. We again find support for the hypothesis of Armey curve when we apply 2SLS in first 
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differences estimation for the full sample. However, there is no evidence found for the Armey 
curve across sub-samples. 
     Following Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), how the composition of expenditures affects 
economic growth is also analysed. The empirical results with regards to current government 
consumption across the OECDs and strong democracies support the presence of Armey curve. 
Applying 2SLS estimation, the results consistently fail to confirm the presence of Armey curve for 
both policy variables. Moreover, direct transfers are also used to examine how the size of 
government is related to this policy variable. The results relating to this variable also support the 
Armey curve hypothesis. 
 
1.5) Structure 
     The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 assesses how changes in 
demographic structure affect policy variables – labor income tax rate, total tax revenue as a 
share of GDP and public debt as a share of GDP. How income inequality affects the composition 
of taxes is the issue explored both theoretically and empirically in the third chapter. The fourth 
chapter analyses the optimal government size, measured by government expenditures as a 
share of GDP, in terms of economic growth. The fifth chapter concludes. 
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Chapter 2 
Demography and Fiscal Policy 
 
2.1) Introduction 
     Since the end of World War II, decreases in both fertility and mortality rates in industrial 
countries have brought about a dramatic rise in the old age population, at least in the OECD 
countries. Life expectancy rose by an average two-and-a-half years per decade in countries 
where people already live longest, as estimated by Oeppen and Vaupel (2002). The median age 
in Europe is estimated to further rise from 37.7 in 2002 to 52.7 in 2050. For Western Europe the 
ratio of old (defined as persons aged over 65) to working age (defined as persons aged 16-65) is 
projected to rise from 20% in 2000 to 40% in 2050 (The Economist, 2002, p. 22). The dramatic 
rise in the relative size of the old has created many challenges for the respective governments 
because of the increased burden on the working-age population. 
     Governments that use Pay-As-You-Go finance systems take care of their dependent 
population through transfers from the young to the old and through the provision of public 
goods and services in kind paid for by current taxation. Given the rise in the relative size of the 
old, unmanageable increases in social security, rising budget deficits, tax hikes and public debt 
both internally and externally or a mix of all are potential outcomes for governments to 
consider. For example; public debt, in principle, has a ceiling at 60% of National Income in the EU 
Stability and Growth Pact (1992). Moreover, external debt may potentially harm annual growth. 
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Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) estimated that growth rates are approximately cut in half if external 
debts increase beyond 90 percent of GDP2.  
     The unprecedented rise in the relative share of the aged population may potentially put 
constraints on the government’s ability to smoothly run its fiscal transactions. A larger number 
of retirees mean a larger share of expenditures to be allocated to their social security services 
which, in turn, would have implications over the rest of fiscal policy. Hence, this study focuses on 
whether and how fiscal policy responds to demographic changes in the population. For this, we 
have taken the average labor income tax rate, total tax revenue as a share of GDP and public 
debt to GDP ratio as measures of fiscal policy.  
     To analyse how governments’ policies change in response to a rise in the share of the old as a 
percentage of the total population, we take inspiration from Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). 
They argued theoretically that a rise in the share of the old can downsize the welfare state as 
long as the median voter is working. According to their proposition, a rise in the dependency 
ratio of the old may potentially produce the following effects: First, a higher dependency ratio 
means a larger support for increase in the labor income taxes because retired people favour it. 
However, the more numerous working people around the median voter have incentives to 
support a decrease in income taxes because their incomes will be taxed since they belong to 
working-age population. The demands of the workers prevail if they are more powerful 
politically as opposed to the old. As a result, a rise in the relative share of the old decreases labor 
income tax rates. Their argument contradicts alternative theories of “grey power” wherein a 
larger elderly vote always leads to increased pension provision. 
     The theoretical contribution of this chapter is to redefine the theoretical argument of Razin, 
Sadka and Swagel (2002) where they argue that the welfare state would increase in size in 
response to a rise in the relative share of the old population only once the median voter is old. 
                                                          
2 Though, Herndon, Ash and Pollin (2014) cast considerable doubt over these findings.   
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Following them, we develop a theoretical model though with a different demographic structure. 
We assume three family types with different preferences depending on their demographic 
makeup. Additionally, we include another dimension in the theory where we consider possible 
empathy towards the old besides considering the political power of the median voter like Razin, 
Sadka and Swagel (2002). The complete rationale of our model is given below.  
     There are three types of families, type-X families, type-Y families and type-Z families. Type-X 
families consist of 6 individuals including two children/youth, two workers (parents) and two 
retirees (population aging 65 and above).  Type-Y families consist of 4 individuals including two 
workers (parents) and two young (non-working individuals). These family types include no 
old.Type-Z families constitute of 5 individuals including one old individual (retired), two workers 
(parents) and two young (non-working individuals). Families are assumed to vote collectively, 
hence type-X and type-Z family members are assumed to be empathetic towards the old 
whereas type-Y families share no empathy for the old. In addition, we also assume probability of 
survival of parents to the retirement age. When we assume 30% probability of parents entering 
the retirement age, both families (type-X and type-Z) which share empathy with the old 
aggregately constitute majority in the population. Thus, at this probability, we expect 
preferences of the elderly to dominate. 
     Given this composition, the theory finds that a rise in the relative size of the old would 
increase tax on labor income once the retirees constitute 8.4% of the population which is 
termed as the ‘critical mass/threshold/benchmark.’ We define the critical mass as the point 
where the proportion of old in the population can no longer be exploited politically. Below the 
critical mass (8.4%), the demands of the workers dominate as the old are vulnerable politically. 
Once the old constitute 8.4% of the population or more, they become powerful politically and 
their demand for a rise in labor income tax rates prevails.  
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     Briefly, similar to Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) we propose a “U-shaped” relationship 
between the labor income tax rates and the retirees share. This implies a negative association 
between labor income tax rates and the share of retirees until the old constitute 8.4% of the 
population but the relationship between these two variables changes and becomes positive 
once the share of retirees exceeds this threshold. 
     We criticize Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) for using the dependency ratio to denote share of 
retirees only. In reality the dependency ratio includes both old and youth dependency ratios. The 
finding may not present the true impact of a rise in the relative size of the old on labor income 
tax rates if the dependency ratio is not de-composed into young and retired population because 
it would also absorb the impact of youth dependency ratio.   Therefore, de-composition of data 
and independently controlling for these two variables is important. Bryant (2003) and Shelton 
(2007) also criticize Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) for this reason. 
     To regress labor income tax rates on the share of retirees in population, we collect annual 
data for the average labor income tax rates3 ranging from 1991 to 2012. The sample covers 13 
OECD countries. Control variables included are GDP growth per capita, openness to trade (the 
sum of imports and imports as a share of GDP), income inequality, and the unemployment rate. 
We apply Ordinary Least Squares, Ordinary Least Squares in first differences, Two Stage Least 
Squares and Two Stage Least Squares in fist difference methods and employ country and time 
fixed effects in the analysis. Standard errors are clustered by country. 
     Despite criticizing Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) for not de-composing dependency ratio 
into young and the old, we estimate the relationship between labor income tax rate and the 
dependency ratio. There is support found for Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) as the relation 
between the two variables is indicated to be U-shaped. However, the threshold is 32.78% which 
is less than what they propose. 
                                                          
3 Its method of calculation and source are described in the data section and the appendix.   
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     Theory proposed in this chapter and the argument of Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) are 
supported by the empirical results. We find a U-shaped association between labor income tax 
rate and the share of retirees (when we add all control variables). The estimated threshold is 
16.43% which is rather closer to what we propose. 
     Owing to non-stationarity of data and possible endogeneity between the variables, we also 
replicate the analysis with 2SLS in first difference estimation (2SLS+FD). The estimated 
relationship is again a U-shaped supporting the theory and Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). 
Again the estimated threshold is attained when retirees constitute 20.82% of the total 
population. As before the estimated threshold is closer to our theory. 
     The empirical analysis is also extended for youth dependency ratio. The evidence for a U-
shaped association between labor income tax rate and the youth is confirmed with 2SLS 
estimation. However, the estimated correlation between the two variables is found to be an 
inverted U-shape when we difference the data. The data seem to lose some information due to 
differencing. 
     As the retired population may be more concerned about their gross expenditures as opposed 
to income taxes only, the empirical analysis is extended taking total tax revenue as a share of 
GDP, measuring the government size, as policy variable. The results are again found to indicate a 
U-shaped correlation between the government size and the share of old. These results reconcile 
with the theory, Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) and the findings we get with labor income 
taxes. When we analyse the relationship between the government size and the youth 
dependency, the results are similar to what we find with labor income taxes. 
     In addition, we also extend the sample size from 13 to 16 OECD countries including Greece, 
Luxembourg and Switzerland. Controlling for possible endogeneity and the presence of unit 
roots, the results support theory and are consistent with results of smaller sample. 
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      The chapter is outlined as follows. Section 2.2 is a literature survey divided into three sub-
sections. We discuss literature investigating the theoretical model of Razin, Sadka and Swagel 
(2002), the determinants of the average labor income tax rate andgovernment in sub-sections 
2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 respectively. Section 2.3 is a theory section. Sub-section 2.3.1 outlines the 
assumption of the model whereas 2.3.2 presents the complete theoretical model where we 
develop our model to redefine the argument of Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). Section 2.4 of 
this paper offers a detailed description for the data sample. The empirical findings are presented 
in section 2.5. The empirical findings of the relationship between the retirees share and labor 
income tax rate and the government size and the debt are analysed in sub-sections 2.5.1 and 
2.52 respectively. In addition, sub-section 2.5.3 tests for structural break in theory and sub-
section 2.5.4 highlights the empirical findings with larger sample size. Section 2.6 concludes. 
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2.2) Literature Review 
     This section is divided into three sub-sections. First of all, literature related to the 
determinants of the labor income tax rates is reviewed. After that the determinants of the 
government size, measured as a share of GDP collected through total taxes, are analysed and in 
the last we analyse the determinants of the public debt as a share of GDP. 
 
2.2.1) Theoretical Model of Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) 
     Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) examine a standard over lapping generations model 
composed of two generations: young and old.Each generation is assumed to be working in the 
first period and retired in the second period. A stylized economy is also assumed based on two 
types of workers, skilled and unskilled, following Saint – Paul (1994) and Razin and Sadka 
(1995a). The skilled workers are more productive providing one efficiency unit of labor per unit 
of labor time whereas the unskilled workers provide only 𝑞< 1 efficiency units of labor per unit of 
labor time. In the first period, each worker has one unit of time and an endowment of 𝐾 units of 
capital but they are born without skills and hence low productivity. Each worker faces a decision 
whether to acquire education and become skilled or else remain unskilled. After the first period, 
workers retire and thereafter their consumption is financed by their savings in the first period 
and government transfers in the current period. 
     An innate ability parameter, 𝑒, denoting the time needed to acquire education characterizes 
the continuum of individuals. A worker becomes skilled after making an investment of 𝑒 units of 
labor time in education. Once the worker becomes skilled the remaining units of labor time 
denoted as 1- 𝑒 provide an equal amount of effective labor in the balance of first period. 
Education is more costly for less capable individuals in terms of lost income (education is a full 
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time activity) as they require more time to become skilled as opposed to capable individuals who 
need relative lesser time. The cost of acquiring education, denoted as 𝑟, is not tax deductible. 
𝐺 (. )denotes cumulative distribution function of innate ability with an interval [ 0, 1 ] . 𝑔 =
 𝐺′refers to the density function. It is also assumed that the government levies a flat payroll tax 
rate, 𝑇, to finance a lump-sum grant, 𝑏. 
     Given these assumptions, the equality between the cost of and the returns to education 
determines a cut-off level corresponding to the individual’s education cost parameter. 
(1 − 𝑇) 𝑤 (1 − 𝑒∗) = 𝑞𝑤(1 − 𝑇) + 𝑟                                                                                                 (2.1) 
𝑒∗ = 1 − 𝑞 −  
𝑟
(1−𝑇)𝑤
  
Individuals acquire education and become skilled if their costs are less than the cut-off level. 
Those for whom the cost of acquiring education exceeds beyond the cut-off level do not attain 
education and rather remain unskilled.  
     A linear production function and a growing population are also assumed. Here, labor income 
taxes do not distort the individual’s decision to supply labor as it is assumed to be fixed though 
income taxes affect aggregate labor supply because taxes affect innate ability parameter.4 
     The government balances its budget in each period. It uses the labor income tax rate to 
finance the grant to the current workers and retirees.  The total grant is given below:  
𝑏𝑡 =  𝑇𝑡𝑤𝑙(𝑒𝑡
∗)
1+𝑛
2+𝑛
                                                                                                                                  (2.2) 
Here 𝑛 refers to population. Note that the median voter is a worker in a growing population. 
Transfers will be driven to zero by the median voter if only the old are beneficiaries. Moreover, 
any social contract that future young will engage in redistribution to the future old may exist yet 
                                                          
4The fixed factor price assumption and the period-by-period budget balancing in thepay-as-you-go tax-transfer system break the 
links between generations that do not overlap.In this way, our intertemporal model becomes essentially isomorphic to a static 
atemporalmodel. This enables us to focus in a simple way on the effect of the dependency ratio onthe tax-transfer system. 
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implementation is not guaranteed. Given this, transfers are shared between workers and 
retirees. 
     The retirees favor higher income taxes as long as taxes raise total revenue and transfers. The 
political equilibrium tax rate is determined by the median voter who is young. Therefore, the 
workers would support higher taxes if their lifetime income is optimized as a result. 
 
𝑊(𝑒, 𝑇𝑡, 𝑇𝑡+1, 𝑛) =  
(1 − 𝑇) 𝑤 (1 − 𝑒) − 𝑟 + 𝑏(𝑇𝑡 , 𝑛) + 
𝑏(𝑇𝑡+1, 𝑛)
1 = 𝑟
          𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒 ≤ 𝑒∗ (𝑇𝑡) 
(1 − 𝑇) 𝑤𝑞 + 𝑏(𝑇𝑡 , 𝑛) + 
𝑏(𝑇𝑡+1,𝑛)
1=𝑟
                      𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒 ≥ 𝑒∗ (𝑇𝑡)                                                    (2.3) 
Equation (2.3) denotes the lifetime income of labor with innate ability parameter e. Subscript t is 
suppressed since it is constant over time for a given population growth rate. First order 
condition and second order condition give us the following: 
 
𝜕𝑊 [𝑒𝑀(𝑛), 𝑇0  (𝑛),𝑛
𝜕𝑇
=  B[𝑇0(𝑛), 𝑛] = 0                                                                                                    (2.4) 
𝜕2𝑊 [𝑒𝑀(𝑛), 𝑇0  ,𝑛
𝜕𝑇2
=  B[𝑇0(𝑛), 𝑛]  ≤ 0                                                                                                       (2.5) 
𝐵(𝑇, 𝑛) =  
− 𝑤[1 −  𝑒𝑀(𝑛)] +
𝑤(1 + 𝑛)
2 + 𝑛
 𝑙[𝑒∗(𝑇𝑡)] +
𝑟𝑇(1 + 𝑛)𝑔[𝑒∗(𝑡)]
(2 + 𝑛)(1 − 𝑇)
𝑑𝑒∗
𝑑𝑇
     𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑀(𝑛) < 𝑒
∗(𝑇) 
− 𝑤𝑞 +
𝑤(1+𝑛)
2+𝑛
 𝑙[𝑒∗(𝑇𝑡)] +
𝑟𝑇(1+𝑛)𝑔[𝑒∗(𝑡)]
(2+𝑛)(1−𝑇)
𝑑𝑒∗
𝑑𝑇
     𝑖𝑓 1 > 𝑒𝑀(𝑛) > 𝑒
∗(𝑇)                                      (2.6) 
 
With the help of equation (2.6) it can be seen that the transfers depend on whether the median 
voter is skilled or unskilled. 
𝑑𝑇0(𝑛)
𝑑𝑛
=  − 
𝐵𝑛[𝑇0(𝑛),𝑛]
𝐵𝑇[𝑇0(𝑛),𝑛]
                                                                                                                               (2.7) 
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Total differentiation of equation (2.4) with respect to 𝑛 gives us equation (2.7) which suggests 
that the sign of transfers B[𝑇0(𝑛), 𝑛]  ≤ 0 determines the direction of the effect of changes in 
the population growth rate on the equilibrium tax rate.With differentiation of equation (2.6) 
with respect to 𝑛  we get 
 
𝐵𝑛[𝑇0(𝑛), 𝑛]  = 
𝑤
𝑑𝑒𝑀
𝑑𝑛
+ 𝑤𝑙{𝑒∗[𝑇0(𝑛)]}
1
(2 + 𝑛)2
+ 𝑇
𝑟
1 − 𝑇
𝑔{𝑒∗[𝑇0(𝑛)]}
(2 + 𝑛)2
𝑑𝑒∗
𝑑𝑇
     𝑖𝑓 𝑒𝑀 < 𝑒
∗[𝑇0(𝑛)]  
𝑤𝑙{𝑒∗[𝑇0(𝑛)]}
1
(2+𝑛)2
+ 𝑇
𝑟
1−𝑇
𝑔{𝑒∗[𝑇0(𝑛)]}
(2+𝑛)2
𝑑𝑒∗
𝑑𝑇
     𝑖𝑓 1 > 𝑒𝑀 > 𝑒
∗[𝑇0(𝑛)]                                        (2.8) 
 
If the sign of B[𝑇0(𝑛), 𝑛] is positive, a rise in the population growth rate raises the labor income 
tax rate. If this is the case, then there exists a negative relation between retirees as a proportion 
of the population and labor income tax rate. 
     A rise in the retirees share is hypothesized to generate two effects. First, it would increase the 
share of retirees implying a decrease in the share of young population. A higher share of retirees 
in the population means a rise in their political power and an increase in favour of labor income 
taxes as they are not workers anymore. Second, a relatively larger size of the retired population 
puts a higher tax burden on the workers to finance redistribution to the retirees. Therefore, 
those for whom the cost of raising taxes exceeds the benefits shift to anti-tax coalition. If the 
median voter is a worker, a rise in the share of the aged population would lead to lower income 
taxes. Nevertheless, the relationship between a rise in their relative share and income taxes 
would be positive once the median voter is retired (i. e. if 𝑛 < 0 in the model). 
     Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) estimate their theoretical predictions using regressions in 
which alternatively the labor income tax rate and real per capita transfers depend on the 
dependency ratio as well as additional control variables. Control variables include real GDP 
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growth, openness to trade, government employment as a share of total employment and 
income inequality. Real GDP growth is taken to control for the cyclical effects of the business 
cycle. Exposure to external shocks is controlled for using openness to trade as Rodrick (1998) 
proposes that the provision of social insurance against the adverse external shocks is one of the 
functions of the welfare state – i. e. a positive association between the larger governments and 
more open economies is expected. Government employment as a share of total employment is 
included to show the breadth of government involvement in the economy. Income inequality is 
taken to test Meltzer and Richard (1981) who argue for more demand for redistribution with an 
increase in the income inequality. Unemployment as a share of total employment isincluded to 
control for reverse causality as argued by Daveri and Tabellini (2000) that higher income taxes 
lead to higher unemployment. 
     They took data for 13 European countries from 1965 to 1992. Their main finding is that an 
increase in the relative size of the retirees as a share of total voters decreases the labor income 
tax rates. Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) argue that the finding is consistent with their 
theoretical argument5 where they suggested a negative association between the labor income 
tax rate and the share of retirees. 
     Bryant (2003) criticizesRazin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) for failing to disaggregate the 
dependency ratio into population aging between 0-14 and 65 and above as well as for 
assumptions made in their theory assuming that the benefit payments are the same for 
everyone. He replicated the empirical work ofRazin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) using the same 
specifications and the same period of time but disaggregating the dependency ratio. His 
estimation resultsindicate that a rise in the share of youth dependency leads to a decrease in the 
labor income tax rates. However, an increase in the relative size of the old as a fraction of total 
                                                          
5 The findings corresponding to the control variables are as follows: firstly a negative but significant coefficient for the growth of real 
GDP showing the counter-cyclical pattern of taxes with the business cycle. The estimated coefficient for openness to trade shows a 
positive correlation with income taxes. This finding supports Rodrick (1998) but does not support Alesina and Wacziarg (1998). 
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voters increases labor income tax rate in contrast to Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). He also 
challenged the prediction ofRazin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) about the future size of the welfare 
state. Rather, he finds that the upward pressure on taxes and benefits would increase with a 
decrease and increase in the young and the old population respectively in the future. Likewise, 
Shelton (2007) also criticizesRazin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) for not disaggregating the 
dependency ratio and finds a positive correlation between income taxes andthe share of 
retirees. 
     Migration, though clearly a different variable, may be similar to aging in the way it affects 
government size. Facchini, Razin and Willmann (2004) estimate that the government size, 
measured as the labor income tax rate, decreases if there is an increase in un-skilled immigration 
or low-skilled immigration as the immigrants add to the working-class group and strengthens 
them more politically. On the one hand, domestic un-skilled workers might lobby against the 
inflow of immigrants because higher share of the immigrant labor means a rise in the labor 
supply pool of un-skilled labor that may depress wages of the domestic un-skilled labor. On the 
other hand, high-skilled labors are pro-immigration because large number of immigrants 
strengthens their political power. The second factor may dominate the first factor implying a 
negative association between immigration of un-skilled labor force and the size of the welfare 
state. 
     In this paper we analyse the impact of the retirees as a fraction of population following Razin, 
Sadka and Swagel (2002) though we also analyse additional policy variables which are tax 
revenue as a fraction of GDP and public debt as a share of GDP as opposed to using just the labor 
income tax rates. The rationale for analysing different policy instruments is that the retired bloc 
may be more concerned to overall expenditures and accumulating higher public debt 
accumulation since the future generations are supposed to pay the debt back. 
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2.2.2) Determinants of the Size of the Government 
     Government size, usually measured by total spending of the public sector as a percentage of 
GDP, has been extensively researched. There are a number of determinants that can potentially 
affect its size. These determinants include demography, immigration, education, globalization, 
income inequality, income levels, ideology,the level of democracy, institutions, corruption, 
population, cultural homogeneity and constitutions. 
     Increases in mean income level also affect the government size through other channels. 
Pickering and Rockey (2011) estimated that an increase in the mean level of income increases 
the impact of ideology on the size of the government. The nature of institutions developed in a 
country should be a reflection of ideology it follows and therefore may also likely affect its 
government size. 
     Trade openness is possibly an important factor determining the government size. Alesina and 
Wacziarg (1998) estimate a positive association between openness to trade and the size of the 
government. They argue that there exists a link between country size and its need to open to 
trade where the indirect link between the government size and openness to trade originates 
from. According to their argument small countries have stronger incentives to be more open to 
trade. A state of autarky is not economically viable for small countries as compared to large 
countries since they are not self-sufficient to the extent that they can rely on their domestically 
produced goods and services. Moreover, small countries cannot exploit the advantage of global 
trade unless their economies are open to trade. Alesina, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2000) argue 
that smaller countries can reap the benefits of cultural homogeneity without paying the cost 
integrated with small markets. In the light of their argument, geographic boundaries form the 
size of market in a world where trade is restricted using trade barriers. Given this, larger 
countries lead to larger governments and smaller countries lead to smaller governments 
whereas the globalization enables the governments of smaller countries to increase their 
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markets beyond their political boundaries. Resultantly, the size of the government rises due to 
increase in their role in the overall economy.  Rodrik (1998) estimates a positive relation 
between openness to trade and the government size, measured by the public expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP. He argues that more open economies are more vulnerable to external 
economic shocks and, hence, government expenditures work as a social insurance against the 
external risks. 
     Ideology also likely determines the size of government. Blais, Blake and Dion (1993) find that 
parties which subscribe to leftist ideology are found to spend a higher fraction of GDP than 
parties skewed towards right-wing ideology. The finding relates to the parties forming majority 
governments whose composition does not change over a number of years. 
     The constitution of a country is also a potential determinant of the state’s involvement in the 
economy. Lizzeri and Persico (2001) argue for the under-provision of public goods if the benefits 
of public goods provision are lesser than the benefits of direct transfers for the office-seeking 
candidates. Because the direct transfers can be made to the selective constituencies easily the 
politicians prefer them over public goods as the latter cannot easily be restricted to a targeted 
group of voters. In their model they compared different electoral systems. They suggest the 
winner-take-all system is less efficient than proportional system if the public good is very 
desirable. Building on the same point another study Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) 
establishes that more power delegation and fewer incentives for legislative cohesion are found 
to be associated with presidential – congressional regime than the parliamentary regime. These 
distinctions cause changes in the size and composition of public expenditures. A large size of 
government is found under parliamentary systems. In this system the majority is targeted for 
redistribution purposes. Moreover, this system offers less under-provision of public goods and 
more rents to politicians. Conversely, the size of government is smaller under presidential 
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regimes. More under-provision of public goods, less rents for politicians and powerful minority 
as the target group for redistribution purposes are the features of congressional regimes. 
     The size of government can also be determined by the extent of democracy. The size of 
government may differ based on whether autocrats or democratically elected leaders rule the 
country. As argued in Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) the political transition from dictatorship to 
democracy may lead to large government size. In order to prevent social unrest and revolution 
the ruling elite strategically opts for extended franchises. In democracy since it represents the 
median voter, therefore, the demand for redistribution is high. To cater to the demands of 
voters for redistribution the representative governments increase taxation which ultimately 
leads to an extended scope of government in the economy. In Boix (2001), democratic regimes 
are found to have bigger governments as compared to dictatorial ones. 
     Institutional quality is also a very important determinant of government size. Stein (1998) 
finds a positive correlation between decentralized governments and the size of government. In 
this form of government the fiscal decisions are arguably better approximate reflection of 
voter’s preferences. Decentralized governments are, therefore, awarded more resources as they 
are more entrusted to provide public goods demanded by the constituents. Nevertheless, 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) conversely assert that centralization would lead to larger 
government size. 
     The size of government is also related to corruption. A corrupt government may allocate a 
higher share of public expenditures on public goods which require inputs from suppliers who are 
close allies of the incumbent government. For example, Mauro (1998) finds that more corrupt 
governments would decrease the share of public expenditures on education. The rationale for 
such a correlation to exist is that education is a public good which does not require the supply of 
high-tech inputs from oligopolistic suppliers who either directly or indirectly constitute 
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government. Thus, the rent-seeking corrupt governments find education less attractive as its 
provision does not serve their self-interest. 
     Population and its demographic structure may also determine government size as different 
aging groups have different preferences.Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) propose a negative 
relationship between the proportion of retirees and the size of government. Their proposed 
hypothesis is based on the two impacts the aging societies generate. First, a rise in the share of 
old refers to more power to the group supporting higher labor income tax rates. Second, a rise in 
the relative share of the aged population increases the burden on current working population as 
their incomes will be taxed to finance redistribution for the old. Since the median voter in their 
model is a young worker, the second factor dominates because supporting a rise in income tax 
rates becomes costly for labor. Contrary to Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002), Bryant (2003) and 
Shelton (2007) find that more aging societies lead to larger government size. They criticize the 
finding of Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) as they use the dependency ratio instead of the aged 
population variable to analyse the impact of aging societies on the size of the welfare state. 
     Poor voters arguably demand more redistribution whereas rich constituents may demand less 
knowing that they will be taxed higher for redistribution to be financed. Hence, income 
inequality may also determine the size of government. Meltzer and Richard (1981) suggest that 
in democracies, where everyone is granted the right to vote, the median voter is generally poor. 
A rise in mean income relative to median income would lead to large size of government, 
measured by total redistribution. 
     Social homogeneity and heterogeneity may also determine the government size. Peltzman 
(1980) finds large governments in countries where large groups share homogenous interest as 
well as articulate them. In his paper the growth of government is mainly attributed to the 
levelling of income differences across a substantial fragment of population – the growth of the 
middle class. On the other hand, Supply of a certain public good to one group may raise concerns 
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for other groups in societies divided on ethnic lines. Hence, this may impact the size of 
government. More heterogeneous and polarized societies, according to political economy 
theories, assign less weight to public goods as compared to patronage. These societies are also 
arguably less careful with regards to fiscal discipline. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) find that 
higher ethnic fragmentation leads to less amount of spending on public goods – education, 
roads, sewers and trash pickups – in the US cities. This may be attributed to differences in 
preferences of ethnic groups and a reduction in utility derived from the use of public goods if 
other ethnic groups also use it. 
     With more communication facilities societies arguably become more aware about their rights 
and mobilized which result in high demand for public goods and transfers. Deutsch (1961) finds 
that accelerating impact of modern communications proved instrumental in paving the way to 
higher demands for government involvement in the economy. Because of widespread 
dissemination of knowledge the people became more informed about what they can get. At the 
same time, the higher level of social mobilization exerted more pressure for public services to be 
effective. 
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2.3) Theory: Household-Level Utility Maximization 
     In contrast to Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) we posit that individuals work and vote so as to 
maximize household level utility rather than individual utility. 
 
2.3.1)   Key Arguments 
     The key argument is that voters maximize household utility and not individual utility. Along 
these lines, different family types are assumed to vote collectively and vote for same candidate. 
Glaser (1959) provides evidence for similarity in the voting behaviour within households as a 
result of close family ties or other types of close attachments that may affect the attitude of 
family members. Niemi, Hedges and Jennings (1977) find the presence of a broad congruence 
within couples in voting behaviour. The agreement may be attributed to the couple’s selection 
or mutual socialization or the similar experiences that they encounter every day. Huckfeldt and 
Sprague (1991) find that political discussions of households, people residing near-by or like-
minded people exert a considerable social influence on the voting preferences of people. 
Nickerson (2008) finds in a placebo-controlled experiment that the propensity to vote passed 
onto other household members is 60% as the preferences of couples become more similar as 
time goes by. 
     Based on the empirical evidence that families vote collectively, we argue that families share 
empathy with each other (within the households). Hence a household with many elderly 
relatives will be more pre-disposed towards material interests benefitting the elderly. 
     Note that this argument does not imply that all household members perfectly align their 
interests with the elderly household member(s). All that is being assumed is collective voting at 
the level of the household. Hence a household with elderly relatives will be more sympathetic to 
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the needs of the elderly than those without. The budget constraint applies at the level of the 
household, and not individuals, so improvements in the income to the old (via redistribution) will 
benefit all members of the household. Hence the key argument is that working age adults 
support elderly household members when pension provision is limited. This aligns their interests 
with those of the elderly. 
     One could question the argument that self-interested adults will put weight on possible utility 
when old if the chance of survival is low. But even here the self-interested adult will care about 
the utility of the elderly when there are elderly relatives currently within the household.6 
     In the analysis the proportion of retired people in society is assumed to grow exogenously 
over time. Increased aging corresponds to a rise in life expectancy. This means that the 
proportion of families with elderly relatives grows over time. Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) 
attribute increases in life expectancy in industrialized countries to medical progress, social 
improvements and economic development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 An alternative, but certainly not mutually exclusive, argument could be that cultural norms dictate deference to the elderly. 
30 
 
2.3.2)   Model 
     We suppose three family types in the model defined as type-X, type-Y and type-Z. Type-X 
family consists of six individuals including two workers (parents), two non-working individuals 
(children/youth) and two retirees (aging 65 and above). Type-Y family constitutes 4 individuals. 
Of them, two are workers and two are children. This family type thus includes no retirees. Type-Z 
families consist of 5 individuals including two workers (parents), two non-working individuals 
(children) and one retiree (old). Children are unable to vote. Hence, there are four voters in type-
X households, two voters in type-Y households and three voters in family type-Z. In such a 
demographic structure, retirees constitute half of the adult population (electorate) in type-X 
family and one-third in type-Z families whereas type-Y families include no old. The family 
structure is endogenous to changes in the mortality or “survival” ratio between the second and 
third generations. 
     Before discussing the model formally, we first discuss the divergence of interests between 
workers and the old. The retirees prefer higher income taxes as they no longer work. On the 
other hand, workers support lower income taxes as their incomes in the form of income taxes 
are deducted to finance redistribution to the old. Especially when the relative size of the old in 
the population increases, so does the burden on workers as now the smaller quantity of workers 
will be taxed to cater to the social security needs of higher proportion of retirees. Nonetheless, 
in our model, we take interests of households as a whole. 
     Because of empathy within the households, we argue that families that include older 
members would vote for higher income taxes in order for higher redistribution to be made to 
the old. Note also that empathizing with the old also potentially serves in their own self-interest 
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as workers may themselves survive to be old in the future.7 Moreover, higher income taxes 
would ensure more extraction of income from families that do not include retirees to families 
with elderly relatives. 
     Increasing life expectancy is modelled as increased probability of surviving into retirement. As 
is shown in the third column of Table 2.1, where we assume 10% probability of workers to 
survive into retirement from all three demographic structures in our model, the retirees 
constitute 3.9% of total population. The method of this calculation is given below: 
     First consider family types (X and Y) to calculate their proportions. Given a 10% survival rate, 
the proportion of type-X families is: 
𝑃2 =  
1
10
∗
1
10
=  0.01.                                                                                                                              (2.9) 
On the other hand the proportion of type-Y families is: 
 (1 −  𝑃)2 =  
9
10
∗
9
10
=  0.81.                                                                                                               (2.10) 
From these proportions, we can calculate the proportion of type-Z family which is 0.18. It is 
shown below: 
1 −  𝑃2 −  (1 −  𝑃)2 =  1 −  0.01 − 0.81 = 0.18.                                                                          (2.11) 
We now analyse which family type holds majority in the given population. Type-Y families, at 
10% survival rate, make up 81% of total population when we assume 10% probability of workers 
to be able to reach retirement age. Since type-Y families share no empathy with the old, they will 
vote in favor of low taxes. Owing to more political power resting with type-Y families, anti-tax 
coalition dominates the preferences of pro-tax coalition. Thus, a rise in the share of retirees 
would lead to lower income taxes. 
                                                          
7This mechanism is distinct, but certainly not incompatible with the main argument proposed in the chapter – that voters empathize 
with current household members. Greater survival rates will potentially induce all voters to be more sympathetic to the needs of the 
elderly if we assume persistence in policy, though a full analysis of this mechanism is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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     Even when we take 20% and 25% probabilities of workers to reach retirement age, the 
majority share (64% and 56.25% which are more than 50%) in the population consists of type-Y 
families. In both cases, the shares of retirees in the population are calculated to be 7.7% and 
9.5% respectively. Anti-tax coalition still dominates pro-tax coalition for type-Y families share no 
empathy with the old. Hence, a negative relation between income taxes and the proportion of 
retirees in the population would emerge with a rise in the relative size of old. 
     A negative correlation corresponds to the argument that the preferences of the working class 
dominate the preferences of retirees. The working population is here more powerful and 
influential politically than the retirees. Moreover, the allocation of an increasing amount of the 
budget expenditure for their healthcare and security needs also causes this negative association 
between the two variables. 
     Only when we take survival probability to be 30%, type-X and type-Z families (9% and 42%) 
jointly make up for more than 50% of total population. These both family types are empathetic 
towards the old. Given that the more political power rests with these families, a positive relation 
between income taxes and the relative size of old would exist. At what threshold level the 
relationship between these two variables becomes positive is of utmost importance. In this case, 
the critical point is 8.4%. The critical point comes at which voters who are empathetic towards 
the old start to outnumber voters who are not. This threshold is calculated as follows: 
 2(1 −  𝑃)2 =  4𝑃2 + 3( 2𝑃 (1 − 𝑃)).                                                                                               (2.12) 
     The term on the left hand side of equation (2.12) is the proportion of type-Y families 
multiplied by two adult voters. On the right hand side, the first term is the proportion of type-X 
families multiplied four voters. The second term is the proportion of type-Z families multiplied by 
three adult voters. The solution to this formula is the root of 
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4𝑃2 − 10𝑃 + 2                                                                                                                            (2.13) 
hence, 𝑃 ≈ 0.219. This means that the proportion of old people is calculated as follows: 
(0.219)2
3
+  
2 (0.219)(1−0.219)
5
= 0.0159 + 0.0684 = 0.084 = 8.4%.                                           (2.14) 
In equation (2.14),  
1
3
 refers to the share of youth in type-X families whereas and  
1
5
  refers to the 
share of elderly members in type-Z families. 
     To sum up, a rise in the share of retirees would lead to a decrease in income taxes but the 
correlation between the two variables becomes positive once the old constitute 8.4% of the 
population. Graphical presentation of this argument is illustrated in Graph 2.1. 
     This argument challenges the theory of Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) who argue for a 
positive relation between income taxes and retirees only once the retirees constitute half the 
total voters. We propose, on the other hand, that a rise in the relative size of old would decrease 
income taxes initially. Nonetheless, a further rise in their share would be positively associated 
with income taxes once proportion of the retirees in population becomes 8.4% due to empathy 
within households. The empathy factor is crucial to our result that Razin, Sadka and Swagel 
(2002) fail to acknowledge. 
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Table 2.1: The effect of increasing longevity on the family structure of the population. 
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Labor Income Tax Rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                           8.4%                                                Retirees  
 
Graph 2.1: A U-shaped relationship between labor income tax rates and the share of 
retirees. 
 
 
     To conclude, though the theory in this section argues for a U-shape relationship between the 
labor income tax rates and the share of retired population following Razin, Sadka and Swagel 
(2002), the critical mass is still far below than what they argue for. The theory suggests that the 
interests of the retirees prevail well before they account for 50% of the population as opposed 
to Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) who argue for the possibility of such a relationship to hold 
only once the median voter is the retiree. 
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2.4) Data 
     The data for the analysis of labor income tax rates are collected following Razin, Sadka and 
Swagel (2002). Following their empirical analysis, the data sample covers 13 OECD countries8. 
The data are annual ranging from 1991 to 2012. We also investigate how total government 
expenditures respond to changes in the demographic structures. Table 2.2 contains descriptive 
statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables used for the analysis. 
     Data for the labor income tax rates are calculated as the ratio of taxes on income, and profits 
to labor income share. The OECD Revenue Statistics is used as a data source. The data span from 
1991 to 2012. The mean and the standard deviation values for labor income tax rates are 
28.45and 10.72 respectively. Its mean demonstrates widespread reliance on income taxes 
though the standard deviation demonstrates a considerable variation within the sample. Figure 
2.1 exhibits an increasing trend in average labor income tax rates over the years though the 
trend is negative in late 2000s. 
     Tax revenue as a share of GDP from 1991 to 2012 is taken from the OECD Revenue Statistics. 
Its mean value, 40.47%, demonstrates the scale of public sector in these countries though its 
standard deviation, 6.21%, shows moderate variation across the sample. Figure 2.2 displays an 
increasing trend for the fraction of GDP collected through taxes from 1991 to 2000 but after this 
the variable shows a slight decreasing trend. 
     The dependency ratio data, measured as 1 minus the total population aged 15-64 as a share 
of the total population, are collected from the World Development Indicators (WDI) Database. 
The mean and the standard deviation are 33.57 and 1.26 respectively. This variable is included to 
test the hypothesis of Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) where they argue for a clear negative 
association between the labor income tax rates and the relative share of the retirees. 
                                                          
8 There are 13 OECD countries included in the sample which are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US. 
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     We break up the dependency ratio into the youth and the retirees share since the 
dependency ratio is composed of the shares of the young and the retired people in the 
population. The sample mean and standard deviation values are 15.96 and 1.81 respectively for 
the old. Across the sample, an increasing trend in the relative size of retired population over the 
years is shown in Figure 2.3. 
     Globalization is likely to affect the governments’ capacity to raise revenue, for example, as 
more openness could mean less tariff revenue. Hence, governments might resort to other forms 
of taxation. As a control variable openness to trade is also included to test the hypothesis of 
Rodrick (1998) who argues for a positive relation between the government size and openness. 
Openness to trade is measured by summing imports and exports as a fraction of GDP. These data 
are also from the World Development Indicators database. The mean and standard deviation for 
openness are 62.89 and 34.65 respectively. 
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Table 2.2. Summary Statistics of the Variables 
   
 
Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
      Labor Income Tax Rate 286 28.45 10.72 12.74 44.9 
      Dependency Ratio 286 33.57 1.26 31.07 36.31 
      Retirees 286 15.96 1.81 12.28 21.1 
      Population aging 0-14 286 17.59 1.95 11.39 21.86 
      Trade Openness 286 62.89 34.65 19.73 58.94 
      Per capita GDP growth 286 1.37 2.21 -1.97 5.89 
      Rich/Middle income share 286 31.08 3.4 23.7 40.1 
      Unemployment Rate 286 7.85 4.02 2.1 15.02 
      Log Per capita real GDP 286 10.34 0.18 9.92 10.85 
      Tax revenue as a share of GDP 286 40.47 6.21 23.28 51.43 
 
The data are cross country averages from 1990-2012. Labor income tax rate is collected from OECD Revenue Statistics data base. Tax 
revenue as a share of GDP, public debt as a share of GDP, Dependency ratio, retirees, 0-14, trade openness, per capita GDP growth, 
ratio of rich to middle income share and unemployment rate are all taken from World Development Indicators database. Log Real 
GDP per capita is collected from Penn World Table database. 
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Cross country average of labor income tax rate taken over the period of 1991-2012 
Figure: 2.1 
 
 
 
Cross country average of Tax revenues to GDP ratio taken over the period of 1991-2012 
Figure: 2.2 
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Cross country average of population aged 65 and above taken over the period of 1991-
2012     
Figure: 2.3 
 
 
 
     Controlling for the cyclicality of the business cycle is also important as governments generally 
find it easier to collect taxes in boom compared to recession. On the other hand, there is a 
literature that finds fiscal policy in developing countries to be rather pro-cyclical(Talvi and Vegh, 
2005 and Ilzetzki and Vegh , 2008). GDP growth per capita is, therefore, included as a control 
variable for cyclical variation. WDI is the source for this data. The mean and standard deviation 
are 1.37 and 2.21 respectively. 
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inequality is introduced in the model. Meltzer and Richard (1981) argue that under majority rule 
the size of the government, measured by the share of income redistributed, increases with pre-
tax inequality measured as mean level of income of voters compared to the income of median 
voter. Milanovic (2000) using data comprising of 79 observations from 24 democracies finds that 
countries with more inequitable distribution of factor income (incomes before taxes and 
transfers) distribute more.  An updated inequality database of Deininger and Squire (1996) is 
used to derive the data for income inequality. The mean and standard deviations are 31.08 and 
3.4 in order. 
     Daveri and Tabellini (2000) find that a rise in labor income taxes may lead to higher real 
wages if trade unions play an instrumental role in the determination of wages. Increased real 
wages lower the demand for labor and, therefore, may lead to higher unemployment rates. They 
substantiate their hypothesis by estimating data for the EU from 1965 to 1995. They estimated 
that a 14% rise in labor tax rates increased the unemployment rate by almost 4%. To be precise, 
they argue and find reverse causality between labor income tax rate and the level of 
unemployment. Total unemployment rate, taken as total unemployment as a share of labor 
force, is included to control for the reverse causation between the two variables found in Daveri 
and Tabellini (2000). The mean and standard deviation of unemployment rates are 7.85 and 4.02 
respectively. The data for unemployment rate are taken from the OECD Revenue Statistics. 
     Countries differ from each other in terms of the level of economic development, which in 
turn, may affect policy variables. To control for differences in economic development, log GDP 
per capita is included following Persson and Tabellini (2003). Its mean and standard deviation 
values are 10.34 and 0.18 respectively. These data are from the World Development Indicators. 
The data are collected from 1991 to 2012. 
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2.5) Empirical Analysis 
     Following the data section, we report the empirical findings related to the labor income tax 
rates and government size measured by tax revenue as a share of GDP sequentially from 1991-
2012. We regresslabor income taxes on the dependency ratio and the share of retirees in the 
first sub-section. Control variables included are openness to trade, per capita GDP growth, log 
real GDP per capita and the measure of inequality. There are two points here that are worth 
mentioning. First, we do not include ratio of civil employment to total employment as a control 
variable due to unavailability of data which Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) use in their paper. 
Second, we add log real GDP per capita in our model to control for differences in development 
level across countries which Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) do not control for in their model. 
Besides these differences in our model, a key distinction is the de-composition of the 
dependency ratio into retirees and children. Regressions in the following sub-section repeat the 
analysis for total tax revenue as a share of GDP. 
 
2.5.1) Empirical analysis of the Labor Income Tax Rates 
     We first regressthe labor income tax rates on the dependency ratio and all other control 
variables.  All specifications exhibited includecountry and time fixed effects. Moreover, the 
errors are clustered by country.  We apply Ordinary Least Squares method on panel data for 13 
OECD countries following Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). The data sample ranges from 1991-
2012. 
     The first column of Table 2.3 replicates Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). A 1% percent increase 
in the dependency ratio leads to 1.42% increase in the labor income tax rates though the 
coefficient is insignificant. This result neither supports our hypothesis nor the empirical finding 
43 
 
of Razin, Sadka andSwagel (2002) where they argue for a negative relationship between the two 
variables as long as the median voter is young. A coalition against higher income taxes 
dominates a coalition supporting a rise in income taxes. All the other estimated coefficients 
corresponding to control variables in the first column are insignificant unlike Razin, Sadka and 
Swagel (2002). 
     Unemployment rate as an additional control variable is included in the second column again 
followingRazin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). Potential reverse causality between income taxes and 
unemployment, higher income taxes leading to more unemployment, is explained by the 
positively estimated coefficient of unemployment rate. The finding supportsRazin, Sadka and 
Swagel (2002) as well as Daveri and Tabellini (2000) who also find reverse causation between 
income taxes and unemployment. However, the coefficient does not hold significance. 
     There are no considerable differences in the findings after we control for unemployment rate 
except that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient for the dependency ratio decreases. It is 
still not statistically significant. 
     Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.3 repeat columns 1 and 2 respectively with the addition of 
quadratic terms for the dependency ratio in each column. Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) argue 
that the relation between labor income tax rate and the old would become positiveonly once the 
old constitute 50% of total voters and more. The theory in this chapter, nevertheless, suggests 
taxes could go up much earlier.  Given this, a “U-shape” relationship between these two 
variables may be inferred. The estimated coefficients for both the linear and quadratic terms for 
the dependency ratio in columns 3 and 4 indicate a U-shaped relation between thelabor income 
tax rates and the dependency ratio. But the coefficients in column 3 are only statistically 
significant at 10%. A rise in dependency ratio at first decreases labor income tax rate but the 
correlation between two variables becomes positive after any further rise in the dependency 
ratio after 32.51% (column 3). For column 4, the estimated threshold is 32.71%. In comparison to 
44 
 
the proposed benchmark with what we argue in the theory and what Razin, Sadka and Swagel 
(2002) argue in their paper, our estimated benchmark is different. 
     Regressions of first four columns of Table 2.3 are repeated in the last four columns with an 
additional control variable, per capita real GDP. It is included following Person and Tabellini 
(2003)to account for the difference in the level of economic development across the countries. 
As before the estimated coefficients for the dependency ratio are positive and insignificant in 
the 5th and 6th columns. This is inconsistent with Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). Whilst columns 
7 and 8 again suggest a U-shape association between the labor income tax rates and the 
dependency ratio, the coefficients of only column 7 are statistically significant at 5%. The critical 
mass estimated from column 7 for the dependency ratio is attained when the retirees represent 
32.82% of the total population.9 Hence, inclusion of GDP per capita does not alter the findings. 
     We consistently find U-shaped correlation between labor income tax rates and the 
dependency ratio. All the calculated benchmarks for dependency ratio in Table 2.3 (columns 3, 4, 
7 and 8) are within the range of 32% to 33%. These are very consistent throughout the table. 
These results support our theory and the hypothesis proposed in Razin, Sadka and Swagel 
(2002). Our theory is supported more than Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) to the extent that 
they claim for such a correlation to exist only when retirees constitute half the total voters. 
     Bryant (2003) and Shelton (2007) criticizeRazin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) for failing to split the 
dependency ratio into youth and old age (retirees) dependency shares. Theyfind a negative 
association betweenlabor tax rates and youth dependency whereas the relation between labor 
taxes and the relative size of retirees is found positive. 
     The criticism of Bryant (2003) and Shelton (2007) appears important when the trends of both 
variables, dependency ratio and the retired population, are compared with each other. The 
dependent population exhibits a decreasing trend from mid 1990s to late 2000s as can be seen 
                                                          
9Detailed method of calculating the critical mass is given below. 
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in Figure 2.4whereas the retired population is showing a rising trend throughout the time period 
as indicated by Figure 2.3. An opposite trend exhibited by the two variables is an indication of 
how important it is to de-compose the dependency ratio into young and retired population. 
Upon analysing the data, having de-composed the dependency ratio, it becomes easier to 
understand the decreasing trend of the dependency ratio. 
     In Figure 2.5 there is a clear indication that the fertility rate measured by, population aged 
zero to fourteen, have decreased from 1991 to 2012. This declining trend corresponding to 
young actually dominates the retired population in the given period because of which the overall 
trend in Figure 2.4 becomes negative. Hence, following Bryant (2003) and Shelton (2007), we 
also differentiate the dependency ratio between youth (population aging between 0-14) and 
retired population (population aging 65 and above). 
     All regressions of Table 2.3 are replicated for Table 2.4 dis-aggregating the dependency ratio 
into youth and the relative size of the old. The estimated coefficient for the share of retirees is 
positive thoughstatistically insignificant. This result suggests that a 1% increase in the relative 
size of the retirees raises the labor income tax rates by 1.54%. This finding is not consistent with 
both the theory of this chapter and the empirical finding of Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) who 
argue and find a negative association between these two variables. However, it supports Bryant 
(2003), Shelton (2007) and Disney (2007) who found a positive relationship between the two 
variables. The retiredpopulation seems to be becoming more powerful politically in an 
unconditional sense than the working age population when we disaggregate the dependency 
ratio into youth and old age dependency ratios. 
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Cross country average of the dependency ratio as a share of the population taken over 
the period of 1991-2012 
Figure: 2.4 
 
 
 
Cross country average of the population aging 0-14 taken over the period of 1991-2012 
Figure: 2.5 
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     The estimated coefficient for the youth dependency is positive but does not hold statistical 
significance. It suggests a rise of 0.88% in the labor income tax rates if there is 1% increase in 
youth dependency as a share of the total population. The finding is not consistent with Bryant 
(2003) and Shelton (2007) who both finda negative relationship betweenlabor income tax rates 
and the youth dependency ratio. In support of their finding they argue that a negative 
correlation unambiguously exists between the income tax rates and youth dependency rate if 
transfer payments are directly made to children aging 0-14. According to them the direct 
redistribution made to children will discourage students to get education as well as increase the 
fiscal leakage. Provided that the children, unlike the retired population, do not have the voting 
power to balance the effects of fiscal leakage and education, a rise in youth dependency would 
likely lead to a decrease in the size of the welfare state.  Nevertheless the findings are complex if 
transfers are made to parents directly. In such a case the tax and transfer system will be seen as 
having less fiscal leakage effects by working age parents than working age non-parents. Thus, a 
rise in the youth dependency ratio may add or subtract to the pro-tax coalition depending on 
innate ability and how childbearing is distributed among the workers. How a rise in the relative 
size of young would affect tax and benefit systems cannot be predicted unconditionally by the 
framework used without knowing these distributions. 
     The estimated results in column 2 offer no considerable difference except that the inequality 
coefficient changes from positive to negative. In next two columns we again test for non-linear 
relationship between labor income tax rates and the share of retirees. 
     In column 3 both, linear and quadratic, coefficients of retirees are positive but insignificant. In 
column 4 we find a U-shaped association between labor income tax rates and the proportion of 
retirees in total population. This finding supports our theory and Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) 
to the extent that the correlation is U-shaped. The estimated threshold is achieved when the 
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retirees constitute 15.83% of the population which is more in line with the argument advanced 
in this chapter. 
     Columns 5-8 add per capita real GDP as a control variable. We find an inverted U-shape 
association between labor income tax rates and the share of retirees in column 7. The estimated 
coefficients are statistically insignificant. This is exactly the opposite of that predicted in the 
theory of this chapter and Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). The estimated coefficients for the 
retirees suggest that the relationship between labor income tax rates and the share of retirees is 
positive and increasing and that the labor income tax rates decline once the retirees constitute 
34.67% of the population.  An inverted U-shape relation indicates that the retired population is 
increasingly powerful politically as well as perhaps that the empathy for them is high. There are 
also some other findings worth discussing. 
     Income inequality is positive in column 7 supporting the hypothesis of Meltzer and Richard 
(1981) and Milanovic (2000) who propose a positive correlation between the two variables. 
However, in column 8, it is negative supporting Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). Trade as a share 
of GDP is consistently negative and insignificant throughout the table which contradicts Razin, 
Sadka and Swagel (2002) who found a positive correlation between globalization and labor 
income tax rates. Likewise, GDP growth is positive indicating a rise in GDP growth would lead to 
a rise in taxes. 
     On the other hand, in column 8, the estimated coefficients of retirees are found to have a U-
shaped association though insignificant. This again supports our theory and previous literature. 
The estimated coefficient is found to be 16.43%, the detailed calculation of which is given below. 
Its graphical presentation can be seen in Figure 2.2. 
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𝐿𝑇𝑅 =  −3.057(𝑉1) +  0.093(𝑉1)2 +  0.020 (𝑉2) −  0.048(𝑉3) +  0.244(𝑉4) −  0.046(𝑉5) +
 0.032(𝑉6) −  11.631(𝑉7)                                                                                                          (2.15) 
Here, 
𝐿𝑇𝑅 = Labor income tax rate 
𝑉1 = Population aging 65 or above  
𝑉2 = Population aging 0-14 
𝑉3 = Trade (exports and imports as a share of GDP) 
𝑉4 = GDP growth per capita 
𝑉5 = Income skewedness 
𝑉6 = Unemployment force as a share of total labor force 
V7 = Log Real GDP per capita 
The labor income tax rate in equation (2.15) is differentiated with respect to dependency ratio. 
𝜕𝐿𝑇𝑅
𝜕𝑉1
= −3.057 +   0.093(𝑉1) = 0 
𝑉1 =
3.057
0.186
= 16.43%  
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Labor Income Tax Rates  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      16.43                                                      Retirees  
 
Graph 2.2: A U-shaped relationship betweenlabor income tax rates and the relative size 
of the old. 
 
     In general, the findings of Table 2.4 regarding labor income tax rates and the share of retirees 
are mixed. We find both the coefficients (linear and quadratic) positive in column 3 whereas the 
correlation is found to be inverted U-shape in column 7. These are inconsistent with the 
hypothesis of this chapter as well as Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). However, in columns 4 and 
8 (where all control variables are included) we find a U-shaped association consistent with our 
proposition and Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). The inverted U-shape association between 
labor income tax rate and the share of retirees may be the manifestation of grey power and 
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diminishing returns. We also test for the structural break at the threshold identified by the 
theory. It is found that structural break exists in all columns of Table 2.4. 
     Few of the variables used in the analysis are non-stationary which may cause results to be 
spurious. For example; both the average income tax and the dependency ratios are bound to 
contain unit roots. To investigate which variables are stationary and which ones contain unit 
roots, we apply Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test, following Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). Applying this 
test, we fail to reject the hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots except GDP growth per 
capita. The Im-Pesaran-Shin test rejects the null hypothesis which means that we cannot reject 
alternate hypothesis which means some panels are stationary. There are problems with 
inference which can be caused if non-stationarity is not dealt with properly. With the presence 
of unit roots in the data, the standard assumption of asymptotic analysis becomes invalid. 
Moreover, the persistence of shocks is infinite if the data are not stationary. To deal with this 
problem, we difference the data of variables such as labor income tax rate, total tax revenue as a 
share of GDP, population aging 65 and above, population aging zero to fourteen, trade as a share 
of GDP, unemployment rate, income inequality and GDP per capita. Whilst differencing the data 
satisfies stationarity properties, some information is lost in the process. The reason to use the 
IPS test is that it developed a set of tests that relax the assumption of a common autoregressive 
parameter across the panel. In addition, it does not require balanced datasets, and data 
availability varies by country. Having controlled for non-stationarity, we replicate the panel data 
analysis with first difference estimation. 
     Table 2.5 reports the estimates in first differences (all variables are differenced but GDP 
growth per capita). In all columns (3, 4, 7 and 8) where we test for non-linearity, the estimated 
correlation between labor income tax rates and the share of retirees in all cases found to be 
insignificant. Differencing loses some information in the data which might account for this. 
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     Furthermore, there are variables such as economic growth, unemployment rate and trade in 
our model that may be endogenous. For example, higher economic growth may decrease the 
level of unemployment. On the contrary, reverse causation may also be possible. Higher trade 
may raise GDP whereas vice versa is also possible. The endogeneity issue needs to be dealt with 
properly. Therefore, we take two lags of three variables, GDP growth, trade and unemployment, 
and use them as instrumental variables in empirical analysis to control for endogeneity. The 
endogeneity problem can arise from many causes such as simultaneity, omitted variable bias 
and measurement error. For example, that higher GDP growth and unemployment may 
simultaneously affect each other. Further analysis is extended using 2SLS estimation (taking 2 
lags of trade, GDP growth and unemployment rate) to control for endogeneity issue that may 
arise because of simultaneous determination of the dependent variable and explanatory 
variables. In the presence of endogeneity, OLS yields inconsistent estimates. 
     Column 1 of Table 2.6 reports results with 2SLS estimation to control for possible endogeneity 
whereas column 2 reports results with 2SLS and first difference estimation to control for both 
possible endogeneity and non-stationarity. We use the specification in column 8 in previous 
tables as it involves all the control variables. There is some support rendered to the theory and 
Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) by the estimated coefficients of the share of retirees as the 
correlation between them is found to be U-shaped in both columns. The estimated thresholds 
for both the columns are 15.91 and 20.82 respectively although statistical significance is again 
low in this quite demanding specification. 
     Here, we summarize how changes in the composition of demographic structure affects labor 
income tax rates. We find U-shaped relation between income tax rates and the share of retirees 
consistently except in Table 2.5 where the estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
Even when we difference the data and address the endogeneity issues, the estimated 
correlation is found to support our theory and Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). Throughout the 
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tables, from Table 2.4 to Table 2.6, the estimated benchmark for U-shaped association is found 
within the range of 15% to 35%.10 Moreover, the thresholds are closer to our theory when we 
control for endogeneity and unit root issues in the data. 
     Subsequently, we investigate how change in youth dependency ratio affects labor income tax 
rates. Razin and Sadka (2007) propose that young (working labor) receive higher share of total 
transfers when the share of children (youth dependency ratio) rises over time. This 
supplementary rise in transfers towards the children does not affect transfers from the labor to 
the retirees that aging causes. Besides, payroll tax is not the only source to finance direct 
transfers and, in practice, by and large the labor income tax rate does not discriminate between 
young and elderly dependent population. Thus, young families with many children may join the 
retirees and support anti-tax policies initially. Nevertheless, they may support for larger welfare 
state once they form half the total voters. 
     In next Table 2.7, the estimated relationship between labor income tax rate and the share of 
youth is estimated to be U-shaped when we apply 2SLS estimation. However, the relationship is 
found to suggest an inverted U-shape when 2SLS in first difference estimation is applied. The 
later finding is also statistically significant at 10%. The estimated benchmark in column 1 is 
13.58% whereas, in the next column, it is 18.69%. In summary, we find a quite contrasting result 
when the data are differenced. This may again suggest the loss of information while controlling 
for the presence of unit roots in the data. 
 
2.5.2) Empirical analysis of the Size of the Government 
     In this subsection we regress total tax revenue as a share of GDP, measuring the size of the 
government, on the shareof retirees and control variables following Razin, Sadka and Swagel 
                                                          
10 These estimated thresholds are taken from columns where all the control variables are included along with main variable under 
investigation. 
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(2002). The old may be more concerned about the overall expenditures rather than labor income 
tax rates only. Except taking a different dependent variable, there is no difference from the 
analysis in the previous subsection. 
     In column 1 and column 2 of Table 2.8 the estimated coefficient for the share of retirees are 
positive though statistically insignificant.These implythat a 1% rise in the share of retirees would 
enlarge the size of the government by 0.12%. This finding is not consistent with Razin, Sadka and 
Swagel (2002) as a higher share of retired population means an addition in the pro-tax coalition 
to finance total redistribution. Thus, a positive correlation between the two variables may exist. 
     Columns 3 and 4 assess the non-linearity in the relationship between the size of government 
and the share of retirees. The estimated coefficients of the share of retirees suggest a U-shaped 
relation between tax revenue as a share of GDP and the relative size ofretired population. Both 
the coefficients hold significance at 1%. These findings substantially support our theory and the 
hypothesis proposed in Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) though with a different dependent 
variable. Both columns report the threshold at 16.73% and 17.72% respectively. 
     In columns 5 to 8, log real GDP per capita is included to account for the difference in the level 
of economic development across the sample as before. Our theory and Razin, Sadka and Swagel 
(2002) seek considerable support from the estimated coefficients of the share of retirees in 
column 7 and column 8. A U-shaped association is again found between labor income tax rates 
and the share of retirees. A rise in the share of retirees leads to decrease the size of government 
initially, nevertheless, both the variables are found to be associated positively once the retirees 
constitute 17.5% of the total population. In column 8, the estimated threshold increases to 
18.62%.  Both linear and quadratic coefficients are strongly significant at 1% in both the 
columns. 
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     To be precise, the findings in Table 2.8 strongly support the theory proposed in this chapter as 
well as the hypothesis of Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). However, we use a different 
dependent variable as opposed to labor income tax rates. Throughout the table the benchmark 
lies within the range of 17% to 19%. There is again strong evidence found for structural break in 
the data. 
     As before, Table 2.9 reports our findings applying OLS in first differences. All the columns that 
investigate the non-linear correlation between the government size and the share of retirees are 
found to report an inverted U-shape association between the two variables. Nevertheless, the 
estimated coefficients are not statistically significant in any column. 
     Table 2.10 reports the results with 2SLS as well as 2SLS in first difference estimation. The 
estimated relationship between the government size and the share of retirees is U-shaped and 
strongly significant at 1% in column 1. Controlling for endogeneity bias provides us with better 
estimated as the coefficients retain statistical significance. Moreover, the estimated threshold is 
19.08%. When we apply 2SLS in first differences as reported in the next column, the result does 
not change. A U-shaped correlation between revenue as a share of GDP and the fraction of old is 
found though statistically insignificant. The benchmark is found to be 20.46%. These both 
findings substantially support, though the dependent variable used is different, our theory and 
Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). 
     Overall, we find notable support for the theory we develop as well as for the argument 
proposed in Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) though the dependent variable is different. The 
findings with regards to the size of government are found to be consistently U-shaped with all 
estimation techniques we use except OLS in first difference estimation. It may imply that the 
retirees are concerned more about overall expenditures as opposed to only labor income tax 
rates. 
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     Comparing the results relating to labor income tax rate and the government size, it can be 
safely argued that the findings regarding the government size support the empirical analysis with 
labor taxes. Moreover, the significance levels improve when we analyse the relation between 
the government size and the old. 
     Empirical analysis taking youth dependency ratio is also replicated for the government size. 
Again, as before, Table 2.11 reports results with 2SLS and 2SLS in first difference estimation. In 
column 1, the coefficients are found to be U-shaped and are strongly significant. A rise in the 
share of youth leads to a decrease in labor income tax rate initially. Nonetheless, the association 
between the two variables changes into positive once the share of youth attains a certain 
threshold.  On the other hand, column 2 finds the relation between the government size and the 
share of youth to be an inverted U-shape. 
 
2.5.3)   Test for the Structural Break 
     All the variables included in the analysis are found to be non-stationary except GDP growth 
per capita when we applied the Im-Pesaran-Shin test. The results of the analysis in levels are 
therefore likely to be spurious. Therefore,we re-estimate the analysis in first differences, and 
test for structural break for the share of retirees at the threshold identified by the median value 
of population aging 65 and above which is 15.841. We did not test for the threshold identified by 
the theory in this chapter since the share of retirees in the population is already beyond that 
threshold. To test structural break we apply Chow test following Chow (1960). The Chow test is 
simply a test of whether the coefficients estimated over one group of the data are equal to the 
coefficients estimated over another. In our case, we aim to reject the null hypothesis of Chow 
test that there is no structural break. 
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     Table 2.12 reports the results for specifications used to assess structural break. Columns 1-3 
report coefficients for labor income tax rate whereas columns 4-6 report results for the 
government size. We only run specification in column 8 of previous tables applying 2SLS and 
2SLS in first differences as it is the preferred specification for it includes all control variables. 
Applying the Chow test, we reject the null hypothesis – there is no structural break. Thus, there 
exists a structural break in the coefficients estimated over one group of the data to coefficients 
over other group of data. In Table 2.12, it can be seen that the coefficient estimates in column 2 
(where pop65above<=15.841) indicate a positively linear correlation between labor income tax 
rates and the share of retirees. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients in column 3 (where 
pop65above>15.841) are found to indicate a U-shaped association between the two variables. 
Similarly, column 2 for the size of government is found to suggest an inverted U-shape 
correlation whereas column 3 is found to be U-shaped. 
 
2.5.4)   Extension of the Sample Size        
     In addition, we also enlarge the sample size to 16 countries by including Greece, 
Luxembourg and Switzerland. Everything else except addition of countries is unchanged. 
Moreover, we run our preferred specification (column 8 in previous tables) because it 
includes all control variables. 
     In columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.13, we report the results investigating how changes in the 
demographic structure are associated with labor income tax rates. As before, we apply 2SLS 
estimation in column 1 and 2SLS in first difference in column 2. The results acquired with larger 
sample reconcile with the findings of smaller sample, the theory developed in this chapter and 
Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) as we find a U-shaped correlation between labor income tax 
rates and the share of retirees in population. Furthermore, the thresholds are estimated to be 
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19.46% (column 1) and 19.97% (column 2) which are closer to the benchmark advanced in the 
theory. 
     Column 3 (2sls) and 4 (2SLS+FD) report coefficient estimates related to the size of 
government, measured by total tax revenue as a share of GDP. In both these columns the 
estimated coefficients are found to suggest a U-shaped correlation between labor income tax 
rate and the relative size of retired population. These results again support the theory, Razin, 
Sadka and Swagel (2002) and findings of smaller sample. The thresholds estimated in column 3 
and column 4 (18.99% and 17.33% respectively) are also closer to the theory developed in this 
chapter than what Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) proposed. 
     Whilst comparing the findings of smaller sample with larger sample, we conclude that there is 
no substantial change between the two. We find the relation between labor income tax rate and 
the old as well as the relation between the government size and the old to be U-shaped.      
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2.6) Conclusion 
     This chapter explored how changes in demography affect fiscal policy. The dependent 
variables include the average labor income tax rates and total tax revenue as a share of GDP. 
Using family-based voting and assuming possible empathy for the old within families we redefine 
the theoretical argument of Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002). We argue that a negative 
relationship between labor income tax rates and the retirees as a fraction of total population 
would change into positive once the aged population represents 8.4% of the total voters.   
     The theory is tested empirically using the average labor income tax rates. The empirical 
findings are fragile unlike in Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) who do not distinguish between the 
young and the old. Our theory and the hypothesis proposed in Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) 
are supported with OLS, 2SLS and 2SLS in first difference estimations to the extent that the 
relation between labor income tax rate and the share of retirees is found to be U-shaped.11 The 
thresholds are estimated to be closer to what our theory predicts. 
     We also extend the empirical analysis for the share of youth. A u-shaped association is again 
found with 2SLS estimation. Nonetheless, the relationship is found to be an inverted U-shape 
when we difference the data. 
     The old people may be more concerned about their overall expenditures as opposed to labor 
income tax rates only. Previous empirical analysis is replicated taking total tax revenue, 
measuring the government size, as dependent variable. As before, the association between labor 
income tax rate and the old is estimated to be U-shaped with OLS, 2SLS and 2SLS in first 
difference estimations and statistical significance also improves. With regards to youth, results 
do not considerably change. 
                                                          
11These refer to last column of each table since they include all control variables 
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     The empirical analysis is extended taking a larger sample size that consists of 16 OECD 
countries. The results still support the theory as well as previous results of smaller sample. 
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Table 2.3: Labor Income Tax Rate 
          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Dependency Ratio 1.419 0.620 -47.539 -39.719 0.920 0.193 -59.021 -51.662 
 
(0.875) (0.471) (25.588)* (29.126) (0.915) (0.691) (25.754)** (35.45) 
Dependency Ratio Square 
  
0.731 0.607 
  
0.899 0.788 
   
(0.383)* (0.437) 
  
(0.383)** (0.535) 
Trade/GDP -0.074 -0.056 -0.079 -0.086 -0.107 -0.060 -0.126 -0.117 
 
(0.072) (0.056) (0.058) (0.052) (0.087) (0.059) (0.060)* (0.055)* 
GDP Growth 0.068 0.172 0.019 0.153 0.241 0.261 0.190 0.186 
 
(0.159) (0.165) (0.141) (0.136) (0.223) (0.220) (0.195) (0.180) 
Inequality 0.319 -0.081 0.066 -0.181 0.316 -0.038 -0.029 -0.180 
 
(0.453) (0.231) (0.340) (0.163) (0.399) (0.259) (0.237) (0.205) 
Unemployment 
 
0.156 
 
0.265 
 
0.020 
 
0.260 
  
(0.163) 
 
(0.189) 
 
(0.156) 
 
(0.213) 
Log(GDP per capita) 
    
-15.767 -13.281 -12.948 -3.583 
     
(11.096) (12.207) (9.444) (12.44) 
Observations 286 255 286 255 260 236 260 236 
R-squared 0.946 0.957 0.951 0.960 0.954 0.958 0.962 0.961 
 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of average Labor Income Tax Rate including Trade/GDP, GDP Growth, Inequality, Unemployment and log(GDP per capita) as control variables. Robust standard errors are reported 
in the parenthesis. Regressions control for time and country fixed effects which are not shown though. Errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 2.4: Labor Income Tax Rate 
          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Retirees 1.542 0.632 1.081 -4.498 1.186 0.269 2.358 -3.057 
 
(0.886) (0.515) (5.157) (3.375) (0.850) (0.511) (5.031) (3.282) 
Retirees Square 
  
0.013 0.142 
  
-0.034 0.093 
   
(0.125) (0.089) 
  
(0.131) (0.092) 
Children 0.876 0.384 0.861 0.161 0.547 0.156 0.582 0.020 
 
(0.869) (0.657) (0.940) (0.642) (1.017) (0.899) (1.057) (0.831) 
Trade/GDP -0.087 -0.060 -0.085 -0.044 -0.125 -0.065 -0.129 -0.048 
 
(0.071) (0.071) (0.080) (0.070) (0.088) (0.070) (0.095) (0.076) 
GDP Growth 0.022 0.148 0.022 0.167 0.228 0.255 0.233 0.244 
 
(0.174) (0.170) (0.175) (0.164) (0.225) (0.210) (0.231) (0.217) 
Inequality 0.410 -0.045 0.413 -0.054 0.447 -0.009 0.448 -0.046 
 
(0.465) (0.343) (0.459) (0.316) (0.457) (0.390) (0.458) (0.369) 
Unemployment 
 
0.162 
 
0.173 
 
0.027 
 
0.032 
  
(0.174) 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.158) 
 
(0.152) 
Log(GDP per capita) 
    
-14.994 -12.819 -15.450 -11.631 
     
(11.152) (11.134) (12.504) (11.17) 
Threshold 41.57 .015   34.67 16.43 
Observations 286 255 286 255 260 236 260 236 
R-squared 0.946 0.956 0.946 0.958 0.955 0.958 0.955 0.958 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of average Labor Income Tax Rate including Trade/GDP, GDP Growth, Inequality, Unemployment and log(GDP per capita) as control variables. Robust standard errors are reported 
in the parenthesis. Regressions control for time and country fixed effects which are not shown though. Errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 2.5: Labor Income Tax Rate 
          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
OLS+FD OLS+FD OLS+FD OLS+FD OLS+FD OLS+FD OLS+FD OLS+FD 
Retirees  -0.319 0.289 7.245 11.648 0.227 0.482 12.852 16.078 
 
(0.866) (1.148) (9.373) (11.003) (1.359) (1.365) (16.696) (16.986) 
Retirees Square  
  
-0.227 -0.340 
  
-0.364 -0.447 
   
(0.278) (0.314) 
  
(0.475) (0.476) 
Children  -0.349 -0.389 -0.293 -0.337 -0.335 -0.533 0.424 0.372 
 
(0.283) (0.355) (0.329) (0.447) (0.943) (1.071) (1.055) (1.201) 
Trade/GDP  0.007 -0.000 0.002 -0.005 -0.003 -0.008 0.001 -0.015 
 
(0.047) (0.052) (0.050) (0.056) (0.024) (0.055) (0.053) (0.060) 
GDP Growth  0.101 0.078 0.101 0.076 0.130 0.153 0.130 0.165 
 
(0.070) (0.093) (0.071) (0.094) (0.086) (0.120) (0.082) (0.127) 
Inequality -0.043 -0.135 -0.094 -0.224 -0.116 -0.180 -0.199 -0.286 
 
(0.099) (0.134) (0.131) (0.182) (0.145) (0.167) (0.224) (0.234) 
Unemployment  
 
-0.096 
 
-0.105 
 
-0.210 
 
-0.237 
  
(0.125) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.142) 
 
(0.152) 
Log(GDP per capita)  
    
-5.502 -14.524 -4.336 -13.643 
     
(10.780) (9.343) (8.350) (10.078) 
Threshold  15.95 17.12   17.65 17.98 
Observations 273 243 273 243 247 224 247 224 
R-squared 0.152 0.162 0.157 0.173 0.149 0.170 0.156 0.182 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of average Labor Income Tax Rate including Trade/GDP, GDP Growth, Inequality, Unemployment and log(GDP per capita) as control variables. Robust standard errors are reported 
in the parenthesis. Regressions control for time and country fixed effects which are not shown though. Errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots applying Im-Pesaran-Shin test. 
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Table 2.6: Labor Income Tax Rate 
    (1) (2) 
 
2SLS  2SLS+FD 
Retirees -0.923 -93.052 
 
(3.494) (652.868) 
Retirees Square 0.029 2.234 
 
(0.091) (15.520) 
Children 0.531 -0.562 
 
(0.800) (12.854) 
Trade/GDP -0.126 3.846 
 
(0.106) (25.529) 
GDP Growth 1.186 1.023 
 
(0.519)** (8.422) 
Inequality -0.063 1.609 
 
(0.344) (13.154) 
Unemployment -0.055 -5.099 
 
(0.165) (40.715) 
Log(GDP per capita) -15.977 -306.624 
 
(11.936) (2,346.136) 
Threshold 15.91 20.82 
Observations 224 212 
R-squared 0.956 0.947 
  
  NOTES: Cross country regressions of average Labor Income Tax Rate including Trade/GDP, GDP Growth, Inequality, Unemployment and log(GDP per capita) as control variables. Robust standard errors are reported 
in the parenthesis. Regressions control for time and country fixed effects which are not shown though. Errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots applying Im-Pesaran-Shin test. In addition, due to endogeneity between, trade, unemployment rate and GDP growth, two lags of these variables are 
taken to use as instrumental variables. 
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Table 2.7: Labor Income Tax Rate 
    (1) (2) 
 
2SLS  2SLS+FD 
Children -1.902 118.765 
 
(5.711) (522.477) 
Children Square 0.070 -3.177 
 
(0.157) (14.043) 
Retirees -0.056 -2.128 
 
(0.798) (20.088) 
Trade/GDP -0.149 2.771 
 
(0.077)* (12.297) 
GDP Growth 1.306 0.877 
 
(0.456)*** (4.706) 
Inequality -0.023 0.446 
 
(0.296) (3.434) 
Unemployment -0.045 -4.809 
 
(0.177) (25.385) 
Log(GDP per capita) -16.943 -233.074 
 
(10.797) (1,206.532) 
Observations 224 212 
R-squared 0.954 118.765 
  
  NOTES: Cross country regressions of average Labor Income Tax Rate including Trade/GDP, GDP Growth, Inequality, Unemployment and log(GDP per capita) as control variables. Robust standard errors are reported 
in the parenthesis. Regressions control for time and country fixed effects which are not shown though. Errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots applying Im-Pesaran-Shin test. In addition, due to endogeneity between, trade, unemployment rate and GDP growth, two lags of these variables are 
taken to use as instrumental variables. 
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Table 2.8: Government Size 
          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
Retirees 0.121 0.120 -6.292 -7.126 -0.060 -0.329 -6.825 -7.712 
 
(0.265) (0.350) (1.572)*** (1.957)*** (0.395) (0.418) (1.551)*** (1.559)*** 
Retirees Square 
  
0.182 0.201 
  
0.195 0.207 
   
(0.042)*** (0.054)*** 
  
(0.040)*** (0.042)*** 
Children -0.105 -0.135 -0.321 -0.450 -0.278 -0.504 -0.479 -0.807 
 
(0.484) (0.433) (0.428) (0.400) (0.662) (0.563) (0.547) (0.470) 
Trade/GDP -0.034 -0.042 -0.021 -0.019 -0.050 -0.043 -0.028 -0.004 
 
(0.031) (0.045) (0.026) (0.031) (0.033) (0.042) (0.029) (0.030) 
GDP Growth -0.108 -0.112 -0.101 -0.085 -0.031 -0.004 -0.055 -0.030 
 
(0.096) (0.118) (0.090) (0.125) (0.127) (0.152) (0.125) (0.149) 
Inequality 0.115 0.108 0.160 0.096 0.186 0.182 0.183 0.100 
 
(0.228) (0.282) (0.203) (0.224) (0.272) (0.304) (0.237) (0.240) 
Unemployment 
 
-0.165 
 
-0.151 
 
-0.279 
 
-0.267 
  
(0.113) 
 
(0.096) 
 
(0.080)*** 
 
(0.076)*** 
Log(GDP per capita) 
    
-5.326 -12.688 -2.699 -10.051 
     
(8.152) (7.908) (5.776) (4.993)* 
Threshold 16.73 17.72   17.5 18.62 
Observations 285 255 285 255 260 236 260 236 
R-squared 0.960 0.963 0.966 0.971 0.963 0.966 0.968 0.971 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of Government Size, measured by tax revenue as a share of GDP, including Trade/GDP, GDP Growth, Inequality, Unemployment and log(GDP per capita) as control variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Regressions control for time and country fixed effects which are not shown though. Errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance 
levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 2.9: Government Size 
          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
OLS+FD OLS+FD OLS+FD OLS+FD OLS+FD OLS+FD OLS+FD OLS+FD 
Retirees  -0.146 -0.053 1.784 2.394 -0.481 -0.299 0.989 2.588 
 
(0.357) (0.475) (4.903) (4.599) (0.719) (0.599) (6.394) (6.600) 
Retirees Square  
  
-0.058 -0.073 
  
-0.035 -0.083 
   
(0.148) (0.134) 
  
(0.187) (0.192) 
Children  -0.291 -0.305 -0.276 -0.294 -0.553 -0.541 -0.415 -0.373 
 
(0.143)* (0.149)* (0.129)* (0.159)* (0.512) (0.527) (0.410) (0.413) 
Trade/GDP  0.002 0.017 0.001 0.016 0.013 0.015 0.003 0.014 
 
(0.018) (0.027) (0.017) (0.027) (0.013) (0.028) (0.020) (0.028) 
GDP Growth  -0.152 -0.182 -0.152 -0.182 -0.183 -0.139 -0.191 -0.137 
 
(0.047)*** (0.055)*** (0.046)*** (0.054)*** (0.066)** (0.062)** (0.068)** (0.064)* 
Inequality -0.081 -0.080 -0.095 -0.100 -0.088 -0.084 -0.100 -0.103 
 
(0.038)* (0.055) (0.050)* (0.075) (0.049)* (0.067) (0.079) (0.096) 
Unemployment  
 
-0.193 
 
-0.195 
 
-0.278 
 
-0.283 
  
(0.086)** 
 
(0.086)** 
 
(0.090)** 
 
(0.087)*** 
Log(GDP per capita) 
    
2.264 -10.371 4.904 -10.208 
     
(5.447) (2.953)*** (5.513) (3.124)*** 
Threshold 15.37 16.39   14.12 15.59 
Observations 272 243 272 243 247 224 247 224 
R-squared 0.276 0.327 0.277 0.329 0.280 0.325 0.276 0.326 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of Government Size, measured by tax revenue as a share of GDP, including Trade/GDP, GDP Growth, Inequality, Unemployment and log(GDP per capita) as control variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Regressions control for time and country fixed effects which are not shown though. Errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance 
levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots applying Im-Pesaran-Shin test. 
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Table 2.10: Government Size 
    (1) (2) 
 
2SLS  2SLS+FD 
Retirees -7.556 -39.907 
 
(1.455)*** (253.856) 
Retirees Square 0.198 0.975 
 
(0.038)*** (6.047) 
Children -0.583 -0.638 
 
(0.356) (4.848) 
Trade/GDP -0.029 1.441 
 
(0.048) (9.839) 
GDP Growth 0.392 0.091 
 
(0.363) (3.190) 
Inequality 0.101 0.615 
 
(0.233) (5.078) 
Unemployment -0.329 -1.881 
 
(0.086)*** (15.646) 
Log(GDP per capita) -11.802 -106.371 
 
(7.264) (902.097) 
Threshold 19.08 20.46 
Observations 224 212 
R-squared 0.971  0.85 
  
  NOTES: Cross country regressions of Government Size, measured by tax revenue as a share of GDP, including Trade/GDP, GDP Growth, Inequality, Unemployment and log(GDP per capita) as control variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Regressions control for time and country fixed effects which are not shown though. Errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance 
levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots applying Im-Pesaran-Shin test. In addition, due to endogeneity between, trade, unemployment rate and GDP growth, two lags of these variables are 
taken to use as instrumental variables. 
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Table 2.11: Government Size 
    (1) (2) 
 
2SLS  2SLS+FD 
Children -9.680 56.043 
 
(2.746)*** (354.323) 
Children Square 0.264 -1.492 
 
(0.073)*** (9.516) 
Retirees -1.082 -3.108 
 
(0.351)*** (12.322) 
Trade/GDP -0.132 0.366 
 
(0.049)*** (2.307) 
GDP Growth 0.839 1.689 
 
(0.353)** (8.211) 
Inequality 0.281 0.280 
 
(0.187) (3.097) 
Unemployment -0.279 -2.978 
 
(0.115)** (17.149) 
Log(GDP per capita) -16.363 -140.941 
 
(7.232)** (812.666) 
Observations 224 212 
R-squared 0.960  0.927 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of Government Size, measured by tax revenue as a share of GDP, including Trade/GDP, GDP Growth, Inequality, Unemployment and log(GDP per capita) as control variables. Robust 
standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Regressions control for time and country fixed effects which are not shown though. Errors are clustered by country. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance 
levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots applying Im-Pesaran-Shin test. In addition, due to endogeneity between, trade, unemployment rate and GDP growth, two lags of these variables are 
taken to use as instrumental variables. 
 
 
 
70 
 
 
 
Table 2.12: Labor Income Tax Rate Labor Income Tax Rate Labor Income Tax Rate Government Size Government Size Government Size 
 2SLS+FD 2SLS+FD 2SLS+FD 2SLS+FD 2SLS+FD 2SLS+FD 
Retirees  -93.05 9.95 -17.17 -39.90 25.73 -9.41 
 
(652.86) (99.12) (21.57) (253.85) (51.55) (5.10)* 
Retirees Square  2.23 0.18 0.46 0.97 -0.98 0.24 
 
(15.52) (3.70) (0.57) (6.04) (2.11) (0.11)** 
Children  -0.56 5.43 0.39 -0.63 -2.42 -2.54 
 
(12.85) (18.14) (5.04) (4.84) (11.50) (1.30)* 
Trade/GDP  3.84 -0.22 0.61 1.44 0.22 0.04 
 
(25.52) (0.38) (0.24)** (9.83) (0.31) (0.09) 
GDP Growth  1.02 0.14 -0.10 0.09 -0.26 -0.26 
 
(8.42) (1.25) (0.25) (3.18) (0.53) (0.11)** 
Unemployment  -5.09 2.02 -0.09 -1.88 -0.31 0.02 
 
(40.71) (5.73) (0.88) (15.64) (3.62) (0.14) 
Inequality 1.60 -1.04 1.46 0.61 -0.17 -0.08 
 
(13.15) (0.71) (1.12) (5.07) (0.53) (0.35) 
Log(GDP per capita)  -306.62 79.01 -0.41 -106.37 -7.46 1.06 
 
(2,346.14) (294.13) (30.24) (902.09) (186.31) (12.54) 
Observations 212 114 98 212 114 98 
R-squared 0.947 0.43 0.34 0.927 0.209 0.314 
Structural Break Full pop65above<=15.841 pop65above>15.841 Full pop65above<=15.841 pop65above>15.841 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of average Labor Income Tax Rate and Government Size, measured by tax revenue as a share of GDP, including Trade/GDP, GDP Growth, Inequality, Unemployment and log(GDP 
per capita) as control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Regressions control for time and country fixed effects which are not shown though. Errors are clustered by country. *, ** and 
*** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
The specification assesses the structural break applying Chow test. 15.841 is the median value for the share of retirees. Moreover, all the specifications involve 2SLS and first difference estimation to control for 
endogeneity and unit roots. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots applying Im-Pesaran-Shin test. In addition, due to endogeneity between, trade, unemployment rate and GDP growth, two lags of these variables are 
taken to use as instrumental variables. 
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Table 2.13: Labor Income Tax Rate Labor Income Tax Rate Government Size Government Size 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2SLS 2SLS+FD 2SLS 2SLS+FD 
Retirees -3.931 -3.476 -8.282 -7.697 
 
(2.211)* (7.438) (1.512)*** (5.581) 
Retirees Square 0.101 0.087 0.218 0.222 
 
(0.066) (0.224) (0.040)*** (0.164) 
Children 0.123 -0.413 -0.441 -0.992 
 
(0.619) (1.559) (0.351) (0.624) 
Trade/GDP 0.001 0.163 -0.001 -0.047 
 
(0.042) (0.195) (0.025) (0.046) 
GDP Growth 0.799 0.346 0.434 -0.358 
 
(0.556) (0.255) (0.359) (0.145)** 
Inequality -0.079 -0.031 0.060 -0.095 
 
(0.334) (0.116) (0.215) (0.043)** 
Unemployment -0.032 -0.018 -0.295 0.316 
 
(0.141) (0.351) (0.089)*** (0.281) 
Log(GDP per capita) -13.391 -13.638 -8.179 11.193 
 (10.538) (13.990) (6.317) (5.383)** 
Threshold 19.46 19.97 18.99 17.33 
Observations 240 228 240 228 
R-squared 0.971 0.27 0.965 0.025 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of average Labor Income Tax Rate and Government Size, measured by tax revenue as a share of GDP, including Trade/GDP, GDP Growth, Inequality, Unemployment and log(GDP 
per capita) as control variables. Robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Regressions control for time and country fixed effects which are not shown though. Errors are clustered by country. *, ** and 
*** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
The sample size is extended to 16 OECD countries including Greece, Luxembourg and Switzerland. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots applying Im-Pesaran-Shin test. In addition, due to endogeneity between, trade, unemployment rate and GDP growth, two lags of these variables are 
taken to use as instrumental variables. 
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Chapter 3 
Inequality and the composition of taxes 
 
 
3.1) Introduction 
     What determines fiscal policy in democracies? A canonical theoretical result derived by 
Meltzer and Richard (1981), building on Romer (1975), is that the size of government increases 
with the degree of inequality in the pre-tax income distribution. 
     Cross country evidence testing the Meltzer and Richard (1981) hypothesis is predominantly 
unsupportive. For example Perotti (1996), Bassett et al (1999) and Persson and Tabellini (2003) 
all find that the size of government is either insignificantly and/or negatively related to measures 
of inequality. In response, new theories have emerged through which high levels of inequality 
can coexist with small government under democracy.12Benabou and Ok (2001) advanced the 
possibility that the prospect of upward income mobility may limit the demand for redistribution 
under rational expectations. Nonetheless, the `Great Gatsby curve' (Krueger, 2012) undermines 
this argument somewhat as a full reconciliation with the data. 
     In the cross-country context there are many potential determinants of the total size of 
government, beyond the income distribution. Socioeconomic, historical and institutional 
differences may account for observed differences in government size, and indeed undoubtedly 
                                                          
12For example Persson (1995) and Benabou (2000). 
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also co-determine differences in the income distribution. The broader literature on the size of 
government catalogues income levels (Wagner's law, analyzed in Ram, 1987), ideology (Pickering 
and Rockey, 2011), demographic change (Razin et al 2002), openness (Rodrik, 1998), country size 
(Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998) and fragmentation (Alesina et al, 1999). Public choice theory 
characterizes the size of government as the outcome of the power of a bureaucracy that has the 
capacity to sustain itself (Niskanen, 1974), which also may differ across institutional settings. 
Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Persson et al (2000) stress the importance of constitutional 
rules in determining government size. Shelton (2007) provides an extensive survey and 
examination of this literature. 
     Consequently an alternative empirical literature instead focusses on testing the hypothesis 
within countries. Meltzer and Richard (1983) found some support for their hypothesis using data 
from the US states, and relatedly Alesina et al (2000) found that public employment was higher 
in US cities with greater levels of inequality. Borge and Rattsø (2004) found that the tax burden 
shifts from poll taxes to property taxes with greater income inequality across Norwegian local 
governments. 
     This chapter revisits international evidence, but first asks a different, but basic, question: how 
does inequality affect the composition of taxes? Arguably total expenditure (and therefore total 
taxation under a balanced budget) is determined institutionally, or more generally by factors 
other than the income distribution listed above. But the total size of government is not the only 
policy lever. Even if the size of the public sector is taken as given, governments still face 
unresolved questions on the appropriate composition of taxes. Perhaps the most basic question 
here is the extent to which government raise taxes on income as opposed to expenditure. 
Indeed Crawford et al (2010) write that "(t)he appropriate balance between direct and indirect 
taxation --- between income taxes and taxes on goods and services --- is one of the oldest issues 
in public finance, but still imperfectly understood." There is of course an enormous literature 
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analysing optimal taxation, beginning with Diamond and Mirrlees (1971a & b), but relatively 
little in the way of a positive analysis of the political economics of the tax composition decision. 
     A related literature examines the adoption of particular tax instruments, both historically 
(Aidt and Jensen, 2009a and 2009b) and as an outcome or indeed a driver of the development 
process (Keen and Lockwood, 2010; Besley and Persson, 2014). However, this literature 
generally neglects the impact of inequality on the adoption process. 
     In this chapter the composition of taxes is determined in a simple median voter framework. 
Taxes may be levied on income, or on expenditure. There are different tax collection costs (or 
deadweight losses) associated with both, but income taxes are more effective at redistributing 
than expenditure taxes. Because the median voter's income is less than their expenditure, a 
given level of additional redistribution costs more to them in consumption terms when financed 
by expenditure taxes than by income taxes. In the theoretical framework the preferred policy of 
the median voter is the unique Condorcet winner, despite the fact there are two policy 
instruments, because across individuals the ideal policy mix is still unidimensional in income.13 
The results relating to income taxes are familiar. As with Meltzer and Richard (1981) greater 
inequality monotonically leads to higher income taxes. The results relating to expenditure taxes 
are novel. At low levels of inequality, increases in inequality also lead to higher expenditure tax 
rates because these are also redistributive (because the rich spend more than the poor hence 
pay more taxes), and at low tax levels the deadweight losses are relatively small. However, once 
inequality passes some threshold level, then there is a stronger desire for redistribution, even if 
this comes at the price of greater deadweight income-tax losses. The median voter now 
substitutes expenditure taxes for income taxes. Nonetheless, an unambiguous finding is that the 
composition of taxes, defined as the extent to which taxes are levied on income relative to 
expenditure, theoretically always rises with inequality. 
                                                          
13 This is the condition of ‘intermediate preferences’ identified by Grandmont (1978), also used by Borge and Rattso (2004). 
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     Cross-country data measuring the extent to which taxes are levied on earnings relative to 
expenditure exhibit a robust positive correlation with inequality. This stands in contrast to the 
evidence testing the standard Meltzer and Richard (1981) hypothesis related to total 
government size. Moreover income taxes as a percentage of total taxes increase, whilst taxes on 
expenditure as a percentage of total taxes fall with increased inequality. The magnitude of the 
estimated effects is quite large. A one-standard deviation increase in inequality is associated 
with an increase in the ratio of taxes collected from income to taxes collected from expenditure 
of around half a standard deviation. These statistical relationships hold most significantly in 
countries with higher levels of democracy, in support of the mechanism proposed in this paper. 
     In addition, we find an inverted U-shape correlation between income taxes and inequality 
though the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant. This supports our theory, 
Figure 3.1 and the non-linear findings related to indirect taxes. Since income taxes are assumed 
to be more effective at redistribution, at higher level of inequality more redistribution is 
financed using income taxes. 
     We also formulate tentative hypotheses related to budget deficits and public debt as shares 
of GDP. Based on the voters’ myopia a rise in equality may lead to higher deficits and debt as the 
opportunist politicians may increase redistribution by increasing deficits and debt levels. 
Empirical findings lend considerable support to tentative hypotheses. 
     Beside cross sectional data analysis, we also repeat non-linear analysis with panel data. The 
findings related to income and expenditure taxes support our theory and cross section 
estimation for weaker democracies. Similarly, non-linear estimation of direct taxes is estimated 
to conflict with our theory. Nevertheless, we find an inverted U-shape correlation between 
indirect taxes and income inequality which substantially supports our model and results with 
cross-sectional analysis for full samples and stronger democracies. 
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     The coefficient estimates related to public debt support our hypothesis whereas budget 
deficits are found to suggest negative relation with income inequality. A rise in equality increases 
public debt for the full sample, stronger and weaker democracies. 
     We do some robustness checks due to non-stationarity of some variables. The empirical 
estimation is replicated using first difference estimation. Direct and indirect taxes support our 
theory for weaker democracies. Both indirect and direct taxes are found to have an inverted U-
shape correlation with inequality though the coefficients are insignificant. The findings are 
consistent with theory and other findings we get employing cross sectional estimation. 
     On the other hand, we also analyse how changes in inequality affect public deficit and debt. 
The estimated coefficients of budget deficits are negative for each sample. However, we find 
support for theory as public debt is positively correlated with inequality in stronger democratic 
sample. 
The next section, 3.2, provides a theoretical analysis of the political economics of income and 
expenditure taxation whereas we discuss regarding budget deficit and public debt in subsection 
3.2.1. Section 3.3 contains data and section 3.4 contains the empirical analysis. Its subsections 
3.4.1, 3.4.2 and 3.4.3 respectively contain cross-section analysis, panel data analysis and panel 
data with first difference estimation analysis. The last section 3.5 concludes. 
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3.2) Model 
     The model is a simple extension of Meltzer and Richard (1981) to include expenditure taxes as 
well as income taxes. As in that paper, individual expenditure 𝑥𝑖 is set equal to disposable 
income, 
𝑥𝑖 =  (1 −  𝑡𝑦) 𝑦𝑖 + 𝑟                                                                                                                              (3.1)                
where𝑡𝑦 is the income tax rate,  𝑦𝑖 is income, indexed i across the population and 𝑟 is per capita 
redistribution. Consumption(𝑐𝑖) is less than expenditure, because of the presence of an 
expenditure/consumption tax (𝑡𝑐), hence 
𝑐𝑖 =  (1 −  𝑡𝑐) 𝑥𝑖                                                                                                                                       (3.2) 
     The budget is assumed to balance so that redistribution in per capita terms is financed from 
consumption and income tax revenue, requiring 
𝑟 =  𝑡𝑐𝑥 + 𝑡𝑦𝑦                                                                                                                                          (3.3) 
𝑥 and𝑦 refer to average expenditures and average income across the population 
respectively.Furthermore at the aggregate level income equals expenditure, thus 
𝑥 =  𝑦                                                                                                                                                          (3.4) 
in order to maintain tractability the labor-supply decision is not formally modelled, hence 
maximization of utility amounts to maximization of consumption (because consumption is the 
only argument in the utility function). The pivotal voter/policymaker thus chooses the triple 𝑞 =
 {𝑡𝑐 , 𝑡𝑦, 𝑟} in order to maximize their own consumption. Substituting in (3.4), (3.3) and (3.1) into 
(3.2) gives 
 
𝑐𝑖 =  (1 −  𝑡𝑐)[(1 − 𝑡𝑦) 𝑦𝑖 + (𝑡𝑐 + 𝑡𝑦)𝑦]                                                                                        (3.5) 
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hence the policy problem reduces to two dimensions (𝑡𝑐 and 𝑡𝑦). The important point of 
departure from Meltzer and Richard (1981) is that there are now two tax instruments being set. 
In general the Condorcet winner does not exist when the policy problem has two (or more) 
dimensions, but the structure presented can be re-expressed in terms of (unidimensional) 
intermediate preferences which means that the choice of the median voter will be 
pivotal.14Grandmont (1978) showed that as long as voters only differ along one dimension (here, 
income), and that the indirect utility function (𝑊(𝑞; 𝑦𝑖)) 
can be written as𝑊(𝑞; 𝑦𝑖) = 𝐽 (𝑞) + 𝐾 (𝑦𝑖) 𝐻 (𝑞) 
then the choice of the median voter is a Condorcet winner. It is clear that equation (5) satisfies 
this requirement. 
     A final ingredient of the model is that mean income declines with taxes, capturing tax 
collection and/or `deadweight' costs. To model this we follow Pickering and Rockey (2011) and 
posit that  
 
𝑦 =  𝑦∗ (1 − 
𝛿𝑦𝑡𝑦𝑦
𝑦∗
−  
𝛿𝑐𝑡𝑐𝑦
𝑦∗
)                                                                                                                  (3.6) 
where𝑦∗ is potential income and 𝛿𝑦 and 𝛿𝑐are parameters defining the sensitivity of actual 
(taxable) income respectively to income and consumption taxes. The parameters 𝛿𝑦 and 𝛿𝑐 
represent deadweight losses, either incurred directly as the tax collection costs, and/or indirectly 
in terms of their effects on economic activity. In order to generate a meaningful policy tension 
0 < 𝛿𝑦 < 1and 0 < 𝛿𝑐 < 1. Otherwise, even the poorest voter would prefer 𝑡𝑦 = 0 . 𝛿𝑦in 
particular may vary across countries. High values could imply high income tax collection costs or 
a low income tax base. As discussed by Besley and Persson (2014), many countries cannot easily 
                                                          
14 See Persson and Tabellini (2000) pp. 25. Borge and Rattso (2004) also employ intermediate preferences to solve a two-dimensional 
policy problem. 
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collect income taxes. Arguably both 𝛿𝑦 and 𝛿𝑐 may be higher in the presence of a significant 
informal economy. Whilst the informal economy is not modelled here, it is intuitive that it is 
more difficult to levy taxes (which would apply by construction to the formal sector) when the 
economic agents within the formal sector may easily migrate to the informal economy. 𝑦, which 
here represents the formal economy, would fall more readily with increased taxation.15 
Nonetheless, across groups of countries that are economically and institutionally similar, one 
might expect that the cost parameters are also similar. 
     The median voter has income𝑦𝑚 , and we define 𝑚 ≡  
𝑦
𝑦𝑚
> 1 . Maximization of (3.5) with 
respect to 𝑡𝑦, given (3.6) yields 
𝑡𝑦 +  𝑡𝑐 =  
(𝑚−1)
𝛿𝑦𝑚
                                                                                                                                       (3.7) 
This immediately delivers the well-known Meltzer and Richard (1981) that the total size of 
government (i.e. 𝑡𝑦 +  𝑡𝑐) is increasing in inequality. Moreover, when choosing 𝑡𝑦 for given𝑡𝑐 the 
two instruments can be understood as perfect substitutes.Hence if 𝛿𝑐 is high, then the median 
voter chooses lower 𝑡𝑐and higher 𝑡𝑦 (The expression𝑡𝑦 +  𝑡𝑐is independent of𝛿𝑐 ) . The intuition 
is; if𝛿𝑐increases then𝑡𝑦 +  𝑡𝑐are perfect substitutes (a decrease in𝑡𝑐and increase in𝑡𝑦cancels out 
each other).Higher 𝑡𝑐 permits lower 𝑡𝑦 . However, 𝑡𝑐 is not a given. 
     Maximization of (3.5) with respect to𝑡𝑐, and using (3.7), yields 
𝑡𝑐 =  
(𝑚−1)[𝑚 (𝛿𝑦− 𝛿𝑐)− (𝑚−1)]
𝑚 [𝛿𝑦(𝑚+1)− 𝛿𝑐(𝑚−1)]
                                                                                                                 (3.8) 
Note that no restrictions are required in order to ensure 𝑡𝑐 < 1. It is trivially clear from (3.5) that 
the median voter will will not want to set expenditure taxes in excess of 100% as this will mean 
negative consumption. 𝑡𝑐 > 0requires 𝛿𝑦 − 𝛿𝑐 >
𝑚−1
𝑚
 . For the median voter to desire positive 
                                                          
15 Porta and Shleifer (2014) also argue that agents choose informality as a means of avoiding tax. 
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expenditure taxes at all, there has to be a wedge between 𝛿𝑦and𝛿𝑐. Were 𝛿𝑦 and 𝛿𝑐 equal, then 
income taxes would always (i.e. irrespective of 𝑚) be the preferred policy instrument. The 
reason for this is that when both types of tax are applied with equal cost (i.e. both incur the 
same output loss) then the only concern left is redistribution. Given the structure of the tax 
system, income taxes are inherently more redistributive (dollar for dollar) than consumption 
taxes. The latter always incur a cost to expenditure, which exceed the cost in terms of (own) 
income when income taxes are applied. However, when𝛿𝑦 > 𝛿𝑐, then the policy decision 
becomes more complex. Incomes taxes may be more redistributive, but if the costs are 
prohibitive, then it becomes optimal for the median voter to choose consumption taxes. 
     Combining equations (3.7) and (3.8) yields 
𝑡𝑦 =  
(𝑚−1)(𝛿𝑦+ 𝛿𝑐)+ (𝑚−1)
2
𝛿𝑦𝑚 [𝛿𝑦 (𝑚+1)− 𝛿𝑐(𝑚−1)]
                                                                                                                  (3.9) 
As per Meltzer and Richard (1981) any degree of income inequality (𝑚> 1) ensures positive 
income taxes. 𝑡𝑦 < 1in fact follows a fortiori from 𝛿𝑦 − 𝛿𝑐 >
𝑚−1
𝑚
. The proof of this is in the 
appendix. The intuition here is that 𝛿𝑦 is high enough such that income taxes will not be 
maximally set.16 
The ratio of income to expenditure taxes is given by 
𝑡𝑦
𝑡𝑐
 ≡  𝜏 =  
(𝛿𝑦+ 𝛿𝑐)+ (𝑚−1)
𝛿𝑦[𝑚 (𝛿𝑦− 𝛿𝑐)− (𝑚−1)]
                                                                                                           (3.10) 
     The derivative of this expression with respect to 𝑚is unambiguously positive given0 < 𝛿𝑐 <
𝛿𝑦 < 1.
17 Increases in inequality lead to increases in income taxes relative to consumption taxes. 
The reason is that as inequality increases, then greater weight is placed on redistribution 
through income taxes for given tax collection (or deadweight output losses) costs. 
                                                          
16 This can also be viewed as shorthand for the plausible general equilibrium result in Meltzer and Richard (1981) that the labor 
supply will be sufficiently elastic at high income tax rates. 
17 Details are in the appendix. 
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     It is also of interest to consider how income and expenditure taxes separately respond to 
increases in inequality. The more straightforward case is income taxes. In this instance there is 
no ambiguity: income taxes increase with inequality (
𝑑𝑡𝑦
𝑑𝑚
> 0 – as shown in the appendix), with 
exactly the same underpinning as that provided in Meltzer and Richard (1981) (who only 
consider income taxes). 
     On the other hand the response of consumption taxes to increasing inequality is ambiguous. 
Taking for simplicity the case of𝛿𝑐 = 0, the derivative of (3.8)with respect to 𝑚 is positive or 
negative depending on 
(2𝛿𝑦 − 3)𝑚
2 + 2𝑚 + 1 ≷ 0  
Note that the first term is unambiguously negative, hence 
𝑑𝑡𝑐
𝑑𝑚
< 0 for large values of m. The 
critical threshold is =
1+√4−2𝛿𝑦
3−2𝛿𝑦
. At levels of inequality below this, increases in inequality lead to 
higher consumption taxes. At levels beyond the threshold, increases in inequality lead to lower 
consumption taxes. The intuition for this non-monotonicity lies in the fact that income taxes are 
more redistributive than consumption taxes. Both instruments achieve redistribution, but at low 
levels of inequality the median voter's income is comparatively close to mean income and the 
redistributive difference (at least for the median voter) between the two instruments is 
relatively small. Here increases in inequality result in both types of tax increasing, with the 
extent depending on the collection costs or deadweight losses associated with each instrument. 
As inequality increases, a stronger tension between the two instruments arises and the median 
voter becomes disposed towards income taxes to the extent that they now substitute for 
consumption taxes. Even if income taxes entail higher deadweight losses, they are still preferred 
because of their capacity to redistribute.18 
                                                          
18Vedder (2001) finds that income taxes are more distortionary than sales tax. 
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     Figure 3.1 depicts how taxes change with inequality under the (arbitrary) parameterization 
𝛿𝑦 = 0.9 and 𝛿𝑐= 0.3. The position of these curves change with these parameters, but the key 
properties always hold given the conditions outlined. Income taxes monotonically increase a la 
Meltzer and Richard (1981), whilst expenditure taxes first increase and then decrease with 
inequality. Note also that the gradient of the income tax curve is always higher than that of the 
expenditure tax curve, hence 
𝑑𝜏
𝑑𝑚
> 0 at all levels of inequality. 
     The model in this section is very stylized and omits several key features of any real-world tax 
system. For example the marginal propensity to consume may fall with income. This particular 
consideration would render the expenditure tax as regressive rather than proportionate as 
above. In a median voter model this would potentially lead to a negative relationship between 
consumption taxes and inequality. Hence the prediction that τ increases with inequality would 
hold more strongly were this feature incorporated into the model. 
     Recent literature has highlighted the role that institutions such as the voting rule (Lizzeri and 
Persico, 2001 and Persson and Tabellini, 1999) or form of government (Persson et al., 2000) may 
play in determining policy, and in particular the size of government. These mechanisms and 
mechanisms highlighting the role of inequality (as in the present paper) are not mutually 
exclusive. For example, one possibility could be that institutions determine the total budget, 
whilst inequality determines the composition of taxes. 
     Other generalizations of the model could include a richer (more progressive?) set of income 
tax instruments and thresholds, and indeed also analyse the tax collection costs (or deadweight 
losses) more fully. 
     Despite its simplicity, the model still sheds light on the tax composition decision in a median 
voter model. The results relating to income taxes are familiar, with income taxes rising as before-
tax inequality rises. The results relating to expenditure taxes are more novel. In particular when 
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inequality is initially at low levels, then increased inequality will also lead to increased demand 
for expenditure taxes. The rich spend more, and greater taxes will serve to redistribute towards 
the poor. However, this mechanism is eroded as inequality increases. Tax levels and associated 
collection costs increase. The median voter now replaces expenditure taxes with income taxes 
and beyond a certain threshold of inequality further increases in inequality lead to reductions in 
expenditure taxes. One possibility is that the elasticity of labor supply is higher than the elasticity 
of demand for goods. The dead-weight loss associated with a particular tax depends importantly 
on elasticities of demand and supply. Crawford, Keen and Smith (2010) suggest that one reason 
for the recent increases in VAT stem from low price-elasticity of demand for commodities.  This 
could justify lower (total) collection costs associated with taxes on expenditures. 
     In the next sub-section we also investigate how changes in income inequality affect budget 
deficits and public debt. Since the main emphasis of this chapter is to analyse the impact of 
income inequality on the composition of taxes, we limit ourselves to empirical analysis with 
regards to deficits and debt.  
 
3.2.1) Discussion related to Budget Deficit and Public Debt 
     Following Meltzer and Richard (1981) we assume zero budget deficits. Our model implies 
consumption-smoothing hence long-run debt levels should be zero if income growth is zero, e, g. 
Barro (1979) argues that average debt through the business cycle should be zero.We do not 
include budget deficit in the model since including it would require the median voter to deal 
with two dimensions (current differences in income as well as future implications of deficits as 
they will have to pay it back in one way or the other) and in general the median voter policy 
choice is not a Condorcet winner in two-dimensional policy space. Nonetheless, we form a 
tentative hypothesis with regards to deficits and now report additional empirical work on this. 
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     There are two purposes that the budget deficit may serve. One of them is to redistribute 
income over time and the second one is to redistribute income across generations. Given this, 
the median voter may trade-off future for present consumption by supporting higher budget 
deficits if income inequality rises. This demand from the median voter may be the consequence 
of his myopia in the sense he discounts the fact it has to be paid back in future. The literature, 
with regards to whether or not the median voter is myopic, is mixed. 
     The neoclassical paradigm envisions individuals (voters/consumers) as far-sighted. Under the 
traditional Keynesian model of consumption, on the other hand, individuals are considered to be 
myopic.  
     Relatedly, voters may suffer from fiscally illusion. According to Buchanan and Wagner (1977), 
voters lack understanding of the inter-temporal budget constraint of the government. Knowing 
this, opportunist governments with desires to be re-elected respond to voters’ demands by 
increasing deficit-financed spending. Since voters are myopic, they overestimate the benefits of 
current expenditures and underestimate the cost that would be imposed by raising taxes in 
future. 
Pommerehne and Schneider (1978) take data for revenue structure and public outlays of 110 
Swiss cities. Fiscal illusion, in their paper, is measured by systematic misperception by individuals 
of both the future tax burden borne by them and the amount of benefit they receive from 
government expenditures. They find strong empirical evidence of fiscal illusion among voters as 
they under-estimate the cost of future taxes that would be imposed to finance current rise in 
public expenditures.  
     The effect on deficits depends to some extent on the degree of myopia in voters. If the 
median voter sees deficits as a means of expropriating from future (high) income groups, then it 
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may be conjectured that inequality will increase the budget deficits/debt. Thus, we tentatively 
propose positive correlation between budget deficits and income inequality. 
Public debt is the accumulation of fiscal deficits. To keep the balance between total revenues 
and total expenditures, generally, is an important target of policy makers responsible for fiscal 
policy in any country. A fiscal deficit may emerge as a consequence when policy makers cannot 
achieve their objective of balanced-budget which may lead to bankruptcy and economic 
depression if debts cannot be repaid. Since public debt is a consequence of fiscal deficits, this 
paper also empirically investigates the relationship between public debt and income inequality. 
     We use debt instead because the deficit may not be a good indicator of the extent to which 
future generations are burdened by increased debts. In particular, under high growth or high 
inflation, deficits can co-exist with falling debt levels.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
86 
 
3.3) Data 
     The main agenda here is to ask whether the composition of taxes across countries 
systematically changes with inequality. Cross-country income and expenditure tax revenue data 
are available from the World Development Indicators through 1990-2012. Despite over 20 years 
of data, there is much greater variation in the policy data, as well as in the inequality data 
discussed below, across countries than within countries.19Consequently we report results from 
cross-country regressions using within-country averages. This at least has the advantage of 
removing any cyclicality from the data, which could also endogenously vary with inequality. 
     The main dependent variable is constructed from the ratio of the percentage of tax revenue 
taken from taxes on income, profits and capital gains and the percentage of tax revenue taken 
from taxes on goods and services, i.e. 
𝜏 =  
𝑡𝑦
𝑡𝑐
=  
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒,𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 (% 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒)
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 (% 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒)
                                                    (3.11) 
where both the numerator and denominator are taken from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI) database. In practice rates vary with different forms of income (and at different levels of 
income) and goods within countries, but the aggregate measure here is a means of gauging the 
overall extent of taxes on income relative to taxes on expenditure. In the regression analysis 
below we use the natural logarithm of τ because there are a small number of outliers where the 
denominator in (3.11) is quite small. 
     As well as examining how ln(𝜏) varies with inequality we also separately analyse how the 
separate tax measures are respectively affected by inequality. The model above unambiguously 
predicts a positive impact of inequality on ln(𝜏)and𝑡𝑦, whilst the effect on 𝑡𝑐 is ambiguous. 
                                                          
19 For example, across strong democracies (described below) the standard deviation of cross-country mean inequality is 6.24, whilst 
the average within-country standard deviation is 1.39. For the main policy variable (ln(𝜏) – described below) the standard deviation 
of the cross-country mean is 1.02, whilst the average within-country standard deviation is 0.261. 
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     The inequality measure used in the empirical analysis is the University of Texas Inequality 
Project's estimate of household income inequality (Galbraith and Kum, 2005). These data 
(denotedas𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃) are constructed using Theil's T statistic to measure pay inequality across 
sectors in each country. 
     Government deficit as a share of GDP is collected from World Development Indictors. Its 
mean, -1.39, shows that on average countries are running deficits whereas the standard 
deviation, 3.76, indicates considerable variation throughout the sample. 
     Government debt as a share of GDP is also taken from World Development Indictors. On 
average the countries constituting the sample are in huge debt as shown by its mean which is 
56.61. The standard deviation, 30.32, also shows quite large variation across the sample.  
     One important determinant of the capacity to tax is the level of development, so a first 
control variables used in the regression analysis is the natural log of GDP per capita in constant 
chained PPP US$ (ln(𝑦)) from the Penn World Tables. OECD membership (𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷) is also used as 
a further control, also to some extent capturing the level of development and institutional 
capacity. Because the alternative tax instruments may redistribute across generations to 
differing extents, demographic variables (the proportion of the population aged 15-64 and the 
proportion aged 65 and above) are also included in the analysis (denoted 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65). These data are all taken from the WDI. 
     Countries raise tax revenue through means beyond taxation on income and goods and 
services. One important source is revenue from customs and other import duties. For this reason 
the trade share (exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP - denoted 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸) is also included 
in the regression analysis. In addition to these controls the log of the total population size 
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(𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃), also from the WDI) is also included, to account for any scale (dis-)economies 
associated with particular types of tax collection.20 
     A final control variable is the quality of democratic institutions. The degree of democracy may 
affect policy variables directly, through channels other than that analysed above, or indirectly as 
a proxy for tax capacity. For this reason the 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 democracy score is included in the 
regression analysis as standard. Moreover the median income earner more plausibly drives 
policy under pure democracy. For this reason the sample is split into countries which score 
highly on this measure and those that do not. The expectation is that inequality will be more 
strongly related to the policy variables in the more democratic subsample. 
     Table 3.1 contains descriptive statistics of the key variables used in the analysis below. Note 
first that there is considerable dispersion in both the tax variables. Countries differ meaningfully 
in terms of how they raise tax revenue. Across the whole sample, taxes on goods and services 
represent a higher fraction of total revenue than taxes on income. This reflects the fact that in 
low income countries, the capacity to raise income taxes is often limited. Indeed within the 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷members, income taxes are around 32% of revenue, whilst in the rest of the World 
income taxes are just 20% of revenue. These data are also consistent with Besley and Persson 
(2014). 
     The 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃 data cover 129 countries, and numerically range from below 30 (the Czech Republic 
and Sweden) to 58.2 (Angola), with higher numbers representing greater inequality. Notably, 
these data are negatively correlated with GDP per capita, with a Pearson correlation coefficient 
of -0.66. Richer countries are measured (on average) to be more equal than poorer countries 
(see Galbraith, 2008 for a discussion). This highlights the importance of controlling for economic 
development; else the inequality measure will be proxying for other potential drivers of policy. 
 
                                                          
20 Both the trade data and the population data come from the World Development Indicators. 
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3.4) Empirical Analysis 
3.4.1) Cross-Section Analysis 
     Before presenting the main results we first report regressions, in Table 3.2, where the size of 
government, as measured by average total tax revenue as a share of GDP, is regressed on 
inequality. This serves to recapitulate the consensus on the absence of evidence supporting the 
Meltzer and Richard (1981) hypothesis that the total size of government increases with before-
tax income inequality. Column 1 is a simple regression with just inequality (𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃) and GDP per 
capita used as regressors. In that regression, as well as column 2, in which the full controls are 
used, the size of government is not significantly correlated with inequality.21 Significance levels 
do not improve when the sample is split by the quality of democracy. Column 3 contains results 
for countries with strong democratic credentials, with an average 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 democracy score of 
7 or above through the sample period.22 Column 4 contains results for countries with 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 
democracies scores of less than 7. In neither instance, there is any statistical relationship found 
between the size of government and inequality. These finding reflects those found for example 
in Perotti (1996), Bassett et al (1999) and Persson and Tabellini (2003).23 
     Table 3.3 contains results when ln(𝜏) is used as the dependent variable. When looking at the 
full sample both excluding (column 1) and including (column 2) control variables there is a 
statistically significant positive association between the extent to which countries use income 
taxes relative to expenditure taxes and inequality. When the sample is separated according to 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2≷7 (columns 3 and 4) it becomes clear that the positive relationship holds only under 
democratic regimes. This is consistent with the theory above, which relies on a complete 
franchise. If the median voter within a reduced franchise earns more than the median income in 
                                                          
21 The sample in column 2 is slightly smaller because the 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌 2 data do not cover some of the countries included in column 1. 
22 This cut-off was chosen for the simple reason that it results in two equally sized subsamples. 
23Specifically, in column 6 of Table 3.1 of Persson and Tabellini (2003) pp. 40. This regression uses the Deininger and Squire (1996) 
measure of Gini coefficient. 
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the population, their inclination towards redistribution will be much weaker.24 When the 
democracy criterion is strengthened further, so that only countries with 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 (column 
5), the magnitude of the estimated coefficient increases and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.25 The finding supports Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000). According to their 
argument the democracies distribute more as compared to dictatorships due to constant threat 
of social unrest and revolution. 
     Using the coefficient estimate from column 5 of Table 3.3, a one standard deviation increase 
in inequality is statistically associated with an increase of 0.46 in the policy variableln(𝜏), holding 
all else equal. Given that this is nearly a half of the raw standard deviation in the policy variable, 
the magnitude of the estimated correlation is sizable. 
     One possible concern with these results is the presence of outliers. To check sensitivity to 
these we computed 𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑆 measures for each observation used in column 5 of Table 3.3 
following the procedure detailed in Welsch and Kuh (1977). Four observations exhibit𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑆 
measures greater than one in magnitude - Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria and the US. Omission of any 
one, or indeed all four of these outliers does not change the results substantively. In all cases the 
estimated coefficient is positive with comparable magnitude and remains significant at the 1% 
level. 
     In Tables 3.4 and 3.5 results are presented respectively for 𝑡𝑦 and 𝑡𝑐 , the numerator and 
denominator in (11). In Table 3.4 the findings for income taxes (𝑡𝑦) are quite similar to the 
results found for ln(𝜏). Increases in inequality are generally found to be positively related with 
the extent to which income taxes are used within total taxes, but more so in the stronger 
democracies. In countries where  𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7, the estimated effect remains positive, though 
is not statistically significant, whilst in countries where𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7, the estimated relationship 
                                                          
24 For example, if only the richest 50% of the population are allowed to vote, then the median voter’s income will be higher than the 
median income of the population. 
25 The 11 countries that get dropped in column 5 relative to column 3 are Argentine, Botswana, Colombia, Estonia, El Salvador, South 
Korea, Macedonia, Moldova, Paraguay, Romania and Turkey. 
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is found to be negative, though at a very weak significance level. When the stronger democratic 
requirement is applied (i.e. where𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8), the estimated effect increases and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Using the estimate of column 5, a one standard deviation 
increase in inequality, is statistically associated with an increase of 6.46 in 𝑡𝑦, holding all else 
equal. As with ln(𝜏), this represent about half of a standard deviation in the policy variable, so 
again the magnitude of the estimated correlation is sizable. 
     In the case of income taxes, some of the results relating to the control variables are of 
interest. The proportion of the population aged over 65 years is consistently negatively related 
to income taxes. This is consistent with the findings of Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) who 
found a robust negative relationship between labor tax rates and the dependency ratio. Another 
regularity in Table 3.4 is the positive relationship with income per capita. As discussed in Besley 
and Persson (2014) this likely reflects the greater capacity to tax in richer countries. A further 
result is that the extent of democracy is positively associated with the extent to which income 
taxes are used. If income taxes (relative to other forms of taxation) are more progressive, then 
given the plausible assumption that democratization means that the median voter becomes 
relatively poorer, then this relationship would be expected. 
     Table 3.5 presents the results relating to 𝑡𝑐, the extent to which taxes raised through 
expenditure on goods and services as a percentage of total revenue. In contrast to income taxes, 
increases in inequality are generally found to be negatively related with the extent to which 
expenditure taxes are used, especially in the stronger democracies. In countries, 
where𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7, the estimated relationship is negative and statistically significant at the 
10% level, whilst in countries where𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8, the estimated effect is statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Arguably this could reflect a compositional effect: greater 𝑡𝑦 must mean less 
taxes raised elsewhere as a percentage of the total, hence correlations may be reversed for 𝑡𝑐. 
Nonetheless, because there are other meaningful sources of revenue the results for 𝑡𝑐 are not 
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just simply a mirror image for 𝑡𝑦. Indeed the raw correlation between the two data series used is 
only -0.08 (for the subsample of democracies with 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 it is still only -0.18). 
     Using the estimate of column 5 of Table 3.5, a one standard deviation increase in inequality is 
statistically associated with an reduction of 5.06 in 𝑡𝑐, holding all else equal. This represents 38% 
of a standard deviation in 𝑡𝑐, so whilst this is slightly less than that found for 𝑡𝑦 this is still a 
sizable effect. 
     Again the results relating to the control variables are of worthy of some discussion. In contrast 
to income taxes there is a negative relationship with income per capita - likely reflecting tax 
capacity, and the ability to raise taxes through income taxes in particular. However, there are 
also some interesting differences between the results for 𝑡𝑦and 𝑡𝑐. For example, unlike the case 
of income taxes the demographic variables are not consistently related with 𝑡𝑐. There is also a 
consistent negative relationship between 𝑡𝑐 and trade (though this relationship is not statistically 
strong). Globalization may constrain countries' capacity to tax goods and services - indeed 
arguably this puts more pressure on countries without the capacity to tax elsewhere (see Khattry 
and Rao, 2002, and Baunsgaard and Keen, 2010). Interestingly, and as found with 𝑡𝑦 the extent 
of democracy is positively associated with the extent to which expenditure taxes are used. 
Essentially revenue sources outside of 𝑡𝑦 and 𝑡𝑐 are increasingly relied upon, the weaker the 
level of democracy. Given that both forms of taxes are progressive (in the weak sense that both 
instruments require the rich to pay more), this finding is consistent with the model presented 
above. 
     In relation to income taxes the theory above generates an unambiguous hypothesis. Greater 
inequality results in greater use of income taxes as a source of revenue. The data are supportive 
of this hypothesis, at least in strong democracies. However, the hypotheses relating to how 
taxes on expenditure are related to inequality are more nuanced. Increases in inequality are 
proposed to increase expenditure tax rates at low levels of inequality, and once some threshold 
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level of inequality is reached, then the relationship becomes negative. In the empirical analysis 
the relationship is unambiguously negative. To test for non-monotonicity a quadratic term in 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃 is included in the analysis. Table 3.6 contains the results, in column 1 for the full sample, in 
column 2 for countries with 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 and in column 3 for countries with𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8. In 
all three cases the estimated sign on the point estimate for the linear term (𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃) is positive, 
whilst the sign on the point estimate for the quadratic term ( 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃2) is negative, consistent with 
the theory above. However, in all three cases the results are statistically insignificant. 
     Estimating a potential non-linear relationship between income taxes and inequality, in Table 
3.7, we find an inverted U-shape correlation though insignificant. This holds across the full 
sample as well as sub-samples (strongly democratic). At low levels of inequality the median voter 
opts for higher income taxes as inequality increases but he prefers lower tax once inequality 
reaches a certain benchmark.  Contrasting a distinction between indirect and direct taxes, we 
argue that at higher level of inequality the median voter votes for redistribution financed more 
through direct taxes than indirect taxes. 
     Following the discussion of section 3.2.1, we also investigate how changes in inequality affect 
government deficit and debt as shares of GDP. In the first and second columns of Table 3.8 the 
coefficients of inequality are positive but statistically insignificant throughout the full sample. 
This finding supports our tentative hypothesis that voters would prefer redistribution to be 
financed by raising higher deficits when the inequality increases. Their preference is based on 
given the assumption that they are short-sighted. For subsamples distinguished by weak and 
strong democracies, the deficit is found to increase with a rise in inequality in stronger 
democracies whereas the association is negative across weak democracies though again the 
significance levels are low. A possible explanation may be that the role of median voter is more 
vital in stronger democracies. That may explain why as the inequality rises the median voter opts 
for more redistribution by voting in favour of higher deficit. 
94 
 
     The relation between public debt as a share of GDP and inequality is investigated in Table 3.9. 
As we explained earlier, the reason to analyse the impact of inequality on public debt is that it is 
relatively a better measure for analysing how burdened future generations are. A rise in 
inequality is positively associated with public debt across full samples as well as stronger and 
weaker democracies. The coefficient estimates are statistically significant at 5% for full sample 
and weak democracies. This again suggests that the median voter owing to short-sightedness 
votes for more redistribution when inequality rises. 
     In a nutshell, our hypotheses regarding budget deficits and public debt are supported across 
all samples though we find negative correlation between budget deficits and income inequality 
for weaker democracies.  
 
3.4.2) Panel Data Analysis 
     This subsection extends the analysis to use panel data estimation. The empirical estimation 
covers 129 countries from 1990 to 2012 employing time and country fixed effects. We use 
Ordinary Least Square for the analysis. Using panel data is important because it not only adds 
time dimension but also enlarges our data sample. 
     In Table 3.10 the coefficient estimates for income taxes are reported. For the full sample 
(both with and without control variables) the estimated correlation between income taxes and 
income inequality is negative though insignificant. Further analysis decomposing the sample into 
weaker and stronger democracies suggests that the association between income tax and income 
inequality is also negatively related in stronger democracies whereas the correlation between 
the two variables is found to be positive across weak democracies. Significance levels do not 
improve. 
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     The estimated relation between income tax and inequality across full samples and strong 
democracies does not support the theory in this chapter. Nevertheless, the coefficient estimates 
are positive across weaker democracies, though insignificant, which is in accordance with what 
we proposed. 
     Similarly, results for indirect taxes in Table 3.11 are neither reconciliatory with the theory nor 
with the findings we get with cross-section estimation. The estimated coefficients are positive, 
though statistically insignificant, for full samples (column 1 and 2) and across strong 
democracies. Nonetheless, we find negative coefficient estimates for weaker democracies with 
no improvement at significance levels. 
     Comparing the results of Table 3.10 and Table 3.11 with panel data estimation, we can clearly 
analyse that the results for the full sample and strong democracies are conflicting with the 
model we propose as well as to some extent with the results for cross sectional estimation. The 
possible justification for such conflicting results may be the inclusion of time dimension with 
country and time fixed effects. There are time-invariant characteristics (culture, religion)which 
are unique to the individual and should not be correlated with other individual characteristics. 
Using time and country fixed effects estimation allows us to control for the bias in results which 
otherwise may exist with cross-sectional estimation. Furthermore, there may be presence of the 
outliers as we confronted while estimating cross-sectional estimation. 
     To check sensitivity to these we again compute 𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑆 measures for direct and indirect taxes 
of Table 3.10 and Table 3.11 following the procedure detailed in Welsch and Kuh (1977). Twenty 
four observations exhibit𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑆 measures greater than one in magnitude –Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, 
Guatemala, Indonesia, Jamaica, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Peru, Slovak Republic, 
Trinidad and Venezuella. Omission of these outliers does not change the results substantively. 
Nevertheless, the estimated coefficients of column 3 and column 5 in Table 3.10 gain 
significance at 1% and 10%. Indistinguishably, column 1, column 2, column 3 and column 5 of 
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Table 3.11 improve significance levels at 10%, 5%, 1% and 1% respectively. These improved 
results of Table 3.10 and Table 3.11 controlling for outliers presence are now reported in Table 
3.12 Table 3.13 respectively. Besides these changes, all other findings do not change. There is no 
substantial change after controlling for outliers confirms that there is sizeable proportion of 
similarity between our baseline specification and robust estimations. This reaffirms that the 
results derived from our baseline specifications employing OLS estimation are not generally 
affected by outliers. 
     We also investigate non-linearity between direct taxes and inequality using longitudinal data 
in Table 3.14. We find a U-shaped relationship, statistically significant, between the two 
variables in both full and strongly democratic samples. This contrasts the theory proposed in this 
chapter as well as the findings with cross-sectional estimation. The benchmark (column 1) is 
estimated to be 44.67. 
     In order to reconcile these findings with the model we may argue that in egalitarian countries 
(inequality less than 44.67)26, increases in inequality implies lower income taxes. It requires 
further research but is on the face of it a rejection of the model. A possible reverse causation 
cannot be ignored too. Lower income taxes may be an incentive for rich people to invest more 
that may translate into higher inequality. Nevertheless, a U-shaped correlation between income 
taxes and income inequality supports our theory to the extent that income taxes are positive at 
higher levels of inequality. 
     As before, Table 3.15 reports results of non-linear estimation for expenditure taxes. The 
estimated coefficients are found to suggest an inverted U-shape association between indirect 
taxes and income inequality for the full sample and across strong democracies though 
statistically significant for full sample only. This result is in accordance with theory as well as with 
findings related to cross-sectional estimation. A rise in income inequality increases expenditures 
                                                          
26 Threshold calculated from the full sample. 
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taxes at first but the correlation between the two variables becomes negative once the income 
inequality reaches to 46.52% (threshold from column 1 as it is statistically significant). 
     In Table 3.16 the relation between budget deficit as a share of GDP and income inequality is 
investigated using panel data. The estimated coefficients are found to be negative in all columns 
except for last column (where 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8) though only column 2 (full sample) holds significance at 10%. These coefficient 
estimates do not support our hypothesis that voters would demand for a rise in budget deficit to 
finance redistribution based on their short-sightedness when income inequality rises. 
     Next, we test relationship between public debt and income inequality the coefficient 
estimates of which are reported in Table 3.17. Throughout the table the relationship between 
the two variables is found to be positive and statistically significant for full sample and across 
weak democracies.27 These results substantially support our proposition. Based on their myopia, 
a rise in inequality will lead voters to support higher public debts for redistribution to be 
financed. Both empirical analysis either with cross-section data or panel data correspond to 
positive correlation between public debt and income inequality. 
     Summarising the results with panel data estimation, it can be said that income and 
expenditure taxes are found to support our theoretical model and cross-sectional findings for 
weaker democracies only (where 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7and  
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8). As far as no-linear relation is concerned, direct taxes are estimated to suggest a 
U-shaped association whereas indirect taxes suggest an inverted-U shape correlation. Evidence 
on indirect taxes substantially reconciles with our theory and results with cross-sectional 
estimation. On the other hand, no support either for theory or cross-sectional results is found 
with regards to direct taxes. Our hypothesis relating to public debt as a share of GDP is also 
                                                          
27 Arguably short-term is a bigger problem in weaker democracies. 
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supported by empirical findings with statistical significance. However, budget deficit is confirms 
the hypothesis only when  𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8. 
 
3.4.3) Panel Data Analysis with First Difference Estimation 
     Since the variables used for empirical analysis are potentially non-stationary, we apply Im-
Pesaran-Shin (IPS) test, following Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003),which fail to reject the hypothesis 
that all panels contain unit roots. As we know the presence of unit roots can cause few problems 
with inference. For example, the persistence of shocks will be infinite. Further, the presence of 
non-stationarity can also render standard assumptions for asymptotic analysis invalid. However, 
whilst differencing the data converts non-stationary data into stationary, some information is 
also lost. The reason to prefer the IPS test over other tests is that it developed a set of tests that 
relax the assumption of a common autoregressive parameter across the panel. Furthermore, 
data are not necessarily required to be balanced, and data availability varies by country in a 
penal data setting. After controlling for non-stationarity, the panel data analysis with first 
difference estimation is re-estimated. 
     Table 3.18 reports the results for direct taxes. The estimated coefficients relating to full 
sample and strong democracies are negative but statistically insignificant. Only the coefficient 
estimates for weaker democracies (𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7and  
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8) are positive though the significance levels do not improve. There is not any 
substantial difference between the results with and without first difference estimation though 
the magnitude of coefficients does change. These results do not support the theory we propose. 
Neither have they supported the findings we derive with cross-sectional estimation. 
     In the following Table 3.19 we investigate how changes in income inequality affects indirect 
taxes. The findings contrast with the theory and results with cross-sectional estimation as we 
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find negative coefficients for inequality across full samples and strong democracies, though the 
estimates are statistically insignificant. Lack of significance may imply lack of variation in the 
data. We lose information when we difference the data. 
     The estimated coefficients in Table 3.20, where we test for non-linear relationship between 
income taxes and inequality, are found to suggest an inverted U-shape correlation between the 
two variables. Both the coefficient estimates (linear and quadratic) are negative when we 
decompose the sample for strong democracies (𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7). Nevertheless, the relation is 
again found to be inverted U-shape when we decompose the sample into even stronger 
democracies (𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8). These results support the hypothesis proposed as well as previous 
findings with cross-section estimation of this chapter. Here, applying first difference estimation 
improves the results with panel data analysis as opposed to results we get without differencing 
the data in Table 3.14 because we get an inverted U-shape correlation which confirms theory 
and results with cross-sectional estimates. 
     All three columns of Table 3.21 (full sample and stronger democracies) suggest an inverted U-
shape relationship between indirect taxes and income inequality. The estimated coefficients in 
column 2 (𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7) also hold statistical significance. These results support our theory and 
all previous findings related to expenditure taxes of this chapter. A rise in inequality leads to 
higher expenditure taxes. However, expenditure taxes decrease once the inequality is 38.71% 
(threshold from column 2 since it is statistically significant). This corresponds strongly with the 
theory. 
          In Table 3.22 examining the effect of inequality on government deficits, the estimated 
coefficients of inequality are negative for full sample as well as for weak and strong democracies 
though statistically insignificant. According to results, the deficit decreases with a rise in 
inequality. This does not support our hypothesis in this chapter which rather argues for a 
positive association between the two variables, though to repeat, is insignificant. 
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     For public debt, the estimated coefficients in Table 3.23 are negative for full samples and 
weak democracies. These are not in accordance with the proposed hypothesis. Nevertheless, 
positive coefficient estimates for inequality in stronger democracies find support for our 
hypothesis. 
     To summarize the findings with first difference estimation briefly, the findings for direct taxes 
do not improve. The estimated coefficients are still negative in all columns except weaker 
democracies. Nevertheless, the results relating to indirect taxes support the theory and results 
with cross-sectional estimation for full samples and across stronger democracies. Whilst we 
assess non-linearity between direct taxes and inequality as well as between indirect taxes and 
inequality, the results reconcile with theory and findings with cross-sectional analysis.  
Furthermore, budget deficits still do not support our hypothesis whereas public debt as a share 
of GDP confirms our hypothesis for stronger democracies only. The results with first difference 
estimation are preferred for they control as the variables are stationary.  
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3.5) Conclusion 
     This chapter analyses how the composition of taxes is determined in a simple median voter 
framework. Taxes may be levied on income, or on expenditure, as in the case of a sales tax. In 
the framework analysed the median voter is a Condorcet winner despite the fact there are two 
policy instruments. The results relating to income taxes are familiar. As with Meltzer and Richard 
(1981) greater inequality monotonically leads to higher income taxes. 
     The results relating to expenditure taxes are novel. At low levels of inequality, increases in 
inequality lead to higher expenditure tax rates. Even though expenditure taxes are not as 
effective at redistributing as income taxes, there is still a redistributive impetus embodied within 
an expenditure tax, as the rich spend more than the poor. If expenditure taxes are preferred for 
separate reasons, perhaps because of smaller deadweight losses or collection costs, then the 
standard argument - that greater inequality leads to higher taxes - also applies to expenditure 
taxes. 
     However, once inequality passes some threshold level, then there is a stronger desire for 
redistribution, even if this comes at the price of greater deadweight losses. The median voter 
now substitutes income taxes for expenditure taxes. Nonetheless, an unambiguous finding is 
that the composition of taxes, defined as the extent to which taxes are levied on income relative 
to expenditure, will rise with inequality. 
     Using cross-country data for tax composition from the WDI, and inequality data from the 
Texas Inequality Project, there is a robust positive correlation between the extent to which taxes 
are levied on income relative to expenditure and inequality. This contrasts with evidence on 
total government size testing the original Meltzer and Richard (1981) hypothesis. Moreover 
income taxes as a proportion of total taxes increase with inequality, whilst expenditure taxes as 
a proportion of total taxes fall with inequality. Given the nature of cross-country data, and in 
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particular unobserved heterogeneity across countries, it is not possible to say that these are 
causal relationships. Nonetheless, the fact that the empirical results hold most strongly for 
countries with higher levels of democracy, is supportive of the mechanism proposed in this 
chapter. 
     Non-linear relationship between direct taxes and inequality is also estimated to be inverted 
U-shape supporting our hypothesis that income taxes are more effective instrument of 
redistributing at higher levels of inequality. 
     Based on the assumption that voters are short-sighted, our hypotheses about budget deficits 
and public debt are also confirmed across all samples. However, the budget deficits for weaker 
democracies are negatively correlated with inequality. 
     The empirical analysis is extended using panel data with and without first difference 
estimation. With first difference estimation, linear estimation related to direct and indirect taxes 
finds support for theory and cross-sectional findings for weak democracies. The theory is 
supported when we test non-linearity between direct taxes and inequality. Similarly, non-linear 
association between indirect taxes and inequality substantially supports the theory and cross-
sectional findings. From budget deficits and public debt, the latter supports our tentative 
proposition when Polity2 >= 7. 
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Figure 3.1: How Expenditure and Income Taxes change with Inequality 
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics of the Variables # obs mean s.d. min max 
𝑡𝑦  125 21.44 7.25 10.14 38.59 
𝑡𝑐  119 28.41 8.15 10.12 40.96 
ln(𝜏)  157 -0.24 0.98 -2.8 4.57 
ln(𝑦)  166 8.63 1.26 5.6 11.22 
Deficit as a share of GDP 158 -1.39 3.76 -11.57 13.82 
Debt as a share of GDP 95 56.61 30.20 14.28 141.89 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  129 44.03 6.49 29.08 58.25 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  194 61.23 6.57 48.52 76.78 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  194 7 4.62 0.81 18.39 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  121 45.98 10.63 22.11 60.82 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  213 0.138 0.333 0 1 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  213 15.07 2.36 9.16 20.96 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  165 3.03 6.2 -10 10 
 
Notes: The data are within-country averages between 1990-2014. 𝑡𝑦denotes taxes on income, profits and capital gains (as a % of revenue) - taken from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI). 𝑡𝑐denotes taxes on goods and services (as a % of revenue) - also taken from the WDI. 𝜏 =  
𝑡𝑦
𝑡𝑐
. 𝑦is real GDP at chained PPPs in millions of 
2005 US dollars per capita - taken from the Penn World Tables. 𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃is the University of Texas Inequality Project estimate of household income inequality. 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564and𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65 are respectively the proportion of the population aged between 15 and 64, and 65 and above. 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸is imports plus exports as a percentage of 
GDP. 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷is a dummy variable denoting 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷 membership. 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) is the country population size 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 is a measure of democracy provided by the Polity IV 
project, with 10 denoting the highest level of democracy, and -10 denoting the highest level of autocracy. 
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Table 3.2: The Size of Government 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
Strong Democracy 
(4) 
Weak Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  -0.177 0.077 0.089 0.19 
 
(0.147) (0.198) (0.209) (0.301) 
ln(𝑦)  1.155 0.737 3.032* -1.384 
 
(0.786) (1.368) (1.599) (1.595) 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
1.81 1.542 0.225 
  
(2.803) (3.242) (3.577) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
-0.195 -0.212 -0.023 
  
(0.174) (0.219) (0.292) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
0.183 -0.236 0.516 
  
(0.204) (0.298) (0.367) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
0.019 -0.033 0.047 
  
(0.022) (0.024) (0.039) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
-1.46*** 2.489*** -1.127* 
  
(0.432) (0.683) (0.578) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
0.254* 0.987 0.103 
  
(0.15) (0.886) (0.162) 
R-Square 0.11 0.29 0.37 0.25 
Number of Observations 119 112 56 56 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 > 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 
 
Notes: Cross country regressions of total tax revenue as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3.3: The Composition of Taxes 
 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
Strong Democracy 
(4) 
Weak Democracy 
(5) 
Strong Democracy 
(6) 
Weak Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  0.076*** 0.027* 0.047* 0.021 0.071*** 0.007 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.022) 
ln(𝑦)  0.428*** 0.733*** 0.859*** 0.561*** 1.014*** 0.629*** 
 
(0.259) (0.138) (0.286) (0.193) (0.299) (0.163) 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
0.374 0.038 -1.204*** 0.161 -0.736* 
  
(0.313) (0.432) (0.418) (0.39) (0.408) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
-0.06*** -0.031 -0.035 0.019 -0.048* 
  
(0.022) (0.041) (0.028) (0.047) (0.025) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
-0.08*** -0.072** -0.166*** -0.094** -0.148*** 
  
(0.024) (0.029) (0.041) (0.036) (0.034) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
0.127** 0.16* 0.119 0.229** 0.088 
  
(0.058) (0.093) (0.087) (0.1) (0.08) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
-0.012 0.122 -0.008 0.115 -0.01 
  
(0.015) (0.115) (0.023) (0.117) (0.02) 
R-Square 0.19 0.43 0.54 0.48 0.62 0.48 
Number of Observations 117 111 56 55 45 66 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Cross country regressions of composition of taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full 
data sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
 
 
107 
 
 
 
Table 3.4: Income Taxes 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
Strong Democracy 
(4) 
Weak Democracy 
(5) 
Strong Democracy 
(6) 
Weak Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  0.524* 0.185 0.586 -0.045 0.995** -0.06 
 
(0.3) (0.307) (0.496) (0.448) (0.435) (0.391) 
ln(𝑦)  4.576*** 6.77*** 8.078** 5.523* 15.254*** 4.53** 
 
(1.538) (1.856) (3.232) (2.954) (3.947) (2.237) 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
7.277 5.686 -3.33 7.307 -4.244 
  
(4.703) (6.861) (7.19) (6.833) (6.516) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
-0.453 0.146 -0.257 0.403 -0.224 
  
(0.321) (0.577) (0.52) (0.838) (0.433) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
-1.35*** -1.36** -1.952** -2.067*** -1.728*** 
  
(0.42) (0.602) (0.733) (0.75) (0.615) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
0.016 -0.037 0.034 -0.055 0.038 
  
(0.025) (0.052) (0.033) (0.053) (0.03) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
1.921** 1.101 2.006* 1.404 1.885* 
  
(0.815) (1.517) (1.093) (1.549) (1.041) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
0.539** 3.322* 0.733* 0.602 0.485 
  
(0.266) (1.724) (0.387) (3.46) (0.319) 
R-Square 0.11 0.31 0.43 0.48 0.51 0.27 
Number of Observations 118 112 56 56 45 67 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Cross country regressions of Income Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3.5: Expenditure Taxes 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
Strong Democracy 
(4) 
Weak Democracy 
(5) 
Strong Democracy 
(6) 
Weak Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  -0.892*** -0.317 -0.591* -0.174 -0.779** -0.001 
 
(0.268) (0.302) (0.342) (0.445) (0.364) (0.429) 
ln(𝑦)  -4.13*** -7.48*** -9.416*** -5.202 -8.226*** -6.819** 
 
(1.493) (2.093) (3.232) (3.844) (3.4) (2.876) 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
-1.394 1.508 32.98*** -2.47 15.39 
  
(4.318) (4.135) (8.105) (3.837) (9.746) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
0.891** 0.603 0.517 0.034 0.629 
  
(0.373) (0.447) (0.631) (0.521) (0.509) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
0.296 0.212 1.27 0.297 1.277*** 
  
(0.416) (0.358) (0.775) (0.389) (0.619) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
-0.026 -0.031 -0.034 -0.039 -0.015 
  
(0.023) (0.031) (0.035) (0.034) (0.032) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
-1.091 -2.172*** -0.541 -2.538** -0.202 
  
(0.833) (0.923) (1.453) (0.998) (1.255) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
0.464 0.326 0.614 0.22 0.429 
  
(0.287) (1.437) (0.446) (1.851) (0.377) 
R-Square 0.12 0.24 0.45 0.33 0.47 0.31 
Number of Observations 118 111 56 55 45 66 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Cross country regressions of Expenditure Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full 
data sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
 
 
109 
 
 
 
Table 3.6: Expenditure Taxes 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Strong Democracy 
(3) 
Strong Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  0.032 0.645 0.988 
 
(1.867) (2.093) (1.903) 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃2  -0.004 -0.016 -0.022 
 
(0.022) (0.027) (0.025) 
ln(𝑦)  -7.463*** -9.549*** -8.681** 
 
(2.075) (2.613) (3.532) 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  -1.295 1.631 -1.939 
 
(4.528) (4.156) (3.825) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  0.881** 0.555 -0.024 
 
(0.373) (0.462) (0.519) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  0.306 0.174 0.239 
 
(0.406) (0.362) (0.4) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  -0.026 -0.031 -0.039 
 
(0.022) (0.032) (0.035) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  -1.106 -2.171** -2.628** 
 
(0.831) (0.935) (1.015) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  0.457 0.411 0.066 
 
(0.295) (1.493) (1.837) 
R-Square 0.24 0.45 0.47 
Number of Observations 111 56 45 
Sample Size Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 
 
Notes: Cross country regressions of Expenditure Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full 
data sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3.7: Income Taxes 
     (1) (2) (3) 
  
Strong Democracy Strong Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  2.712 3.184 2.599 
 
(2.280) (3.501) (3.330) 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃2  -0.029 -0.033 -0.020 
 
(0.027) (0.047) (0.044) 
ln(𝑦)  6.904 7.792 14.817 
 
(1.872)*** (3.369)** (4.257)*** 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  8.158 5.950 7.803 
 
(4.919) (6.757) (7.001) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  -0.510 0.045 0.351 
 
(0.334) (0.641) (0.870) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  -1.287 -1.444 -2.120 
 
(0.423)*** (0.650)** (0.775)*** 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  0.018 -0.037 -0.056 
 
(0.025) (0.051) (0.053) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  1.759 1.107 1.323 
 
(0.833)** (1.527) (1.569) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  0.478 3.501 0.466 
 
(0.261)* (1.864)* (3.522) 
R-squared 0.311 0.432 0.510 
Observations 111 56 45 
Sample Size Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 
 
Notes: Cross country regressions of Income Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3.8: Deficit as a share of GDP 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Strong Democracy Weak democracy Strong Democracy Weak democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  0.061 0.025 0.209 -0.106 0.147 -0.072 
 
(0.091) (0.091) (0.146) (0.111) (0.126) (0.125) 
ln(𝑦)  0.789 0.922 0.591 1.547 0.970 1.674 
 
(0.471)* (0.645) (0.831) (0.909)* (0.707) (1.514) 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
0.626 0.859 2.465 0.280 3.612 
  
(1.378) (1.819) (1.798) (1.852) (2.529) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
0.001 0.066 -0.178 0.012 -0.172 
  
(0.119) (0.172) (0.163) (0.148) (0.268) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
-0.175 0.046 -0.336 -0.026 -0.386 
  
(0.123) (0.256) (0.119)*** (0.215) (0.170)** 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
0.019 0.034 -0.016 0.033 -0.024 
  
(0.011) (0.013)** (0.014) (0.011)*** (0.017) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
-0.096 0.453 -1.119 0.211 -1.265 
  
(0.291) (0.377) (0.507)** (0.351) (0.645)* 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
-0.067 -0.051 -1.172 0.012 -1.891 
  
(0.074) (0.087) (0.515)** (0.089) (1.057)* 
R-squared 0.045 0.181 0.330 0.296 0.314 0.263 
Observations 116 109 53 56 64 45 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Cross country regressions of Government Deficit as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full 
data sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3.9: Debt as a share of GDP 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Strong Democracy Weak democracy Strong Democracy Weak democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  0.107 2.335 0.525 3.699 1.271 3.596 
 
(0.755) (1.150)** (1.939) (1.538)** (1.419) (1.747)** 
ln(𝑦)  -2.752 -1.760 -14.666 0.034 -15.501 4.855 
 
(4.939) (9.126) (13.538) (11.254) (9.715) (20.368) 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
6.361 -0.815 -7.231 6.016 -16.919 
  
(20.237) (26.860) (23.241) (18.382) (34.808) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
-2.681 -1.277 -0.811 -0.678 -2.493 
  
(1.560)* (2.511) (1.659) (1.947) (2.914) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
3.388 0.031 3.682 -0.872 4.098 
  
(1.599)** (2.067) (1.869)* (1.766) (2.221)* 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
0.163 0.261 -0.067 0.295 -0.020 
  
(0.144) (0.149)* (0.151) (0.124)** (0.176) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
1.870 -2.800 2.530 1.363 3.092 
  
(3.065) (4.821) (4.120) (3.623) (4.699) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
1.314 1.153 15.687 0.754 21.232 
  
(1.019) (1.829) (5.286)*** (1.424) (10.772)* 
R-squared 0.0118 0.160 0.314 0.386 0.310 0.343 
Observations 87 81 35 46 42 39 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Cross country regressions of Government debt as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full 
data sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3.10: Income Taxes 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Strong Democracy Weak democracy Strong Democracy Weak democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  -0.067 -0.108 -0.240 0.252 -0.135 0.180 
 
(0.148) (0.166) (0.211) (0.252) (0.245) (0.234) 
ln(𝑦)  5.288 6.354 16.943 -0.140 18.325 0.241 
 
(1.824)*** (2.051)*** (3.691)*** (2.482) (4.017)*** (2.387) 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
-2.644 0.585 -2.081 0.705 -2.058 
  
(1.340)** (1.510) (2.185) (1.558) (2.155) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
-0.258 -1.229 0.357 -1.208 0.369 
  
(0.181) (0.405)*** (0.237) (0.440)*** (0.229) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
-0.114 -0.216 4.717 -0.076 4.155 
  
(0.479) (0.541) (1.312)*** (0.534) (1.226)*** 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
0.045 0.077 0.010 0.087 0.021 
  
(0.016)*** (0.027)*** (0.027) (0.028)*** (0.025) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
1.178 37.619 -1.305 46.399 -2.397 
  
(5.267) (8.522)*** (10.263) (8.530)*** (9.580) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
-0.367 0.104 -0.361 0.337 -0.371 
  
(0.132)*** (1.003) (0.250) (1.049) (0.245) 
R-squared 0.889 0.891 0.924 0.886 0.925 0.887 
Observations 870 839 540 299 516 323 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions of Income Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3.11: Expenditure Taxes 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Strong Democracy Weak democracy Strong Democracy Weak democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  0.152 0.122 0.220 -0.106 0.204 -0.112 
 
(0.132) (0.123) (0.147) (0.212) (0.157) (0.215) 
ln(𝑦)  -6.194 -9.086 -16.454 -7.183 -18.236 -6.188 
 
(1.713)*** (1.653)*** (2.559)*** (2.426)*** (2.717)*** (2.406)** 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
-4.431 -3.718 -0.887 -3.803 -1.115 
  
(1.511)*** (4.674) (1.940) (4.542) (1.955) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
0.538 0.902 0.525 0.907 0.383 
  
(0.178)*** (0.305)*** (0.331) (0.329)*** (0.320) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
1.194 0.566 3.042 0.514 3.149 
  
(0.445)*** (0.429) (1.349)** (0.431) (1.290)** 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
0.019 0.007 -0.001 0.014 -0.009 
  
(0.017) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
-15.515 -32.845 10.791 -36.902 2.910 
  
(6.142)** (7.418)*** (11.322) (7.610)*** (11.283) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
-0.146 0.065 -0.289 0.099 -0.244 
  
(0.114) (0.954) (0.188) (1.027) (0.183) 
R-squared 0.898 0.897 0.896 0.924 0.886 0.923 
Observations 840 807 522 285 497 310 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions of Expenditure Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3.12: Income Taxes 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Strong Democracy Weak Democracy Strong Democracy Weak Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  -0.035 -0.050 -0.423 0.252 -0.314 0.180 
 
(0.139) (0.171) (0.155)*** (0.252) (0.185)* (0.234) 
ln(𝑦)  3.650 3.830 8.611 -0.140 9.375 0.241 
 
(1.636)** (1.816)** (2.210)*** (2.482) (2.462)*** (2.387) 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
-3.325 -1.404 -2.081 -1.307 -2.058 
  
(1.258)*** (1.476) (2.185) (1.439) (2.155) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
-0.059 -0.724 0.357 -0.581 0.369 
  
(0.170) (0.307)** (0.237) (0.373) (0.229) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
0.017 -0.328 4.717 -0.163 4.155 
  
(0.418) (0.404) (1.312)*** (0.395) (1.226)*** 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
0.052 0.072 0.010 0.084 0.021 
  
(0.015)*** (0.022)*** (0.027) (0.022)*** (0.025) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
-4.318 23.913 -1.305 32.241 -2.397 
  
(4.946) (7.094)*** (10.263) (7.030)*** (9.580) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
-0.425 -0.999 -0.361 -0.570 -0.371 
  
(0.139)*** (0.599)* (0.250) (0.615) (0.245) 
R-squared 0.912 0.915 0.961 0.886 0.963 0.887 
Observations 845 814 515 299 491 323 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions (after omitting outliers) of Income Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in 
the text. Full data sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 
1%. 
 
 
116 
 
 
 
Table 3.13: Expenditure Taxes 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Strong Democracy Weak democracy Strong Democracy Weak democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  0.232 0.236 0.508 -0.106 0.521 -0.112 
 
(0.136)* (0.123)* (0.123)*** (0.212) (0.136)*** (0.215) 
ln(𝑦)  -4.394 -7.393 -10.126 -7.183 -11.804 -6.188 
 
(1.767)** (1.688)*** (2.345)*** (2.426)*** (2.528)*** (2.406)** 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
-3.971 -3.536 -0.887 -3.624 -1.115 
  
(1.515)*** (4.235) (1.940) (4.135) (1.955) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
0.585 0.912 0.525 0.956 0.383 
  
(0.198)*** (0.322)*** (0.331) (0.387)** (0.320) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
0.932 0.516 3.042 0.533 3.149 
  
(0.454)** (0.423) (1.349)** (0.430) (1.290)** 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
0.019 0.023 -0.001 0.030 -0.009 
  
(0.017) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
-15.750 -27.523 10.791 -29.972 2.910 
  
(6.171)** (6.918)*** (11.322) (7.083)*** (11.283) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
-0.134 1.411 -0.289 1.589 -0.244 
  
(0.102) (0.718)** (0.188) (0.786)** (0.183) 
R-squared 0.909 0.909 0.917 0.924 0.908 0.923 
Observations 815 782 497 285 472 310 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions (after omitting outliers) of Expenditure Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables 
described in the text. Full data sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 
10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3.14: Income Taxes 
     (1) (2) (3) 
  
Strong Democracy Strong Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  -3.663 -2.512 -2.696 
 
(0.815)*** (1.173)** (1.262)** 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃2  0.041 0.028 0.032 
 
(0.010)*** (0.015)* (0.017)* 
ln(𝑦)  6.496 15.600 16.618 
 
(1.987)*** (3.757)*** (4.090)*** 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  -2.824 0.694 0.827 
 
(1.298)** (1.548) (1.632) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  -0.354 -1.278 -1.234 
 
(0.178)** (0.406)*** (0.448)*** 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  0.076 -0.204 -0.042 
 
(0.458) (0.531) (0.523) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  0.050 0.081 0.092 
 
(0.016)*** (0.026)*** (0.027)*** 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  -2.590 33.807 42.524 
 
(4.912) (8.485)*** (8.401)*** 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  -0.368 0.231 0.485 
 
(0.124)*** (0.989) (1.025) 
R-squared 0.894 0.925 0.926 
Observations 839 540 516 
Sample Size Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions of Income Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3.15: Expenditure Taxes 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
Strong Democracy 
(3) 
Strong Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  2.14*** 0.746 0.4 
(0.772) (0.967) (1) 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃2  -0.023** -0.006 -0.002 
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) 
ln(𝑦)  -8.8*** -16.26*** -18.22*** 
(1.68) (2.69) (2.9) 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  -4.34*** -4.3 -4.41 
(1.54) (4.81) (4.6) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  0.579*** 0.904*** 0.886*** 
(0.181) (0.303) (0.33) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  0.88* 0.423 0.38 
(0.453) (0.439) (0.439) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  0.013 0.002 0.01 
(0.017) (0.023) (0.023) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  -17** -36.56*** -41.52*** 
(6.79) (8.66) (8.69) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  -0.143 0.066 0.14 
(0.109) (0.945) (1.01) 
R - Squared 0.9 0.9 0.89 
Observations 807 522 497 
Sample Size Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions of Expenditure Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3.16: Deficit as a share of GDP 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Strong Democracy Weak democracy Strong Democracy Weak democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  -0.613 -0.679 -1.593 -0.034 -1.312 0.050 
 
(0.461) (0.405)* (0.967) (0.098) (0.853) (0.093) 
ln(𝑦)  15.435 15.999 25.014 3.284 23.430 4.900 
 
(11.071) (9.941) (14.289)* (1.430)** (14.229) (1.273)*** 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
-3.303 -3.913 -2.518 -3.608 -2.758 
  
(2.333) (3.667) (1.517)* (3.557) (1.711) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
-0.067 -0.435 -0.358 -0.316 -0.383 
  
(0.191) (0.598) (0.171)** (0.553) (0.152)** 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
-2.003 -4.945 -0.266 -5.144 -0.295 
  
(1.297) (3.410) (0.301) (3.694) (0.292) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
-0.103 -0.148 0.003 -0.138 0.001 
  
(0.061)* (0.085)* (0.016) (0.081)* (0.016) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
-48.955 -77.107 -10.638 -75.238 -7.496 
  
(25.651)* (44.143)* (5.009)** (43.939)* (4.583) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
-0.094 -0.217 0.761 -0.215 0.425 
  
(0.104) (0.304) (0.406)* (0.286) (0.412) 
R-squared 0.374 0.478 0.557 0.709 0.539 0.717 
Observations 835 810 282 528 306 504 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions of Government Deficit as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3.17: Debt as a share of GDP 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Strong Democracy Weak Democracy Strong Democracy Weak Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  1.614 1.874 0.536 2.537 0.346 2.306 
 
(0.553)*** (0.567)*** (0.857) (0.712)*** (0.782) (0.893)** 
ln(𝑦)  -27.023 -31.902 -24.610 -49.962 -27.031 -55.001 
 
(7.621)*** (7.401)*** (12.346)** (10.105)*** (11.555)** (12.959)*** 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
-14.334 -3.524 -28.082 -3.025 -28.510 
  
(5.178)*** (5.442) (4.644)*** (5.549) (4.754)*** 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
0.252 -3.707 4.143 -3.816 4.935 
  
(0.839) (1.215)*** (1.054)*** (1.224)*** (1.271)*** 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
1.644 1.268 3.602 0.492 4.322 
  
(1.825) (4.191) (2.198) (3.782) (2.205)* 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
0.297 0.345 0.178 0.354 0.173 
  
(0.058)*** (0.078)*** (0.077)** (0.071)*** (0.076)** 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
-52.152 -36.809 -99.696 -40.283 -117.770 
  
(23.184)** (30.818) (42.376)** (30.076) (41.879)*** 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
0.087 -0.754 -5.168 -0.885 -2.571 
  
(0.685) (0.812) (3.039)* (0.819) (2.880) 
R-squared 0.878 0.875 0.887 0.895 0.889 0.896 
Observations 592 576 198 378 214 362 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions of Government debt as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 3.18:Income Taxes 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Strong Democracy Weak Democracy Strong Democracy Weak Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  -0.046 -0.083 -0.222 0.020 -0.270 0.050 
 
(0.158) (0.164) (0.298) (0.148) (0.333) (0.134) 
ln(𝑦)  
 
-1.266 4.405 -1.759 10.793 -3.496 
  
(4.854) (8.241) (5.151) (8.609) (5.069) 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
-1.331 1.861 -2.722 2.239 -2.746 
  
(1.235) (0.892)** (1.058)** (0.906)** (1.054)*** 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
0.575 -0.161 0.465 -0.676 0.664 
  
(1.009) (2.284) (0.898) (2.347) (0.921) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
-0.450 0.684 -7.101 0.505 -4.572 
  
(2.697) (2.727) (7.154) (2.730) (6.747) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
0.063 0.110 0.005 0.140 -0.010 
  
(0.042) (0.064)* (0.034) (0.063)** (0.034) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
0.188 2.371 -0.257 4.592 1.118 
  
(4.777) (7.084) (7.801) (7.030) (7.010) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
-0.125 -0.268 -0.136 -0.215 -0.166 
  
(0.122) (0.363) (0.118) (0.387) (0.117) 
R-squared 0.152 0.169 0.205 0.217 0.234 0.209 
Observations 729 702 463 239 446 256 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions of Income Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots following Im-Pesaran-Shin test). 
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Table 3.19: Expenditure Taxes 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Strong Democracy Weak Democracy Strong Democracy Weak Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  -0.149 -0.121 -0.317 0.061 -0.192 0.017 
 
(0.138) (0.134) (0.187)* (0.176) (0.201) (0.181) 
ln(𝑦)  -0.297 -5.273 -5.874 -9.523 -6.573 -9.136 
 
(1.336) (2.885)* (4.318) (4.817)** (4.633) (4.500)** 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
-0.697 -0.908 -0.266 -1.079 -0.209 
  
(1.035) (0.757) (0.999) (0.759) (1.038) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
-0.340 -0.707 -0.264 0.582 -0.327 
  
(0.942) (1.649) (0.953) (1.711) (0.944) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
0.031 0.675 0.555 0.807 -0.428 
  
(2.236) (1.636) (7.149) (1.504) (6.350) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
-0.027 -0.044 -0.024 -0.038 -0.030 
  
(0.019) (0.025)* (0.038) (0.026) (0.035) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
1.058 -1.556 15.452 -4.362 9.954 
  
(3.141) (4.581) (7.658)** (4.937) (7.520) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
-0.047 -0.143 -0.109 0.032 -0.137 
  
(0.127) (0.580) (0.135) (0.511) (0.139) 
R-squared 0.161 0.186 0.228 0.235 0.226 0.231 
Observations 700 673 446 227 427 246 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions of Expenditure Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots following Im-Pesaran-Shin test). 
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Table3.20: Income Taxes 
     (1) (2) (3) 
  
Strong Democracy Strong Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  0.729 -0.178 0.146 
 
(1.630) (2.299) (2.104) 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃2  -0.009 -0.001 -0.005 
 
(0.018) (0.028) (0.026) 
ln(𝑦)  -0.204 3.134 11.057 
 
(1.918) (4.563) (8.281) 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  -1.330 1.743 2.242 
 
(1.243) (0.883)** (0.906)** 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  0.644 0.721 -0.597 
 
(1.046) (2.596) (2.413) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  -0.605 1.100 0.471 
 
(2.696) (2.976) (2.714) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  0.063 0.108 0.140 
 
(0.043) (0.065)* (0.064)** 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  -0.497 1.806 4.126 
 
(4.249) (6.970) (6.791) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  -0.117 -0.267 -0.215 
 
(0.123) (0.358) (0.387) 
R-squared 0.169 0.208 0.234 
Observations 702 463 446 
Sample Size Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions of Income Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots following Im-Pesaran-Shin test). 
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Table 3.21: Expenditure Taxes 
     (1) (2) (3) 
  
Strong Democracy Strong Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  0.153 2.162 1.813 
 
(0.896) (1.113)* (1.122) 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃2  -0.003 -0.028 -0.023 
 
(0.011) (0.014)** (0.014) 
ln(𝑦)  -0.363 -2.127 -5.283 
 
(1.338) (2.083) (4.464) 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  -0.589 -0.777 -1.063 
 
(1.049) (0.793) (0.780) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  -0.362 -1.132 0.926 
 
(0.947) (1.681) (1.752) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  -0.101 0.086 0.638 
 
(2.261) (1.629) (1.490) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  -0.026 -0.044 -0.041 
 
(0.019) (0.025)* (0.026) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  0.637 -3.688 -6.477 
 
(3.242) (4.999) (5.318) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  -0.011 -0.157 0.025 
 
(0.122) (0.590) (0.530) 
R-squared 0.180 0.242 0.239 
Observations 673 446 427 
Sample Size Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions of Expenditure Taxes as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots following Im-Pesaran-Shin test). 
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Table 3.22: Deficit as a share of GDP 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Strong Democracy Weak Democracy Strong Democracy Weak Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  -0.420 -0.133 -0.142 -0.110 -0.209 -0.088 
 
(0.248)* (0.090) (0.128) (0.132) (0.144) (0.117) 
ln(𝑦)  19.709 4.595 2.505 5.719 3.958 5.710 
 
(14.139) (2.286)** (3.669) (3.078)* (4.294) (2.909)* 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
0.770 2.497 0.214 2.617 0.382 
  
(1.110) (0.863)*** (0.687) (0.867)*** (0.667) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
0.725 0.255 0.651 0.304 0.669 
  
(0.732) (1.128) (0.947) (1.113) (0.947) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
0.686 0.071 2.468 0.072 2.654 
  
(1.170) (1.265) (2.691) (1.280) (2.424) 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
0.006 0.019 -0.005 0.025 -0.008 
  
(0.018) (0.026) (0.025) (0.029) (0.023) 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
-0.931 0.851 -7.238 1.224 -5.433 
  
(2.732) (3.645) (5.062) (3.445) (4.533) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
-0.035 -0.285 -0.044 -0.289 -0.039 
  
(0.093) (0.154)* (0.105) (0.157)* (0.106) 
R-squared 0.346 0.259 0.377 0.215 0.376 0.252 
Observations 703 683 453 230 435 248 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions of Government Deficit as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots following Im-Pesaran-Shin test). 
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Table 3.23: Debt as a share of GDP 
        (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
   
Strong Democracy Weak Democracy Strong Democracy Weak Democracy 
𝑈𝑇𝐼𝑃  -0.268 -0.204 0.077 -0.638 -0.019 -0.663 
 
(0.430) (0.441) (0.709) (0.465) (0.836) (0.461) 
ln(𝑦)  -54.853 -56.254 -4.963 -48.780 -44.712 -47.454 
 
(12.289)*** (13.289)*** (10.830) (19.075)** (21.240)** (18.647)** 
𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷  
 
-2.109 -13.374 2.483 -15.616 3.362 
  
(6.336) (2.660)*** (3.559) (2.366)*** (3.264) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564  
 
-3.705 -12.317 -3.666 -0.500 -3.292 
  
(4.335) (7.205)* (6.938) (5.948) (6.834) 
𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65  
 
-0.420 3.119 -21.623 8.393 -21.337 
  
(6.770) (8.645) (8.907)** (8.740) (8.054)*** 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸  
 
0.090 0.051 0.233 0.002 0.202 
  
(0.055) (0.091) (0.082)*** (0.089) (0.082)** 
𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃)  
 
15.211 45.082 35.050 33.403 40.239 
  
(19.227) (48.838) (29.829) (47.044) (28.470) 
𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2  
 
-1.028 1.102 0.187 2.306 0.164 
  
(1.202) (2.820) (0.606) (3.209) (0.609) 
R-squared 0.278 0.296 0.357 0.388 0.384 0.398 
Observations 488 476 319 157 309 167 
Sample Size Full Full 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 7 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 ≥ 8 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 < 8 
 
Notes: Panel data regressions of Government Debt as a percentage share of GDP including  ln(𝑦), 𝑂𝐸𝐶𝐷, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃1564, 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑃65, 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐸, 𝑙𝑛(𝑃𝑂𝑃) and 𝑃𝑂𝐿𝐼𝑇𝑌2 as control variables described in the text. Full data 
sample includes 129 countries and covers time period from 1990-2012. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
All the variables are differenced due to presence of unit roots following Im-Pesaran-Shin test). 
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Chapter 4 
Government Size and Economic Growth 
 
4.1)    Introduction 
     Is government intervention in the economy necessary? If yes, what is the optimal level of 
government intervention that would maximize living standards? These questions are at the heart 
of economics. There are proponents as well as opponents of government intervention and a 
continuum of opinions on the optimal size of government. 
     In this paper we analyse how government intervention/size, measured by government 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP, affects economic growth, measured by real GDP growth 
per capita. In order to proceed, we build on Islam (1995). Whilst Islam (1995) focuses on 
convergence, our hypothesis is based on the work of Armey (1995) where we argue that a rise in 
government expenditures as a fraction of GDP will increase GDP growth but only prior to a 
certain point after which further increases in government expenditures would lead to decreased 
GDP growth. We use panel data taking five years averages of data from 1981-2010 covering 79 
countries. Our data sample is different to Armey (1995) covering many more countries and 
years. 
     We take government expenditures as a share of GDP to measure government size and other 
control variables which include log initial real GDP per capita, openness to trade, the population 
growth rate, secondary school enrolment rate, inflation rates, the level of democracy, rule of law 
and bank deposits as a share of GDP. 
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     There is substantial evidence for the Armey curve across non-OECDs. The weak democracies 
are also found to have Armey curve. These results are in accordance with our hypothesis. On the 
other hand, lack of evidence for the presence of the Armey curve implies that these countries 
can sustain larger governments supporting Besley and Persson (2011). This argument is justified 
when we analyse that the share of public expenditure in GDP is 44.69% on average.  
     Because of possible endogeneity between government consumption and economic growth 
we apply 2 Stage Least Squares estimation (2SLS) method. The method also employs time and 
country fixed effects clustering standard errors by country. The evidence relating to full sample 
does not support presence of the Armey curve. 
     We also split the data sample depending on the OECD membership. Countries with OECD 
membership are highly democratic whereas Non-OECDs are relatively weak democracies. 
Following Besley and Persson (2011), Besley and Persson (2014) and Feng (1997), we also expect 
larger government size in strong democracies. The relationship between GDP growth and the 
government size is estimated to be an inverted U-shape across the non-OECD sample supporting 
our hypothesis, Armey (1995) and previous literature. The benchmark for the efficient 
government spending is found to be 23.99% of GDP. A rise in the size of government size 
increases economic growth but the growth is negatively affected with any further public 
expansion once the size of government reaches 23.99%. 
     On the other hand, the results regarding full and the OECD sample are rather mixed. We find 
both a U-shaped and an inverted U-shape association across these samples. Even when an 
association supporting the Armey curve is found for the OECD sample the estimated coefficients 
are statistically insignificant. As with the more democratic subsample this may imply that these 
countries are already have governments at or above the efficient level of government suggested 
by our empirical analysis. 
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     The evidence for the support of Armey curve is substantial across non-OECD countries when 
we interact government size with level of democracy. The purpose of interaction is to analyse 
the robustness of our results considering the possible indirect effects between the two variables. 
Democracies tend to have larger governments, so this possible indirect relation between these 
two variables is controlled by using them as interactive variables.  
     Following Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) we also break-down government spending into 
current consumption and public investment as the type of governments also matters. We find 
evidence for Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) and Devarajanet al (1996) across full sample, non-
OECD and OECD and strong democracies. Increase in current government expenditures lead to 
higher output growth. We also find evidence for positive effect of public investment on GDP 
growth for full samples, weak democracies and non-OECD countries. These results confirm the 
previous literature such as Aschauer (1989) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993). However, strong 
democracies and the OECD countries are estimated to suggest negative correlation between the 
two avriables lending support to Gregoriou (2008) and Devarajanet al (1996). 
     Further, non-linearity between these variables and economic growth is examined. For current 
government consumption there is substantial support found for the Armey curve across OECD 
countries and strongly democratic countries. However, the association between current 
consumption and economic growth is rather found to be U-shaped. 
     Contrary to current consumption, public investment is estimated to support the hypothesis of 
Armey Curve throughout non-OECDs and weak democracies. The nature of correlation between 
economic growth and public investment is found to be U-shaped across OECD and more 
democratic countries. These coefficients also do not hold statistical significance. 
     Following Cashin (1995) we also investigate how changes in direct transfers affect economic 
growth. For the whole sample, both direct taxes and transfers are found to support the presence 
of Armey curve. 
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     The empirical analysis is also extended by exploring how changes in the government size 
affect GDP per capita. In this case the evidence we find using 2SLS in first differences estimation 
confirms the hypothesis of Armey curve for the full sample though the coefficients are not 
statistically significant. The results are U-shaped for subsamples. 
     Section 4.2 reviews the literature whereas section 4.3 reviews the Armey Curve. Data are 
discussed in section 4.4 in detail. Section 4.5 confirms the empirical analysis and the following 
section concludes. 
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4.2) Literature Review 
     Before the incarnation of the first wave of growth theory, economic (GDP) growth was 
considered due to factor accumulation which arises from differences in saving rates (Solow), 
preferences (Cass-Koopmans) and other exogenous variables. However, in recent years, 
economists have explored the mechanics of growth with different dimensions. For example, the 
emphasis of Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988) is that the externalities originating from factor 
accumulation cause steady state growth. The distinctive feature of the models developed by 
Romer (1990a) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) is that they endogenize steady-state growth and 
technical progress although their explanation of differences in the level of economic 
development across countries did not differ from that of the old theories. 
     Differences in parameters considered essential for growth by both neo-classical and 
endogenous growth models led research to further avenues. The previous research also 
proposes other determinants of growth. Among those determinants are – the role of 
institutions, ideology, human capital, research and development, globalization, finance and 
growth, short-run and long-run macroeconomics, inequality, social and political factors, 
government size, investment, supply shocks and population. 
     Since we aim to empirically test the relationship between the size of government, measured 
by public expenditures as a share of GDP, and economic growth (Armey Curve) in this chapter, 
we first review the literature on economic growth followed by the literature on the Armey curve. 
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4.2.1) Government Size as a Determinant of Economic Growth 
     The size of government is an important potential determinant of output growth of a country. 
The evidence for its impact on economic growth has been found to be both positive as well as 
negative depending on its scope in economic matters and the data sample analysed. 
     Government size, measured by government expenditures as a share of GDP, may negatively 
affect economic growth as it potentially can produce distortionary effects for the economy. Dar 
and AmirKhalkhali (2002) find that a larger government size leads to a lower economic growth 
indirectly through its adverse impact on factor productivity. They estimate that larger 
government size in 19 OECD countries from 1971-1999 decreases capital productivity and total 
factor productivity growth. The efficiency level resulting from larger policy-induced distortions 
(burden of taxation) is lower in countries where government size is larger. Lack of market 
mechanisms, likewise, arguably suppresses the efficiency of resource use as well as the presence 
of crowding-out effects that discourage investment which is pivotal for economic growth. Folster 
and Henrekson (2001) find a robust negative correlation between public expenditures and 
economic growth for rich countries. Despite extending the analysis to non-OECD countries, their 
findings are substantially supported. An analysis of data spanning from 1960-1996 for the US, 23 
OECD countries and the larger sample consisting of 60 countries, Gwartney, Holcombe and 
Lawson (1998) suggest that the government intervention beyond their core functions in the 
economy reduce investment as a percentage of GDP, labor productivity and real GDP growth. 
Wildavsky (1975) also argues for a negative relationship between economic growth and 
expansion of public economy. 
     The association between GDP growth and government size is also analysed after de-
composing government expenditures. Different compositions of government expenditures yield 
mixed effects, positive and negative, on economic growth. Devarajan, Swaroop and Zou (1996) 
de-compose government expenditures into current and capital expenditures and analyse their 
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impact on GDP growth. A rise in economic growth per capita with higher current expenditures 
and a decrease in GDP growth per capita with more capital expenditures are estimated. Large 
share of budget allocation for capital expenditures in developing countries implying excessive 
use of capital expenditures actually turns otherwise productive expenditure into unproductive. 
Since many components of current expenditures have high rates of return than capital 
expenditures, the excessive use of capital expenditures results in lower economic growth. To 
sum up, an excessive use of even the productive, capital, expenditures could become 
unproductive as is seen in the case of 43 developing countries in their study. Increases in total 
government outlays, government consumption and government transfers are found to reduce 
the productivity growth of the private sector by Hansson and Henrekson (1994). Contrarily, 
government expenditures on education are estimated to have a positive effect whereas 
government investment has no impact on private productivity growth. Comparing the difference 
between total and marginal productivity the former is found to affect labor and capital 
productivity. Using cross-country data of the share of government consumption expenditures in 
GDP, Landau (1983) finds a negative relation between the fraction of GDP spent as government 
consumption and real GDP growth per capita. 
     On the other side of spectrum others have found a positive impact of government 
involvement. Rubinson (1977) finds that economic growth is promoted by large government 
size. Using a data set including 115 market economies during 1960 to 1980, Ram (1986) finds a 
positive impact of government size on economic growth. He also finds a positive externality 
effect of public expansion on the overall economy and higher factor productivity in the public 
sector in 1960 at least. Similarly, La Porta, Silances, Shleifer and Vishny (1999) use measures such 
as government size, government intervention, public sector efficiency, political freedom and 
supply of public goods to determine the performance of government.  Performance of larger 
governments is concluded to be better. Besides that the performance of poor countries, 
countries closer to the equator, ethno linguistically heterogeneous and countries using socialist 
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laws or having more religious population have been found to be inferior. Carr (1989) argues for a 
positive correlation between the size of government and economic growth28. 
     The findings of the literature analysing the impact of the size of government on output 
growth are not conclusive and, at times, contrary. The difference in the results may largely be 
attributed to the differences in the data, the sample of countries chosen for the analysis and the 
difference of the chosen model. 
 
4.2.2) Other Determinants of Economic Growth 
     The size of government is not the only determinant of economic growth; hence we briefly 
review a broad variety of literature shedding light on the factors that may potentially have an 
impact on output growth. 
     Institutions to some extent are determined by the ideology of statesas they represent the 
magnitude of government intervention in the economy which makes it an important 
determinant of economic growth. Policy makers influenced by the idea of free economy might 
prefer to establish effective and strong institutions for they form the rules of the game by 
providing economic agents with appropriate incentives. On the contrary, weak institutions and a 
higher level of government intervention can be found in societies with the objective of a 
controlled economy. As we already know that government intervention can yield both positive 
and negative effects - i. e. government existence can be good or bad depending on institutions. 
Bjornskov (2005) finds higher economic growth in right-wing societies as compared to left-wing 
societies as voters in latter might demand inefficient levels of redistribution and government 
                                                          
28 The findings are suggested to be analysed with caution though. Ignoring the positive externalities generating from goods and 
services provided by the government and evaluating them at cost value does not perfectly measure government productivity. 
Further, he suggests, the marking of government intermediate goods as final products also induces a positive bias between the two 
variables. 
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intervention whilst paying less heed to the matters of the economy. Haan and Sturm (2000) also 
suggest that higher economic growth is found in societies which let the economy free. 
     Economic growth also depends on whether or not the institutions protect property right. 
Protection of property rights encourages innovation by securing the rights of producers investing 
for invention/innovation of new technology. Along these lines, the works of Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2005) and Jones (1981) establish institutions as the fundamental cause for long-
run economic growth. Furthermore, Keefer and Knack (2002) find any factor negatively affecting 
institution by decreasing its ability to enforce protection of property rights and the security of 
contract may hamper economic growth. In their study social polarization negatively affects 
economic growth by reducing the ability of institutions to enforce property rights. 
     Investment, undeniably, is among the most important determinants of GDP. De Long and 
Summers (1990) find a rise in GDP growth by one third of a percentage point per year with a 1% 
higher investment in machinery and equipment. 
     Another study by Makki and Somwaru (2004) establishes a positive correlation between GDP 
growth and foreign direct investment because often the advance technology transfer takes place 
through foreign direct investment (FDI). Nonetheless, there is an endogeneity problem despite 
the high returns generated through foreign direct investment as it is attracted by the countries 
which are either doing well or expected to do well in the future.29 
     According to Solow-Swan (1956) growth model as well as much of the literature that 
followed, the returns to physical capital are diminishing implying the convergence hypothesis. 
For example, the work of Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and King and Levine (1994) support the 
growth model developed by Solow-Swan (1956)30. 
                                                          
29 The argument is owed to Pritchett (1996a). 
30 Although given this, yet the positive externalities ensuing from FDI cannot be ruled out. 
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     The confidence of economic agents, especially investors, heavily depends on the stable 
political environment of the country. Political instability inevitably causes policy instability with 
frequent and untimely change of faces in the political office since every political party (dictators 
if there is a military coup) has a different set of preferences and list of priorities.  Alesina, Ozler, 
Roubini and Swagel (1996) find that higher political instability, measured by the propensity of a 
government collapse, hampers economic growth. In his work, Fosu (1992) finds a deleterious 
effect of political instability on economic performance. Likewise, Barro (1991)finds a negative 
relation between political instability, measured by revolutions, coups and political 
assassinations, on economic growth and investment. Jong-A-Pin (2009) extending the 
dimensions of political stability to four, mass civil protest, politically motivated aggression, 
instability within the political regime and instability of the political regime, also finds lower GDP 
growth with higher political instability31. 
     Incentives of, and constraints on, economic actors are determined by institutions in a country. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) establish arguments about the important role the 
institutions can play in the economic development of a country as they provide protection of 
property rights. Similarly, Gould and Gruben (1996) suggest that more protection of intellectual 
property rights for they provide incentives to innovate would increase GDP growth. 
     Allocation of a considerable share of the budget for education, health and other human 
capital investments manifests the importance of human capital for a country. As aptly put by 
Alderman et al. (1996) developing countries spend more than $100 billion a year on human 
capital investment. Considering this, its contribution to economic growth requires an in-depth 
analysis. The significance of human capital in the form of educational attainment is accentuated 
in many economic growth models, for example; Nelson and Phelps (1966), Lucas (1988), 
Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993), Rebelo (1991) and Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990). In an 
                                                          
31Campos and Nugent (2002) claimed that there exists neither a causal relationship nor any negative relationship between political 
instability and economic growth. Nevertheless, they find short-run effect. 
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empirical study, for example, Barro (2001) finds faster economic growth in those countries which 
attain higher level of education at their start for a given level of initial per capita GDP and values 
of policy-related variables. Using the proxies for human capital, some empirical studies of 
growth (Benhabiband Spiegel (1994) and Barro (1991) also attempt to analyse how higher level 
of educational attainment affects economic growth though their work suffered due to lack of 
data availability on education for a large number of countries. The importance of education also 
implies a positive role for government intervention. 
     Population is also a significant determinant of GDP. There are two streams of thought. 
Proponents of higher population argue about the demand-side effects and consider population 
as a blessing whereas the opponents speak about the supply-side effects the higher population 
growth generates and consider it a burden on the economy. According to the Malthusian theory 
of population growth, an arithmetic rise in the resources coupled with a geometric rise in the 
population growth (unrestricted) would result in famine, disease, misery, starvation, war and a 
tendency for economies to stagnate at subsistence level. Coale and Hoover (1958)suggest three 
adverse effects of population growth; capital-shallowing effect, an age dependency effect and an 
investment-diversion effect.  Becker, Glaeser and Murphy (1999) find that an increase in 
population can decrease productivity as intensive use of land and other natural resources may 
produce diminishing marginal returns. 
     On the other hand, Keynes (1936), Hansen (1939) and Reddaway (1939) term slow population 
growth to be a potential cause of the insufficient aggregate demand that prolonged the 1930’s 
depression.32 Greater specialization and higher investment in knowledge can also be attributed 
to high population growth rate that would translate into increased productivity. Likewise, it can 
also provide with cheap labor and big market. 
                                                          
32 Though the debate never ended and the view that population growth generates adverse effects dominated from 1960s again and 
continued thereafter.  
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Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) consider geography also as a potential cause for 
affecting economic growth. They broke geography into three categories; climate, availability of 
technology and disease burden. Montesquieu (1748) argues that people in cold climate would 
be more willing to work whereas the inclination of inhabitants of hot territories towards work 
would be relatively less due to the heat factor. Sachs (2001) suggests that the productivity of 
technology in temperate-zone will be less as opposed to the technology in tropical-zone. A 
reduction of 1.3 percent growth a year due to diseases is found by Sachs (2000). 
     Culture, since it is composed of the values, beliefs, preferences and attitudes of the society as 
a whole, is certainly instrumental in any country’s economic development. Besides the necessary 
condition for economic growth such as natural, physical, financial, informational and human 
resources, the attitude of the society in economic literature is termed as the sufficient condition 
for economic prosperity. The attitude may include approach towards research and development, 
equal rights, democracy, honesty, dedication, sincerity, and the willingness to work, learn, 
participate, innovate and invent as well as the intention and motivation to develop. Mechanism 
explained in the theory of stages of growth did not always work because Rostow and Harrod-
Domarmodels implicitly assume the attitude of under-developed countries similar as that of the 
developed nations (Todaro 1992). In addition, different cultures based on different beliefs 
choose a different set of institutions which then determine the rules how the society will work 
(Greif 1994). Needless to say, free and effective institutions promote growth whereas weak 
institutions are one of the reasons why GDP growth of developing or under-developed countries 
is low. 
     Proponents of “trickle down” economic theory suggest that a rise in income inequality 
resulting from economic growth has to be swallowed though a hard pill. Their rationale for this 
advocacy is that the boons of economic development will ultimately be redistributed to the 
society once the economy becomes better-off as a whole. Kuznets hypothesis re-conciliates with 
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the idea of trickle-down effect theory. However, there exists a large amount of literature that 
rather finds a reverse causation. According to the literature, it is the income inequality that 
reduces growth as opposed to growth causing income inequality. Alesina and Perroti (1996) 
show that societies with unfair distribution of income and land demand more redistribution 
through a rise in direct taxes which harm economic growth. Likewise, Persson and Tabellini 
(1994)find that a higher level of unfair distribution would result in lower growth. 
     Some government policies increase GDP growth whereas some might bring harmful effects to 
it. Similarly, taxation policies also receive mixed response as far as their impact on economic 
growth is concerned. Vedder (2001) finds negative impact of taxes on economic growth 
elaborating that less taxes mean less government spending. Private sector makes more 
productive use of resources as compared to public sector as the policies of latter are non-market 
friendly as well as politically influenced. According to his study, income taxes are more 
distortionary than sales tax. On the contrary, Helms (1985) finds a positive impact of higher 
taxation on economic output. Higher taxes may increase economic growth when the revenues 
generated from them are used to make transfer payments which may lead to improved public 
services, such as, education, infrastructure and social security needs. 
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4.3) The Armey Curve 
     Absence or presence of government in economic matters has always attracted considerable 
attention and controversy. According to Public Choice literature, corruption, rent seeking 
activities and excessive taxation causing inefficiency are problems associated with large public 
sectors. On the other hand, law and order, protection of property rights, confidence in the 
economy and incentive to save and invest are potential favourable effects that proponents of 
government expansion put forward. For example, Ram (1986) and Kormendi and Meguire (1986) 
are studies that find positive effect of government size on the economy whereas Landau (1983), 
Engen and Skinner (1992), Folster and Henrekson (2001) and Dar and Amirkhalkhali (2002) are 
studies that find adverse effects of public expansion on the economy. Hence, there arise 
questions that need to be investigated. Should government exist at all to control and regulate 
the economy? If yes, what should be the level of its intervention? The research literature is not 
wholly resolved. 
     At the limit, a country without government will face significant problems; no rule of law, no 
protection of property rights, no incentive to either save or invest due to constant fear of 
expropriation, no confidence on currency and many more issues that can be named. Thus, some 
government seems essential. Government can promote economic growth by building better 
legal institutions and administrative as well as economic infrastructure.  
On the other hand, the presence of government is not costless. There are many negative effects 
of government activity that may be the consequence of its rent-seeking behaviour, corruption, 
excessive taxation and inefficiency.  
     Given the potentially adverse and favourable consequences of government involvement in 
the economy, it can be said that government intervention is essential but too much of it is not 
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desirable. What is the optimum level of government presence then? Is it the government size 
that causes growth or the other way round? 
     The Armey curve questions “Wagner’s Law” by reversing the causality between the two 
variables. Wagner (1892) developed a hypothesis, which later was enshrined in the literature as 
Wagner’s Law, suggesting an increase in the government size with an increase in income. 
However, Armey (1995) establishes government size as instead a cause for lower economic 
growth. 
     As is suggested by the Armey curve, government involvement in the economy is desirable up 
to an extent but beyond that point it will damage the economy by decreasing its economic 
growth. The Armey curve establishes a non-linear, inverted U-shape, relationship between GDP 
growth and the government size, measured by the government expenditures as a share of GDP. 
He suggests that the positive implications of government activity on the overall economy may be 
due to the provision of sub-structures and public goods.The negative effects, however, may 
result from the crowding-out effect of government monopolistic activities. 
     The literature investigating the Armey curve is now quite well developed. Vedder and 
Gallaway (1998) find evidence for the Armey curve.  At first, they argue that due to reductions in 
transaction costs, improved environment for investment, improvement in the rule of law and 
enforceable property rights the growth of public expansion in the economy leads to higher 
output growth. However, there is a negative correlation between economic growth and 
government size if government expands beyond a certain threshold. In their sample including 
Canada, Denmark, Italy, Sweden, Britain and the US the findings are consistent with the Armey 
curve. 
     Tanzi and Zee (1997) also support the Armey curve hypothesis. According to their argument 
public finance instruments, such as tax, expenditures and overall budgetary policies, could affect 
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economic growth. These instruments by increasing allocative efficiency, maintaining 
macroeconomic stability and making income distribution fairerhelp economies to grow more. 
Nonetheless, their hypothesis is not supported by empirical findings because the findings lack 
robustness. Contrary to theirs’, our findings are robust and consistent with the Armey curve. 
     Proceeding along the same lines, Grossman (1987) also supports the Armey curve. He 
develops a simultaneous equations model in order to test the non-linear relationship between 
the size of government and economic growth. The model is empirically tested using time-series 
data for the United States and finds substantial support for presence of the Armey curve. 
     Cashin (1995) develops an endogenous growth framework to study how public investment, 
public transfers and distortionary taxation affect economic growth. Using time series estimation 
to support his theory he concludesthat there are trade-offs associated with growth of 
government. Public investment and transfer payments contribute positively to economic growth 
as they yield positive externalities by encouraging private investment. Distortionary impact of 
taxation imposed to fund the supply of public goods, nevertheless, leads to dampen economic 
growth as they reduce the marginal return to private capital. This chapter also finds strong 
evidence for the Armey Curve implying both positive and negative effects of government though 
only for the Non-OECD and weak democratic countries when we decompose the sample. 
     Using a two – sector model production function employing government and private sector, 
Ram (1986) analyses the effect of government size on GDP growth. The study supports the 
Armey curve. Having classified government into three categories, Chen and Lee (2005) conclude 
that there exists a threshold effect and a non-linear relationship between the size of government 
and economic growth. 
     The short and intermediate-run analysis of the Armey curve has also been investigated. Using 
single and simultaneous equations for less developed and developed countries the study, Lin 
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(1994), concludes that the growth of government induces economic growth in the short-run but 
not in the intermediate-run33. 
     Besides establishing a non-linear relationship between the size of government and economic 
growth, some papers also estimate the optimal government size. Handoussa and Reiffers (2003) 
study the relationship between economic growth and government size having obtained data 
from 1968 to 1997 for Tunisia. Due to the significant role of the Tunisian government their 
findings support presence of the Armey curve. According to their findings the government 
expenditures making up 35% of GDP would induce economic growth beyond which further 
public expansion will reduce the GDP growth. In another study, (Radwan and Reiffers2004), 
public consumption constituting 44% of Gross Domestic Product is suggested as optimal 
government size for Israel34. Pevcin (2004) uses panel data estimates of the Armey curve and 
finds that government expenditures making up 36% to 42% of GDP as an optimal size of 
government for 12 European countries from 1950 to 1996. 
     Following the already existing literature, we therefore expect a non-linear, inverted U-shape, 
relationship betweeneconomic growth and the size of government (government expenditure as 
a share of GDP). This means that economic development rises with a rise in government 
expenditures at first but after reaching an optimum level the further rise in government size 
decreases GDP growth. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 25 years is considered as intermediate-run in this study. 
34 The suggested figure may appear big but it’s realistic for countries where the presence of state has penetrated for a long time. 
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4.4) Data 
     In order to estimate the relationship between economic growth and the government size we 
collect annual data from 1981-2010 covering 79 countries35. Data collection and their 
organization take inspiration from two previous studies, Islam (1995) and Lee and Gordon 
(2005), though unlike them we examine the potential non-linear relationship between economic 
growth and the size of government. The control variables included are initial Real GDP per 
capita, openness to trade, the inflation rate, the population growth rate, secondary school 
enrolment rates, level of democracy, the rule of law and bank deposits as a share of GDP. These 
are collected following Lee and Gordon (2005) though their research agenda is different than 
ours.36 Nevertheless, we replace their measure of institutions with the level of democracy and 
the rule of law as the data for institutions were not publicly available. Following Islam (1995)37 
we take averages for 5-year time intervals to control for the cyclical effects in the data. We have 
six data (time) points for each country, averages over – 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-
2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010.  We apply 2SLS estimation and employ time and country fixed 
effects as used by Islam (1995). We also use errors clustered by country. Besides this, we also 
examine how changes in current government expenditures and capital expenditures affect 
economic growth using the same sample. In addition we also investigate how changes in direct 
taxes and transfers relate to GDP growth. 
     Our main variable, GDP growth is calculated from PPP converted GDP per capita38 (chain 
series), at 2005 constant prices, which is collected from Penn World Table. Its mean value, 1.98, 
shows a moderate growth on average across the sample which is shown in table 4.1. However, 
its standard deviation, 4.82, exhibits notable variation across the sample as is indicated in Figure 
                                                          
35 A country is included if its population is higher than a million and if they have enough observations. 
36 They study the impact of tax structure on economic growth. 
37 They test the convergence hypothesis. 
38 We collect PPP converted GDP growth,measured in millions, and then divide it by population, measured in millions, to get Real 
GDP growth per capita.  
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4.1.39The figure actually exhibits no trend but we can clearly see periods of falling, recovering 
and increasing economic growth. In the early 1990s, around 2000 and 2007 the GDP growth is in 
negative figures due to recession. Besides these periods, the figure shows periods of moderate 
increases in economic growth or falls. 
     Government expenditures as a share of GDP are taken from World Economic Outlook – 
International Monetary Finance (WEO-IMF). It is used to analyse how GDP growth is affected 
with changes in public expenditures following the hypothesis of Armey (1995). Its mean and 
standard deviation are 33.40 and 13.53 respectively. Graphical presentation of government 
involvement is shown in Figure 4.2. Around 1990 and 2007 the government expenditures are 
shown to be rising which may possibly indicate countercyclical fiscal policy. However, besides 
these periods the trend rather indicates procyclicality or acyclicality. This is supported by the 
previous literature. Talvi and Vegh (2005) find fiscal policy is acyclical for G7 countries and 
procyclical for developing countries. Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) also find evidence that fiscal policy 
in developing countries is procyclical. This figure is clearly showing a counter-cyclical pattern 
when compared with Figure 4.1. Government expenditures as a share of GDP decrease when 
economy performs well and vice versa. 
     Besides analysing the impact of the government size on economic growth, we also analyse the 
impact of current government consumption and public investment on economic growth. We 
decompose the government expenditures into current and capital expenditures following Ghosh 
and Gregoriou (2008). 
     Data for current government expenditures are collected from International Monetary Fund: 
Government Financial Statistics (IMF-GFS). Its mean and standard deviations are 25.06 and 
                                                          
39The graphical presentation does not include all the countries across the sample due to missing data. It includes Bangladesh, 
Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and US only. Sample selection 
for Figures 4.2 and 4.3 are same. 
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10.13. The mean shows that it constitutes a considerable fraction of government spending 
whereas the standard deviation shows notable variation across the sample. 
     Data source for public investment is also IMF-GFS. Its mean, 3.20, shows that governments on 
average are not inclined to invest more on capital. Similarly, large variation is indicated by the 
standard deviation,2.28, across the sample. 
We also test the impact of changes in transfers on GDP growth. Transfers are both collected 
from World Development Indicators. The mean value of direct transfers, 40.72, is suggestive of 
the fact that governments all over the sample distribute a lot. Contrarily the standard deviation, 
20.63, shows big variation, 
     Initial real GDP per capita40, measuring the level of development, is a key independent 
variable identified in the Solow model. It is used to control for the heterogeneity in the level of 
development across countries. To measure differences in the level of development across the 
countries in the sample, we take log of initial real GDP per capita. It is calculated by taking the 
five years average of each data (time) points. The mean and standard deviation of the whole 
sample are 8.67 and 1.22respectively. 
     Frankel and Romer (1999) and Dollar and Kraay (2003) suggest openness to trade as an 
important contributor to economic growth as they find a positive association between them41. 
Following them, we collect data for trade openness (measured by exports plus imports as a 
share of GDP) from the World Development Indicators (WDI) database. Its mean is 73.33 though 
substantial variation across the sample is also indicated by the standard deviation which is 46.99. 
     Comparing democracy with dictatorship, Feng (1997) argues that strong democracies are 
positively correlated with economic growth, though indirectly, through providing stable political 
                                                          
40 [PPP converted GDP per capita (chain series), at 2005 constant prices]. Its unit is 2005 International dollar per person. 
41 Their evidence, however, is sceptically viewed by Rodriguez and Rodrick (2001). 
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system. In order to control for potential ideological effects on growth we take data on polity242 
variable from Polity IV Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946 – 2013. Its range goes from -10 to 
10 where 10 refer most democratic countries whereas -10 to extremely autocratic ones. As 
indicated by the standard deviation, 6.48, some countries are strongly democratic whereas some 
are weakly democratic. 
     Following Temple (1999), population growth rate data are collected from the WDI database. 
Its mean value shows that annual population growth rate, on average, is 1.38 across the sample 
whereas the standard deviation, 1.27, also shows a substantive variation across countries. 
                                                          
42 It is measured by deducting democratic ratings from autocratic ratings. Autocratic ratings range from -1 to -10 where -10 refer to 
extremely autocratic. Similarly the ratings for democracy span from 1 to 10 where 10 indicates extremely democratic. 
148 
 
 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics of the Variables 
   
  
   
 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
    
  
Real GDP Growth Per Capita 406 1.98 4.82 .74 9.58 
Government Expenditure (% of GDP) 420 40.92 14.74 12.38 59.112 
Secondary School Enrolment 426 72.21 32.37 17.64 85.46 
Quality of Democracy (polity2) 436 3.74 6.48 -3.8 10 
Natural Log Real GDP per capita 420 9.39 1.37 5.55 11.02 
Openness to Trade (Trade) 448 44.30 14.57 13.55 60.24 
Investment as a share of GDP 443 22.82 7.02 11.23 32.14 
Inflation Rate 405 8.08 6.91 2.77 17.89 
Population Growth (Annual) 474 1.38 1.27 .03 2.78 
Log Initial  Real GDP per capita 448 8.67 1.22 6.48 10.60 
public investment 186 3.20 2.28 1.13 9.88 
Current Govt Expenditures 189 25.06 10.13 10.36 38.44 
Direct Transfers 268 40.72 20.63 16.37 62.52 
Bank Deposits/GDP 411 39.48 25.68 18.81 64.66 
Rule of Law 237 .12 1.00 -1.38 1.66 
   
 
Cross country data are taken from 1981-2010. Real GDP per capita (chained series-PPP) is taken from the Penn World Table and Real GDP Growth Per Capita, natural log real GDP per capita 
and initial real GDP per capita are calculated from real GDP per capita. Government expenditures as a fraction of GDP is taken from World Economic Outlook (IMF). Primary school enrolment 
rate, openness to trade, inflation rate and population growth rate are taken from World Development Indicators. Polity2 data are collected from Polity IV database.
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Cross country average annual real GDP growth per capita for Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, 
Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and US. 
Figure: 4.1 
 
 
 
 
Cross country average annual government spending as a share of GDP for Bangladesh, Belgium, 
Botswana, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and 
US. 
Figure: 4.2 
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Cross country average annual log real GDP per capita for Bangladesh, Belgium, Botswana, 
Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Norway, Spain, Sweden, UK and US. 
Figure: 4.3 
 
     Investment as s share of GDP is collected from World Development Indicators. Summers 
(1990) find investment to be positively correlated with GDP growth. Its mean and standard 
deviation are 22.82 and 7.02 respectively. 
     Education, as it defines the human capital of a country, is expected to be one of the most 
influential factors in economic growth. Mankiw et al (1992), an authoritative paper in the growth 
literature, use school enrolment rate in their analysis.43 Following this paper and Lee and Gordon 
(2005) we collect primary school enrolment rate as a control variable.44 
     Following Lee and Gordon (2005) we collect inflation rates data. The data are collected from 
the WDI database. Its mean and standard deviation are 38.16 and 193.71 respectively. Its mean 
                                                          
43 Nevertheless, there is no agreement on the best measure of education. For example, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) and Pitchett 
(1996) can be consulted for detailed explanation. 
44 Gross enrolment ratio is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially 
corresponds to the level of the education shown. Primary education provides children with basic reading, writing, and mathematics 
skills along with an elementary understanding of such subjects as history, geography, natural science, social science, art, and music. 
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indicates that the inflation rate, on average, is high across the sample. But, nevertheless, the 
standard deviation shows the data are skewed by hyper-inflation. 
     Rule of law is included as a control variable to control for political stability. Data for this 
variable are collected from World Governance Indicators. As suggested by Alesina, Ozler, Roubini 
and Swagel (1996) that more politically stable governments are found have higher economic 
growth. 
     Bank deposits as a share of GDP is included to control for financial development following 
Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) though they used bank credit to the private sector as a proxy for 
financial development. They found a positive relation between financial development and 
economic growth. 
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4.5) Empirical Findings 
     This section is divided into two sub-sections. In the first sub-section we will analyse how 
changes in the government size, measured by government expenditures as a share of GDP, 
affect economic growth. We will de-compose government expenditures into current 
government consumption and public investment as shares of GDP and will analyse how these 
variables are related to economic growth following Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) in the next sub-
section. Building on Cashin (1995), how changes in transfers affect GDP growth is also analysed. 
Furthermore, we also analyse the impact of government size on real GDP per capita. 
 
4.5.1)   Government Size as a Share of GDP 
     This sub-section presents findings regarding how government size, measured by government 
expenditures as a share of GDP, affects economic growth. Presented in Table 4.2 are the 
estimated coefficients of the specification where we regress real GDP growth per capita on 
government expenditures including control variables. The control variables include initial Real 
GDP per capita, openness to trade, the inflation rate, the population growth rate, primary school 
enrolment, level of democracy, rule of law and bank deposits as a share of GDP. Five years 
averages of data from 1981 to 2010 are taken to control for the cyclical variation which could 
confound annual data. We apply OLS making use of country and time fixed effects in the 
specifications. Standard Errors are clustered by country. The relation between GDP growth and 
the size of government is also tested keeping in view possible correlation between extent of 
democracy and the government size. 
     Non-linearity between economic growth and the government spending along with initial GDP 
per capita taken as a control variable is tested in the first column of Table 4.2. The estimated 
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coefficients for the linear (at 5%) and quadratic terms (at 1%) are statistically significant. The 
finding supports presence of the Armey curve. A rise in the government size increases economic 
growth but once the government size constitutes 42.33% of GDP any further government 
involvement decreases economic growth. As far as determining the optimal size of government 
is concerned, the finding is closer to Radwan and Reiffers (2004) who find 44% as a benchmark 
for optimal government involvement. However, the estimated benchmark is higher than Peden 
(1991), Scully (1994) and Herath (2012). 
     Under the classical supply-side paradigm of productivity growth, for example, Peden (1991) 
finds the presence of Armey curve in the US economy. Data estimation from 1929-1986 finds the 
optimal government size when government expenditures represent 20% of GDP. In another 
study, Scully (1994), the size of government measured by income taxes as a share of GNP at all 
levels (local, state and federal) is estimated to decrease economic growth once these taxes 
increase beyond 23% of GNP in the United States. Data for this study are from 1949-1989. Along 
these lines Herath (2012) using time series data from 1959-2009 and second degree polynomial 
regression confirms presence of the Armey curve for Sri Lanka. Government expenditures 
composing 27% of GDP is estimated as the optimal government size. According to him, a further 
increase in government expenditures for additional, unproductive, projects financed by raising 
taxes and borrowings creates excessive burden and lack of incentives for the workers. Similarly, 
Radwan and Reiffers (2004) find the optimal government size at 44% whereas Pevcin (2004) 
finds it when government expenditures represent 36% to 42% of GDP. 
     Drawing an analysis between our result and previous literature clearly suggests that the 
optimal government size estimated is substantially large to most of the papers referred in the 
last paragraph. The coefficients representing government size may be capturing the omitted 
variable bias.  
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     Besides the main variable in the first column, the estimated coefficient of log initial GDP per 
capita is negative and strongly significant statistically (at 1%). It supports the convergence 
hypothesis proposed by Solow (1956) that the GDP per capita of poor countries will grow faster 
than the GDP per capita of rich countries. The model explains 47.5% of the total variation in the 
economic growth. 
     In order to address the omitted variable bias problem we add investment as a share of GDP, 
trade as a share of GDP, population growth rate, secondary school enrolment rate and the level 
of democracy as control variables in the next column. 
     Evidence for the Armey curve is again found in the second column. The benchmark estimated 
to be efficient is 38.7%. Investment as a share of GDP is positively correlated with GDP per 
capita. This finding supports Summers (1990) who also finds higher GDP growth with more 
investment. Positive and strongly significant coefficient of trade implies higher GDP growth 
would be achieved with more openness. This is in accordance with Frankel and Romer (1999) 
and Dollar and Kraay (2003). Popualtion is found to be adversely affecting economic growth in 
previous literatures like Coale and Hoover (1958) and Becker, Glaeser and Murphy (1999). The 
estimated coefficient of population is negative and significant which supports previous 
literature.  
     In column 3 we add inflation rate, rule of law and bank deposits as a share of GDP as control 
variable. The coefficients related to the government size are estimated to suggest U-shaped 
association with the GDP growth though the coefficients are insignificant. Initial GDP per capita 
and investment support the previous findings. Rest of the control variables are not statistically 
significant. 
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     In columns 4 and 5 the sample is de-composed into weak and strong democratic countries45. 
Drawing a comparison between weak and strong democracies as far as the size of government is 
concerned is important. Countries with strong democratic structure can arguably sustain larger 
governments as opposed to dictatorships or weak democracies. 
     Besley and Persson (2014) argue that the capacity to tax of developing countries is 
constrained by key factors. Such factors include a heavy reliance on the informal economy, aid 
and resource dependence, failure of governments to take action, weak political institutions, low 
contestability of power, weak checks and balances, absence/weak cultural norms and identity 
with regards to paying taxes and weak state building.  Referring to the development cluster 
argument of Besley and Persson (2011) that different capacities of state coevolve, we may infer 
weak democracy may limit the capacity of state to tax. 
     Strong democracies with potentially higher capacity to tax than weak democracies does not 
imply that the former have limitless capacity to tax. Due to other dynamics related to raising 
taxes even the strong democracies cannot raise taxes at their will. The Laffer curve is a relevant 
idea here. A comparison in the previous paragraph is drawn only to make a point that the size of 
government is expected to be larger in strong democracies than weaker ones. 
     As expected, the relationship between GDP growth and government size is similar to Armey 
curve but the coefficients are not statistically significant across less democratic sample. 
However, statistically insignificant relationship between the two variables throughout the OECD 
countries is rather U-shaped. One possible interpretation of the results is that the OECD 
countries already have governments beyond the optimal point. This result reconciles with Besley 
and Persson (2011). However, such an interpretation runs counter to the public choice literature 
– where the size of government is determined by political process and is in general not optimally 
determined. 
                                                          
45 Strong democratic countries are the ones where the value of polity2 is greater than 6.2 whereas weak democracies are those with 
polity2 less than or equal to 6.2. This benchmark actually refers to the median value of the level of democracy. 
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     In columns 6 and 7 the full sample is now decomposed for the OECD and non-OECD 
subsamples. The OECD countries are strongly democratic whereas the non-OECD sample does 
include some weak democracies. The argument with regards to development cluster also seems 
to hold for the OECD and non-OECD samples. The OECD countries being strongly democratic can 
afford to have larger government size due to high fiscal capacity owing to factors discussed in 
Besley and Persson (2014). The threshold for the OECDs is estimated to be 39.25 whereas, on 
average, the share of expenditures in GDP is 44.69 across these countries in our sample. This 
threshold estimated may actually be out of the range of sample taken here. 
     While summarising Table 4.2, we find mixed evidence. Across less democratic and non-OECD 
samplesthe hypothesis for the presence of the Armey curve is supported though the coefficients 
lack significance. Throughout full sample and the OECDs as well as strongly democratic countries 
the estimated relationship is rather U-shaped. Even the coefficients suggesting a U-shaped 
correlation do not hold significance. 
     One possible problem with the results discussed so far is that government consumption is 
likely to be endogenous in growth: holding everything else constant, it should fall as growth 
accelerates (and therefore GDP increases) and vice versa. As we mentioned earlier, the 
endogeneity problem can be caused by many factors such as simultaneity, omitted variable bias 
and measurement error. In this chapter, government size and government spending may 
simultaneously affect each other. So the coefficient estimates yielded by OLS estimation may be 
inconsistent. Therefore, we use a different method, such as 2SLS for further estimation where 
we take two lags of government expenditures as instrumental variables to control for 
endogeneity bias in results. 
     Non-linearity between economic growth and the government spending along with initial GDP 
per capita taken as a control variable is tested in the first column of Table 4.3. The estimated 
coefficients of government size do not support Armey Curve as they represent a U-shaped 
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association between economic growth and government expenditures as a share of GDP. Both 
linear and quadratic terms are not statistically significant. 
     Besides the main variable in the first column, the estimated coefficient of log initial GDP per 
capita is negative and strongly significant statistically (at 1%). It supports the convergence 
hypothesis proposed by Solow (1956) that the GDP per capita of poor countries will grow faster 
than the GDP per capita of rich countries. 
     In the second column we use control variables such as openness to trade, investment as a 
fraction of GDP, population growth, secondary school enrolment rate and level of democracy. 
The relationship between GDP growth and the size of government does not change. Rest of the 
control variables are insignificant except initial GDP per capita and level of democracy. These 
both variables are negative and significant at 1 and 10% respectively. According to the 
coefficient estimates of level of democracy, more democratic countries are found to have lower 
output growth. The finding does not support Feng (1997) who finds a positive correlation 
between the two variables though indirectly. This may be due to possible correlation between 
the extent of democracy and the size of government. 
     We add inflation rate following Lee and Gordon (2005), rule of law to measure political 
stability and bank deposits as proxy to incorporate the role of financial development in the third 
column. The finding related to GDP growth and the size of government still represents a U-
shaped association but holds significance at 5%. Besides this the trade and investment as a share 
of GDP are positively and significantly correlated to economic growth. A positive association 
between trade and output growth supports Romer (1999) and Dollar and Kraay (2003) who also 
find a positive correlation between the two variables.The level of democracy is again negatively 
but strongly significant associated with GDP growth. 
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Graph 4.1: The relationship between the Government Size and Economic Growth 
 
 
     Unlike Table 4.2, we cannot estimate the relationship between economic growth and the 
government size decomposing the sample into weak and strong democratic countries. This is 
because the sample does not have enough observations. However, we test for the Armey curve 
across non-OECD and OECD countries. 
     The Armey Curve is found to exist in both sub-samples but statistically significant for non-
OECD countries only. Across non-OECD countries the efficient level of government expenditures 
is found when they constitute 23.99% of GDP. For the OECD countries the benchmark is found to 
be 27.5% though the coefficients are insignificant. As far as determining the optimal size of 
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government is concerned, the finding for non-OECDs is closer to Peden (1991), Scully (1994) and 
Herath (2012). 
     A possible explanation for the lack of relationship across OECDs is that virtually all of them 
already have governments at or above the optimal level. As it is mentioned already, the fraction 
of GDP constituted as government expenditures is 44.69% which goes beyond the optimal level 
determined here. This may also be the reason why the findings related to the full sample are 
found to have a U-shaped relationship in the previous table. 
     There is no support found for the convergence hypothesis across non-OECD countries 
whereas population growth rate is negative and strongly significant. Secondary school enrolment 
rate is positively correlated with economic growth supporting Barro (2001), Nelson and Phelps 
(1966), Lucas (1988), Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1993),Rebelo (1991) and Becker, Murphy and 
Tamura (1990). Moreover, economic growth is also found to be higher with stable political 
system. This result is in accordance with previous literature as Alesina, Ozler, Roubini and Swagel 
(1996). 
     In short, we find substantial support for the presence of the Armey Curve in non-OECD 
countries. The optimal level of government expenditures is estimated to be 23.99% of GDP. The 
relationship found between GDP growth and the size of the government also supports the 
Armey Curve for the OECD sample but the estimated coefficients are insignificant. Contrary to 
sub-samples the findings of the whole sample rather suggest a U-shaped correlation. This does 
not support the Armey Curve hypothesis. This contrary finding of the full sample may be due to 
the fact that the OECD countries already have governments at or beyond this benchmark. 
          Another possible problem with results so far can be non-stationarity of data that may 
cause results to be spurious. We fail to reject the hypothesis that all variables, except the 
dependent variable (real GDP growth per capita), contain unit roots when we apply Im-Pesaran-
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Shin (IPS) test, following Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). Persistence of shocks likely to be infinite 
and the standard assumption for asymptotic analysis being invalid may potentially affect the 
results if unit roots are present. Thus, we difference the data of all variables to control for non-
stationarity except real GDP growth per capita as it is found to be stationary. 
     We also explore the Armey curve using first difference estimation along with 2SLS in Table 
4.4. Due to taking first difference we faced lack of data problem. Hence, Table 4.4 has only two 
columns. We find no evidence for the presence of the Armey curve in both columns when we 
control for possible endogeneity issue and the presence of unit roots. 
     Comparing the findings of Table 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 (OLS, 2SLS where we take lags of government 
size and use them as instrumental variables and 2SLS with First Difference where we difference 
all variables except real GDP growth per capita as it is stationary), it can be safely said that the 
findings with 2SLS estimation give better information of the relationship between economic 
growth and the government size across non-OECD and the OECD countries. With 2SLS estimation 
there is substantial support for the presence of Armey curve throughout non-OECD and the 
OECDs though the coefficients are statistically significant only for non-OECD countries. The OECD 
countries are also found to sustain large governments. There is no evidence, nonetheless, for the 
presence of the Armey curve when we employ 2SLS in first differences estimation. 
     Since the government size can be correlated with the extent of democracy we also investigate 
further by using government size and extent of democracy variables as interactive variables in 
Table 4.5. Due to lack of data for the OECD countries we do not have estimated results for these 
countries. Thus, the Table 4.5 contains four columns. The sample composed of non-OECD 
countries is again found to support the presence of Armey Curve. An inverted U-shape 
correlation between GDP growth and the size of government suggests government size to be 
optimal at 23.02%. The results relating to full sample, however, are found to suggest rather a U-
shaped association between the two variables. 
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     The interactive variable is found to be consistently positive in all columns and statistically 
significant in the full sample and across non-OECD countries. The explained variation in the 
dependent variable is almost 97%. 
     To summarise, we find notable support for the presence of Armey Curve in non-OECD 
countries. The suggested benchmark is when government expenditures constitute 23.02% of 
GDP. This is very close to what we get for Table 4.2. The result of the full sample suggests a U-
shaped correlation which is contrary to the Armey Curve hypothesis but the estimated 
coefficients are not statistically significant. 
 
4.5.2) Tests for the validity of the Instrumental Variables 
     The lagged variables are considered as natural candidates to be used for instruments yet they 
are not necessarily good instruments. Given that the only instrumental variables (IVs) used here 
are lags of government expenditure, it is very well possible that these affect growth directly 
rather than only through their effect on contemporaneous government expenditure. Another 
potential problem is that they may be weak instruments which may cause IV estimates to be 
seriously biased even in large samples (Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995) and, thus, lead to 
spurious estimates of significance (Murray, (2006)). In order to analyse whether or not the 
instruments used are valid, a generally recommended criterion is to use F-test of joint 
significance of the instrumental variables in the first stage regression. The null hypothesis under 
this test is that the instruments are not valid or weak. 
     F-statistics are reported in Table 4.3. In most instances unfortunately we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis, i. e. the instruments used for analysis are found to be weak. Only in column 5 for the 
OECD sample are the instruments found to be reasonably strong. The validity of instruments 
used in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 is also examined. The instrumental variables are still found to be 
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invalid. This inevitably raises scepticism about the accuracy of the estimates, especially in the 
non-OECD where the inverted U-shape (Armey curve) correlation between growth and 
government size was found. 
     We also apply Sargan-Hansen J test to investigate the exclusion restriction. This tests over-
identifying restrictions in a statistical model. The null hypothesis under this test is that over-
identifying restrictions are valid (hence that the instruments satisfy the exclusion restriction). 
According to the Sargan-Hansen J test, the instrumental variables in Table 4.3 are found to be 
valid in all columns except column 1 where we do not use control variables. This somewhat 
reduces the suspicion about the accuracy of coefficient estimates. Hence it appears that the 
exclusion restriction is not violated. 
     We also test for the quality of instruments in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 where the data are 
differenced. The Sargan-Hansen J test suggests that the instruments are valid for column 1 of 
Table 4.4 but the instruments are found to be weak in column 2 where control variables are 
included in the regression. Along these lines, the instrumental variables are suggested to be valid 
in column 2 and column 4 of Table 4.5. 
     Given the doubts cast on the validity of lagged variables used as instrumental variables in our 
analysis, we acknowledge that the analysis presented may be biased to some extent. However, 
the previous literature does not suggest any suitable variable that can be used as instrumental 
variable for government expenditures. The existing literature investigating the Armey curve also 
suffers from this potential flaw. 
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4.5.3)   Government Consumption and Investment 
     Following Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), we test for how changes in composition of 
government expenditures (current government consumption and public investment) are related 
to GDP growth. We decompose government expenditures into current and public investment 
following Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) where they surprisingly find current government 
expenditures to be positively correlated with economic growth whereas the correlation between 
public investment and output growth is negative.For example, public spending on operations 
and maintenance has a stronger impact on economic growth than both health and education 
expenditures. Likewise, Devarajanet al (1996), using data for 43 countries from 1970-1990, find a 
positive relation between current spending and per capita real GDP growth. However, they find 
that the capital component of expenditures negatively associated with economic growth. 
Nevertheless, there is some literature that finds contrasting results. Aschauer (1989) finds that 
capital spending such as; infrastructure of streets, water systems, mass transit, highways, 
airports and sewers, have a positive impact on productivity. Similarly, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 
find investment in transport and communication positively correlated with growth. 
     Table 4.6 and Table 4.7 show results for current and public investment.We apply OLS 
estimation. Moreover, we do not include rule of law and bank deposits as a share of GDP as they 
do not have enough observations. 
     In column 1 (with only one control variable; log initial real GDP per capita) of Table 4.6, the 
estimated coefficient for current government consumption, measuring the government size, is 
positive though insignificant. In the second column, when we add other control variables, the 
coefficient estimates is found to be negative though the significance level stays the same. In the 
third column, which also includes inflation rate as an additional control variable, we find positive 
impact of current government expenditures on real GDP growth per capita. This result is in 
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agreement with Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) and Devarajanet al (1996) who also find a positive 
correlation between the two variables. 
     As before, columns 4 and 5 report the coefficient estimates of a decomposed sample into 
weak and strong democracies. In strong democracies we find evidence for positive impact of 
current spending on economic growth whereas the weaker democracies are found to be 
negatively affected. 
     In non-OECD and OECD sub-samples, columns 6 and 7, the estimated coefficients are positive. 
These results again support Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) and Devarajanet al (1996). 
     To be precise, we find support for Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) and Devarajanet al (1996) 
across full sample (column 3), non-OECD and OECD and strong democracies. Increase in current 
government expenditures lead to higher output growth. Lack of significance may result from lack 
of variation in the data as we take five year averages to control for business cycle fluctuation.  
     The next Table 4.7 reports the results for the government size measured by public 
investment. The estimated coefficients in first three columns are positive implying a positive 
association between public investment and economic growth. These results do not support 
Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) and Devarajanet al (1996). Nonetheless, the results are found to 
support Aschauer (1989) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) who also find positive correlation 
between public investment and GDP growth. 
     The estimated coefficients are positive in columns 4 and 6 whereas these are negative in 
columns 5 and 7. In strong democracies and the OECD countries, public investment is estimated 
to be negatively associated with economic growth supporting the findings of Ghosh and 
Gregoriou (2008) and Devarajanet al (1996). On the contrary, higher public investment is found 
to positively affect economic growth in weaker democracies and non-OECD countries supporting 
Aschauer (1989) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993). 
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     In a nutshell, we find evidence for positive effect of public investment on GDP growth for full 
samples, weak democracies and non-OECD countries. These results are in agreement with 
Aschauer (1989) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993). However, the findings across strong 
democracies and the OECD countries reconcile with Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008) and 
Devarajanet al (1996) as the estimated coefficients are negative. 
     In column 1 of Table 4.8, we find a U-shaped correlation between GDP growth and current 
government consumption. Both linear and quadratic coefficients are statistically significant at 5% 
and 1%. A rise in government spending decreases output growth but any further rise in 
government consumption increases GDP growth once it reaches 39.41%. This does not support 
Armey Curve though with a different dependent variable. 
The association between output growth and government consumption remains U-shaped in 
second and third columns, though insignificant, when we add control variables. These results 
also oppose the presence of Armey Curve in our full sample. 
     We decompose the sample into weak and strong democracies in columns 4 and 5 
respectively. For weak democracies, there is no support for the presence of the Armey Curve as 
the estimated coefficients refer to a U-shaped correlation. On the other hand, Armey Curve is 
supported in stronger democratic countries. For stronger democracies the efficient level of 
government size is found to be 40%. 
     Columns 6 and 7 report the analysis decomposing the sample into non-OECD and OECD 
countries respectively. We find a U-shaped correlation for the non-OECD countries whereas the 
association between the two variables in the OECDs is found to be an inverted U-shape. 
However, only the estimated coefficients for the OECD countries hold statistical significance. So 
we find enough support for the presence of the Armey Curve in OECDs whereas the finding is 
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totally opposite for the non-OECDs. The efficient level of the government spending is estimated 
to be 35.54%. 
     While summarising the findings of Table 4.8, it can be analysed that we find no support for 
the Armey Curve hypothesis for the full sample though with a different dependent variable. 
Drawing a comparison between OECDs and Non-OECDs, there is substantial support for an 
inverted U-shape hypothesis for current government expenditures in the OECD sample as well as 
strongly democratic sample. On the other hand, Non-OECD and less democratic countries are 
found to have a U-shaped association. The maximum public spending as a share of GDP is 
reported 38.44% which is closer to the benchmark we estimate for strong democracies (40%) 
and the OECD countries (35.54). According to these results, these countries should not increase 
public spending any more. On the other hand, the results indicate a U-shaped correlation in full 
sample (column 3), weak democracies (4) and non-OECD countries (column 6). Their estimated 
thresholds are 36.16%, 40.5% and 33.1% respectively. Hence, these countries are suggested to 
increase their public spending. 
     In Table 4.9 we investigate the relationship between GDP growth and public investment 
measuring the size of government. Both the coefficients (linear and quadratic) in the first column 
are positive though statistically insignificant. On the other hand, columns 2 and 3 where we add 
all control variables are found to suggest a U-shaped correlation between GDP growth and 
capital expenditures. Though with a different dependent variable, these results do not support 
the presence of the Armey Curve. 
     Next, we decompose the sample into less and more democratic countries. We find a U-
shaped correlation between economic growth and capital expenditures for both sub-samples. 
The result does not support the Armey Curve hypothesis though the estimated coefficients are 
statistically insignificant. 
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As before, we further decompose the sample into non-OECD and the OECDs. In case of non-
OECDs both the linear and quadratic coefficients are positive whereas the estimated coefficients 
related to the OECD countries are negative. However, none of them holds significance. 
     The results related to capital expenditures are rather more fragile. There is a U-shaped 
association found between economic growth and capital expenditures in the whole sample 
though insignificant. For non-OECD and OECD countries the estimated coefficients (linear and 
quadratic) are positive and negative respectively though statistically insignificant. On the other 
hand, less and more democratic samples are found to suggest a U-shaped association between 
GDP growth and public investment. 
     Because of possible endogeneity between these variables and the government size, we apply 
2SLS estimation to assess non-linear relationship. To do so, we take two lags of current 
consumption and public investment as instrumental variables. We can only estimate results for 
full sample, strong democratic countries and the OECDs because the data for weak democracies 
and non-OECD countries were not sufficient. Due to possible non-stationarity, we applied Im-
Pesaran-Shin test. But, owing to lack of observations the test failed to test the hypothesis of unit 
root presence could not be rejected. Thus, the results may be spurious. 
     Throughout Table 4.10, we consistently find an inverted U-shape correlation between current 
government consumption and economic growth. These results do not support the hypothesis of 
Armey curve. With 2SLS estimation, results for both strong democracies and the OECD countries 
also suggest a U-shaped relationship which was not the case with OLS estimation. 
     Across Table 4.11, the estimated coefficients suggest a U-shaped relationship between public 
investment and GDP growth except for column 1 where control variables are missing. The results 
do not confirm the presence of Armey curve for public investment. With controlling endogeneity 
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bias, the estimated coefficients retain significance. Moreover, the results consistently suggest a 
U-shaped unlike with OLS estimation. 
     Following Cashin (1995) we also analyse the impact of direct transfers on output growth in 
Tables 4.12. According to him, transfers and public investment are positively correlated with the 
output growth. We rather investigate the non-linear relationship of this variable with the GDP 
growth following the Armey Curve. This table consists of two columns only due to lack of 
observations. A U-shaped correlation is found between GDP growth and direct transfers in 
column 1, though statistically insignificant, where we only add initial GDP per capita as a control 
variable.  The estimated coefficients in column 2 (where we add all control variables) of Table 
4.12 support the hypothesis of Armey Curve and the coefficients hold statistical significance at 
1%. An increase in direct transfers lead to higher economic growth but the association between 
the two variables becomes negative once transfers constitute 53.17% of GDP. 
     When we analyse the data statistics for this variable, the maximum amount of transfers is 
reported to be 62.52 whereas the mean is 40.72. On average, higher direct transfers can still be 
made that will stimulate economic growth as well. To be precise, we find considerable support 
for the hypothesis of Armey Curve when we investigate the correlation between GDP growth 
and government direct transfers including all control variables. 
     In Table 4.13 we estimate the impact of changes in the government size on GDP per capita 
with 2SLS estimation. We find no support for the presence of the Armey curve in Table 4.13 
where the association between economic growth and GDP per capita is estimated to be U-
shaped across the sub-samples though both the coefficients in the full sample are positive. 
     Table 4.14 replicates Table 2.13 but additionally with first difference estimation. We can only 
report two columns (one with one control variable and the other with all the control variables) 
as we lose information when we difference the data. Both column 1 and column 2 are estimated 
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to suggest an inverted U-shape association between GDP per capita and the government size 
though the significance at 5% is held by only the quadratic term in column 1. The estimated 
threshold in column 2 is found to be 45% which is very closer to Radwan and Reiffers (2004) who 
find it to be 44%. 
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4.6) Conclusion 
     This chapter analyses the optimal government size for economic growth following the Armey 
Curve (1995). We find some support for the presence of the Armey Curve (1995) across Non-
OECD countries using data from 1981-2010. The estimated efficient level for government 
expenditures is attained when they represent 23.99% of GDP. Once government expansion 
reaches this threshold, further increases in government size are associated with lower output 
growth. Similar results hold for the sample of weak democracies. On the other hand, a U-shaped 
and inverted U-shape correlation is also found across the full sample and the OECD countries but 
the results lack robustness. This does not support the hypothesis of Armey curve and may imply 
the capacity of the OECD countries to sustain large governments as their share, on average, is 
already 44.69%.Moreover there is a potential endogeneity problem in this entire literature. 
When government size is instrumented with its own lags, these are found to be somewhat weak 
in the non-OECD countries. Thus it is not impossible to rule out the possibility that the estimated 
Armey curve results may be spurious. 
     We reproduce the empirical analysis after decomposing government expenditures into 
current government consumption and public investment followingGhosh and Gregoriou (2008). 
The evidence for the Armey Curve (1995) across the OECDs and strong democracies is 
substantial for government consumption though the results relating to public investment are 
rather fragile with OLS estimation. Nevertheless, the results are consistently found to be U-
shaped when we control for endogeneity bias. 
     Furthermore, following Cashin (1995), we test the relationship between transfers and 
economic growth. Direct transfers are found to have an inverted U-shape relationship with 
economic growth supporting the evidence of the Armey curve across the full sample.  
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     We also find evidence for the Armey curve hypothesis when we regress GDP per capita on the 
government size applying 2SLS estimation in first differences for the whole sample though the 
results are found to be U-shaped for decomposed samples. 
     The novelty of this study is the use of panel data analysis for estimating the optimal 
government size and the latest data. In addition, we extend the empirical analysis to investigate 
how composition of government expenditures affects economic growth. Besides this, empirical 
analysis on direct transfers and GDP per capita is also offered. 
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Table4.2: GDP Growth 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
    
Weak Democracy Strong Democracy Non-OECD OECD 
Govt Expenditures 0.254 0.387 -0.105 0.375 -0.645 0.041 -0.628 
 
(0.117)** (0.181)** (0.527) (1.273) (0.612) (0.539) (0.618) 
Govt Expenditures Squared -0.003 -0.005 0.003 -0.012 0.009 -0.002 0.008 
 
(0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.007) (0.022) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
Initial GDP per capita -8.333 -8.880 -9.628 -5.921 -10.672 -9.230 -9.198 
 
(1.738)*** (1.466)*** (1.983)*** (3.109)* (2.835)*** (2.393)*** (3.855)** 
Investment/GDP 
 
0.147 0.250 0.300 0.334 0.123 0.226 
  
(0.071)** (0.096)** (0.325) (0.115)*** (0.105) (0.244) 
Trade 
 
0.053 0.023 0.031 0.010 0.017 0.111 
  
(0.024)** (0.031) (0.067) (0.037) (0.034) (0.048)** 
Population Growth 
 
-1.452 -1.222 -0.255 -1.164 0.139 -1.200 
  
(0.676)** (0.962) (1.926) (1.306) (1.160) (1.450) 
Secondary School Enrolment 
 
0.023 0.035 -0.056 0.013 -0.056 0.010 
  
(0.033) (0.050) (0.152) (0.040) (0.096) (0.034) 
Level of Democracy 
 
-0.125 0.135 0.108 1.120 0.087 0.717 
  
(0.121) (0.189) (0.292) (0.821) (0.230) (0.757) 
Inflation 
  
-0.179 -0.097 -0.374 -0.216 -0.001 
   
(0.164) (0.197) (0.146)** (0.162) (0.122) 
Rule of Law 
  
0.748 1.190 0.496 -1.176 1.491 
   
(2.088) (4.200) (2.973) (2.571) (2.404) 
Bank Deposits/GDP 
  
-0.034 0.162 -0.011 0.025 0.021 
   
(0.025) (0.169) (0.022) (0.075) (0.011)* 
Observations 344 311 191 74 117 125 66 
R-squared 0.475 0.557 0.651 0.780 0.745 0.722 0.837 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of the government size including Initial GDP per capita, Inflation, Trade, Population Growth, Secondary School Enrolment, Rule of Law, Bank Deposits/GDP and POLITY2 as control 
variables described in the text. Cluster standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Strong democracy refers to Polity2 >= 6.2 (median value). Weak democracy refers to Polity2 < 6.2. Regressions control for time 
and country fixed effects which are not shown though. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 4.3: GDP Growth 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
    
Non-OECD OECD 
Govt Expenditures -0.519 -0.465 -2.547 3.215 0.055 
 
(1.265) (0.921) (1.186)** (1.542)** (0.604) 
Govt Expenditures Squared 0.006 0.005 0.030 -0.067 -0.001 
 
(0.014) (0.010) (0.014)** (0.023)*** (0.006) 
Initial GDP per capita -10.871 -12.863 -14.202 4.083 -23.555 
 
(3.584)*** (3.280)*** (2.851)*** (3.604) (2.505)*** 
Trade 
 
0.071 0.218 0.108 -0.128 
  
(0.060) (0.068)*** (0.065)* (0.034)*** 
Investment/GDP 
 
0.052 0.195 -0.031 0.172 
  
(0.074) (0.081)** (0.097) (0.081)** 
Population Growth 
 
-0.816 -3.973 -9.248 2.367 
  
(0.764) (1.217)*** (2.607)*** (0.719)*** 
Secondary School Enrolment 
 
0.067 0.151 0.918 -0.335 
  
(0.045) (0.093) (0.223)*** (0.050)*** 
Level of Democracy 
 
-0.409 -0.785 -0.133 -9.202 
  
(0.238)* (0.185)*** (0.320) (1.465)*** 
Inflation 
  
0.122 -0.161 -1.609 
   
(0.100) (0.195) (0.185)*** 
Rule of Law 
  
1.670 7.162 2.479 
   
(3.458) (3.649)** (1.787) 
Bank Deposits/GDP 
  
0.023 0.115 -0.029 
   
(0.031) (0.148) (0.006)*** 
F-Statistic (p-value) 0.73 0.24 0.99 0.14 0.03 
Sargan-Hansen J (p-value) 0.026 0.17 0.74 0.81 0.06 
Observations 116 108 79 43 36 
R-squared 0.712 0.816 0.910 0.959 0.994 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of the government size including Initial GDP per capita, Inflation, Trade, Population Growth, Secondary School Enrolment, Rule of Law, Bank Deposits/GDP and POLITY2 as control 
variables described in the text. Cluster standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Strong democracy refers to Polity2 >= 6.2 (median value). Weak democracy refers to Polity2 < 6.2. Regressions control for time 
and country fixed effects which are not shown though. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
We use 2SLS estimation taking two lags of Government Expenditures as instrumental variables to control for possible endogeneity.F-Statistic and Sargan-Hansen J are used to test the quality of the instruments. 
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Table 4.4: GDP Growth 
   (1) (2) 
 
2SLS+FD 2SLS+FD 
Govt Expenditures  -0.027 -0.223 
 
(0.378) (0.475) 
Govt Expenditures Squared  -0.003 0.0001 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
Initial GDP per capita -13.180 -7.434 
 
(4.722)*** (10.922) 
Trade  
 
0.095 
  
(0.253) 
Investment/GDP  
 
0.031 
  
(0.194) 
Population Growth  
 
-0.099 
  
(0.964) 
Secondary School Enrolment  
 
0.057 
  
(0.043) 
Level of Democracy  
 
-0.400 
  
(0.829) 
F-Statistic (p-value) 0.27 0.13 
Sargan-Hansen J (p-value) 0.14 0.0001 
Observations 116 103 
R-squared 0.622 0.730 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of the government size including Initial GDP per capita, Inflation, Trade, Population Growth, Secondary School Enrolment, Rule of Law, Bank Deposits/GDP and POLITY2 as control 
variables described in the text. Cluster standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Strong democracy refers to Polity2 >= 6.2 (median value). Weak democracy refers to Polity2 < 6.2. Regressions control for time 
and country fixed effects which are not shown though. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
We use 2SLS, taking two lags of Government Expenditures as instrumental variables to control for possible endogeneity, and first difference estimations where we difference all variables except real GDP growth per 
capita as it is stationary.F-Statistic and Sargan-Hansen J are used to test the quality of the instruments. 
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Table 4.5: GDP Growth 
      (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 2SLS+FD 2SLS+FD 2SLS+FD 2SLS+FD 
    
Non-OECD 
Govt Expenditures -0.519 0.045 -1.441 2.625 
 
(1.265) (1.126) (1.121) (0.947)*** 
Govt Expenditures Squared 0.006 -0.003 0.015 -0.057 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)*** 
Initial GDP per capita -10.871 -11.561 -12.618 1.943 
 
(3.584)*** (3.199)*** (2.342)*** (2.136) 
Trade 
 
0.055 0.198 0.131 
  
(0.069) (0.068)*** (0.057)** 
Investment/GDP 
 
0.093 0.219 0.065 
  
(0.062) (0.079)*** (0.084) 
Population Growth 
 
-0.842 -2.444 -7.309 
  
(0.749) (1.126)** (1.837)*** 
Secondary School Enrolment 
 
0.054 0.270 0.992 
  
(0.041) (0.105)** (0.227)*** 
Level of Democracy 
 
-0.814 -1.869 -1.298 
  
(0.495)* (0.540)*** (0.540)** 
Democracy*GovernmentSize 
 
0.022 0.044 0.044 
  
(0.024) (0.018)** (0.023)* 
Inflation 
  
0.088 -0.237 
   
(0.091) (0.199) 
Rule of Law 
  
5.035 9.397 
   
(2.980)* (3.448)*** 
Bank Deposits/GDP 
  
0.049 0.175 
   
(0.032) (0.142) 
F-Statistic (p-value) 0.73 0.27 0.68 0.26 
Sargan-Hansen J (p-value) 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.08 
Observations 116 108 79 43 
R-squared 0.712 0.810 0.923 0.968 
 
Notes: Same as Table 4.5. However, we use government size and extent of democracy as control variables in the analysis. We use 2SLS, taking two lags of Government Expenditures as instrumental variables to 
control for possible endogeneity, and first difference estimations where we difference all variables except real GDP growth per capita as it is stationary.F-Statistic and Sargan-Hansen J are used to test the quality of 
the instruments. 
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Table 4.6: GDP Growth 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
    
Weak Democracy Strong Democracy Non-OECD OECD 
Current Govt Expenditures 0.104 -0.025 0.018 0.046 0.102 -0.018 0.051 
 
(0.139) (0.146) (0.151) (0.337) (0.249) (0.324) (0.240) 
Initial GDP per capita -8.377 -8.194 -4.748 -7.523 -5.385 -4.938 -7.018 
 
(2.452)*** (3.328)** (3.324) (4.797) (2.353)** (4.263) (3.291)** 
Investment/GDP 
 
0.141 0.176 0.212 0.346 0.143 0.208 
  
(0.106) (0.113) (0.172) (0.275) (0.149) (0.303) 
Trade 
 
0.056 0.056 0.087 0.015 0.086 -0.033 
  
(0.039) (0.041) (0.036)** (0.042) (0.046)* (0.043) 
Population Growth 
 
-1.684 -2.066 -2.360 0.281 -2.619 -0.654 
  
(0.881)* (0.856)** (1.994) (1.404) (1.825) (1.682) 
Secondary School Enrolment 
 
0.066 0.033 0.314 0.032 0.110 0.029 
  
(0.050) (0.032) (0.246) (0.028) (0.151) (0.023) 
Level of Democracy 
 
-0.046 -0.111 -0.282 1.435 -0.104 0.325 
  
(0.210) (0.201) (0.337) (1.112) (0.256) (0.184)* 
Inflation 
  
0.066 -0.083 0.191 0.021 0.104 
   
(0.116) (0.244) (0.098)* (0.307) (0.115) 
Observations 183 161 139 57 82 68 71 
R-squared 0.538 0.621 0.712 0.798 0.838 0.740 0.769 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of Govt Consumption including Initial GDP per capita, Inflation, Trade, Population Growth, Secondary School Enrolment, Rule of Law, Bank Deposits/GDP and POLITY2 as control 
variables described in the text. Cluster standard errors are reported in the parenthesis.Strong democracy refers to Polity2 >= 6.2 (median value). Weak democracy refers to Polity2 < 6.2. Regressions control for time 
and country fixed effects which are not shown though. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 4.7: GDP Growth 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
    
Weak Democracy Strong Democracy Non-OECD OECD 
public investment 0.167 0.156 0.182 0.290 -0.071 0.266 -0.854 
 
(0.287) (0.301) (0.240) (0.362) (0.313) (0.329) (0.525) 
Initial GDP per capita -9.671 -8.156 -4.976 -8.893 -4.571 -5.329 -6.213 
 
(1.690)*** (2.972)*** (2.863)* (3.874)** (3.213) (3.320) (3.333)* 
Investment/GDP 
 
0.134 0.165 0.173 0.272 0.123 0.089 
  
(0.108) (0.106) (0.157) (0.132)** (0.147) (0.135) 
Trade 
 
0.061 0.057 0.094 0.001 0.089 -0.062 
  
(0.036) (0.036) (0.039)** (0.034) (0.043)** (0.035)* 
Population Growth 
 
-1.601 -2.192 -2.602 -0.004 -2.551 -0.625 
  
(0.695)** (0.613)*** (0.826)*** (1.563) (0.782)*** (2.178) 
Secondary School Enrolment 
 
0.066 0.033 0.350 0.025 0.127 0.026 
  
(0.051) (0.033) (0.247) (0.020) (0.153) (0.017) 
Level of Democracy 
 
-0.040 -0.120 -0.254 1.400 -0.111 0.263 
  
(0.195) (0.175) (0.321) (1.050) (0.259) (0.171) 
Inflation 
  
0.063 -0.106 0.164 0.028 0.034 
   
(0.089) (0.208) (0.075)** (0.201) (0.114) 
Observations 180 158 136 57 79 68 68 
R-squared 0.530 0.622 0.715 0.805 0.833 0.748 0.786 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of Govt Investment including Initial GDP per capita, Inflation, Trade, Population Growth, Secondary School Enrolment, Rule of Law, Bank Deposits/GDP and POLITY2 as control 
variables described in the text. Cluster standard errors are reported in the parenthesis.Strong democracy refers to Polity2 >= 6.2 (median value). Weak democracy refers to Polity2 < 6.2. Regressions control for time 
and country fixed effects which are not shown though. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 4.8: GDP Growth 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
    
Weak Democracy Strong Democracy Non-OECD OECD 
Current Govt Expenditures -0.473 -0.496 -0.217 -0.331 0.640 -0.324 0.782 
 
(0.212)** (0.315) (0.251) (0.396) (0.350)* (0.387) (0.376)* 
Current Govt Expenditures Squared 0.006 0.006 0.003 0.005 -0.008 0.004 -0.011 
 
(0.002)*** (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003)** (0.005) (0.004)*** 
Initial GDP per capita -6.889 -7.497 -4.451 -6.978 -4.344 -5.340 -9.454 
 
(2.837)** (3.229)** (3.441) (4.475) (2.562) (3.896) (3.258)*** 
Investment/GDP 
 
0.119 0.167 0.216 0.338 0.139 0.252 
  
(0.107) (0.114) (0.175) (0.267) (0.152) (0.292) 
Trade 
 
0.059 0.060 0.094 0.004 0.091 -0.068 
  
(0.038) (0.042) (0.037)** (0.039) (0.048)* (0.043) 
Population Growth 
 
-0.607 -1.483 -1.287 0.362 -1.852 -0.517 
  
(1.366) (1.366) (3.383) (1.390) (2.587) (1.687) 
Secondary School Enrolment 
 
0.078 0.043 0.364 0.024 0.149 0.004 
  
(0.054) (0.036) (0.299) (0.031) (0.174) (0.027) 
Level of Democracy 
 
-0.050 -0.087 -0.266 1.726 -0.081 0.385 
  
(0.201) (0.211) (0.362) (1.144) (0.264) (0.139)** 
Inflation 
  
0.079 -0.021 0.214 0.035 0.066 
   
(0.123) (0.294) (0.103)** (0.315) (0.116) 
Observations 183 161 139 57 82 68 71 
R-squared 0.574 0.636 0.716 0.804 0.844 0.744 0.796 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of Govt Consumption including Initial GDP per capita, Inflation, Trade, Population Growth, Secondary School Enrolment, Rule of Law, Bank Deposits/GDP and POLITY2 as control 
variables described in the text. Cluster standard errors are reported in the parenthesis.Strong democracy refers to Polity2 >= 6.2 (median value). Weak democracy refers to Polity2 < 6.2. Regressions control for time 
and country fixed effects which are not shown though. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 4.9: GDP Growth 
         (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
    
Weak Democracy Strong Democracy Non-OECD OECD 
public investment 0.122 -0.084 -0.197 -0.128 -1.805 0.025 -0.785 
 
(0.576) (0.713) (0.629) (1.262) (1.182) (0.900) (1.888) 
public investment Squared 0.002 0.012 0.017 0.016 0.160 0.010 -0.011 
 
(0.017) (0.021) (0.019) (0.037) (0.099) (0.026) (0.260) 
Initial GDP per capita -9.660 -8.062 -4.708 -8.259 -7.919 -5.125 -6.202 
 
(1.688)*** (3.042)** (3.007) (4.701)* (4.117)* (3.602) (3.349)* 
Investment/GDP 
 
0.141 0.176 0.196 0.240 0.134 0.088 
  
(0.113) (0.109) (0.187) (0.120)* (0.156) (0.150) 
Trade 
 
0.059 0.056 0.089 -0.016 0.090 -0.063 
  
(0.038) (0.038) (0.045)* (0.034) (0.045)* (0.036)* 
Population Growth 
 
-1.615 -2.234 -2.671 -0.604 -2.566 -0.619 
  
(0.713)** (0.650)*** (0.895)*** (1.815) (0.815)*** (2.302) 
Secondary School Enrolment 
 
0.065 0.032 0.338 0.016 0.122 0.026 
  
(0.051) (0.032) (0.260) (0.019) (0.156) (0.018) 
Level of Democracy 
 
-0.036 -0.101 -0.228 1.364 -0.097 0.264 
  
(0.199) (0.174) (0.338) (1.249) (0.268) (0.194) 
Inflation 
  
0.050 -0.121 0.077 0.017 0.035 
   
(0.087) (0.215) (0.103) (0.193) (0.117) 
Observations 180 158 136 57 79 68 68 
R-squared 0.530 0.624 0.719 0.808 0.852 0.750 0.786 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of Govt Consumption including Initial GDP per capita, Inflation, Trade, Population Growth, Secondary School Enrolment, Rule of Law, Bank Deposits/GDP and POLITY2 as control 
variables described in the text. Cluster standard errors are reported in the parenthesis.Strong democracy refers to Polity2 >= 6.2 (median value). Weak democracy refers to Polity2 < 6.2. Regressions control for time 
and country fixed effects which are not shown though. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 4.10: GDP Growth 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
    
Strong Democracy OECD 
Current Govt Expenditures -0.591 -4.562 -2.166 -1.737 -12.970 
 
(0.714) (2.058)** (1.118)* (0.772)** (26.053) 
Current Govt Expenditures Squared 0.002 0.031 0.008 0.007 0.180 
 
(0.006) (0.016)** (0.009) (0.009) (0.392) 
Initial GDP per capita -21.423 -29.539 -38.479 -7.862 20.337 
 
(3.273)*** (8.582)*** (9.754)*** (13.606) (52.724) 
Trade 
 
-0.219 -0.296 -0.134 0.603 
  
(0.134) (0.107)*** (0.079)* (1.462) 
Investment/GDP 
 
-0.364 -0.054 -1.536 -1.862 
  
(0.305) (0.207) (0.536)*** (3.327) 
Population Growth 
 
-0.939 -2.031 4.003 3.271 
  
(3.151) (2.101) (1.610)** (6.648) 
Secondary School Enrolment 
 
-0.069 -0.134 -0.077 0.352 
  
(0.084) (0.058)** (0.039)** (0.994) 
Level of Democracy 
 
1.365 1.167 2.110 -4.893 
  
(0.816)* (0.479)** (0.638)*** (13.243) 
Inflation 
  
-0.297 -0.365 -0.389 
   
(0.193) (0.175)** (1.261) 
Observations 77 71 66 37 44 
R-squared 0.863 0.703 0.891 0.921 0.9 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of the government size including Initial GDP per capita, Inflation, Trade, Population Growth, Secondary School Enrolment, Rule of Law, Bank Deposits/GDP and POLITY2 as control 
variables described in the text. Cluster standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Strong democracy refers to Polity2 >= 6.2 (median value). Weak democracy refers to Polity2 < 6.2. Regressions control for time 
and country fixed effects which are not shown though. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
We use 2SLS estimation taking two lags of Current Government Expenditures as instrumental variables to control for possible endogeneity. The data are not differenced due to lack of observations. 
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Table 4.11: GDP Growth 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
    
Strong Democracy OECD 
public investment 3.464 -8.455 -6.207 -10.152 -5.826 
 
(2.654) (4.435)* (3.012)** (4.105)** (4.787) 
public investment Squared -0.108 0.530 0.440 1.393 1.001 
 
(0.106) (0.201)*** (0.125)*** (0.482)*** (0.563)* 
Initial GDP per capita -13.177 -12.170 -16.163 -27.028 2.893 
 
(2.583)*** (4.417)*** (5.071)*** (15.765)* (5.834) 
Trade 
 
-0.007 -0.033 0.051 0.185 
  
(0.100) (0.078) (0.067) (0.072)** 
Investment/GDP 
 
0.564 0.569 0.482 0.343 
  
(0.156)*** (0.066)*** (0.359) (0.221) 
Population Growth 
 
0.351 1.369 0.970 0.738 
  
(1.329) (1.077) (0.951) (1.169) 
Secondary School Enrolment 
 
0.037 0.021 0.026 0.021 
  
(0.059) (0.070) (0.035) (0.041) 
Level of Democracy 
 
0.172 0.191 -0.209 0.526 
  
(0.303) (0.195) (0.489) (0.895) 
Inflation 
  
0.003 -0.284 0.279 
   
(0.163) (0.267) (0.137)** 
Observations 76 70 65 36 43 
R-squared 0.732 0.873 0.931 0.887 0.897 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of the government size including Initial GDP per capita, Inflation, Trade, Population Growth, Secondary School Enrolment, Rule of Law, Bank Deposits/GDP and POLITY2 as control 
variables described in the text. Cluster standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Strong democracy refers to Polity2 >= 6.2 (median value). Weak democracy refers to Polity2 < 6.2. Regressions control for time 
and country fixed effects which are not shown though. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%.  
We use 2SLS estimation taking two lags of Government Investment as instrumental variables to control for possible endogeneity. The data are not differenced due to lack of observations. 
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Table 4.12: GDP Growth 
    (1) (2) 
 
2SLS 2SLS 
  
Transfers -1.179 3.297 
 
(1.190) (0.671)*** 
Transfers Squared 0.014 -0.031 
 
(0.012) (0.007)*** 
Initial GDP per capita -10.023 -4.695 
 
(9.849) (6.964) 
Trade 
 
-1.243 
  
(0.254)*** 
Investment/GDP 
 
0.358 
  
(0.312) 
Population Growth 
 
-0.390 
  
(0.766) 
Secondary School Enrolment 
 
1.049 
  
(0.313)*** 
Level of Democracy 
 
0.357 
  
(0.376) 
Observations 53 46 
R-squared 0.624 0.963 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of the government size including Initial GDP per capita, Inflation, Trade, Population Growth, Secondary School Enrolment, Rule of Law, Bank Deposits/GDP and POLITY2 as control 
variables described in the text. Cluster standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Strong democracy refers to Polity2 >= 6.2 (median value). Weak democracy refers to Polity2 < 6.2. Regressions control for time 
and country fixed effects which are not shown though. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%.  
We use 2SLS estimation taking two lags of Government Transfers as instrumental variables to control for possible endogeneity. The data are not differenced due to lack of observations. 
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Table 4.13: GDP per capita 
       (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
    
Non-OECD OECD 
Govt Expenditures 0.157 -0.015 0.022 -0.063 -0.050 
 
(0.093)* (0.085) (0.048) (0.030)** (0.031) 
Govt Expenditures Squared -0.002 0.00025 0.00005 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003)*** (0.0003) 
Lag GDP per capita 0.908 0.470 0.893 1.041 0.600 
 
(0.416)** (0.259)* (0.218)*** (0.177)*** (0.214)*** 
Trade 
 
0.002 0.002 0.003 0.0001 
  
(0.005) (0.003) (0.002)** (0.002) 
Investment/GDP 
 
0.002 -0.002 0.0002 0.006 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001)*** 
Population Growth 
 
0.011 0.126 0.240 0.021 
  
(0.032) (0.072)* (0.090)*** (0.039) 
Secondary School Enrolment 
 
-0.001 0.004 0.003 -0.013 
  
(0.003) (0.005) (0.007) (0.001)*** 
Level of Democracy 
 
-0.018 -0.025 -0.034 -0.215 
  
(0.012) (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.054)*** 
Inflation 
  
-0.008 -0.005 -0.046 
   
(0.004)* (0.006) (0.006)*** 
Rule of Law 
  
0.372 0.372 -0.032 
   
(0.217)* (0.178)** (0.067) 
Bank Deposits/GDP 
  
0.002 0.007 -0.001 
   
(0.001)*** (0.004)* (0.000)*** 
Observations 116 108 79 43 36 
R-squared 0.991 0.999 0.999 0.999 1.000 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of the government size including Initial GDP per capita, Inflation, Trade, Population Growth, Secondary School Enrolment, Rule of Law, Bank Deposits/GDP and POLITY2 as control 
variables described in the text. Cluster standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Strong democracy refers to Polity2 >= 6.2 (median value). Weak democracy refers to Polity2 < 6.2. Regressions control for time 
and country fixed effects which are not shown though. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%.  
We use 2SLS estimation taking two lags of Government Transfers as instrumental variables to control for possible endogeneity. The data are not differenced. 
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Table 4.14: GDP per capita 
    (1) (2) 
 
2SLS+FD 2SLS+FD 
Govt Expenditures  0.014 0.027 
 
(0.010) (0.019) 
Govt Expenditures Squared  -0.0001 -0.0003 
 
(0.00006)** (0.0002) 
Initial GDP per capita 
 
-0.208 
  
(0.403) 
Trade  
 
-0.005 
  
(0.009) 
Investment/GDP  
 
0.001 
  
(0.012) 
Lag GDP per capita  0.097 0.355 
 
(0.113) (0.440) 
Population Growth  
 
0.000 
  
(0.029) 
Secondary School Enrolment  
 
0.000 
  
(0.001) 
Level of Democracy  
 
-0.015 
  
(0.030) 
Observations 116 103 
R-squared 0.812 0.807 
 
NOTES: Cross country regressions of the government size including Initial GDP per capita, Inflation, Trade, Population Growth, Secondary School Enrolment, Rule of Law, Bank Deposits/GDP and POLITY2 as control 
variables described in the text. Cluster standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Strong democracy refers to Polity2 >= 6.2 (median value). Weak democracy refers to Polity2 < 6.2. Regressions control for time 
and country fixed effects which are not shown though. *, ** and *** respectively denote significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%.  
We use 2SLS estimation taking two lags of Government Size as instrumental variables to control for possible endogeneity. The data (all variables) are differenced. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
 
5.1)   Conclusion 
     In the second chapter the relationship between labor income tax rates and the relative share 
of the retirees is explored both theoretically and empirically building on Razin, Sadka and Swagel 
(2002). The empirical analysis covers data from 1991-2012 which is a bigger sample than 
previously analysed. This chapter also analyses how government size responds to changes in the 
retirees share. The possibility of within-family empathy is also explored. 
     Given the possibility of within-family empathy, we replicate the argument of Razin, Sadka and 
Swagel (2002) and argue for a U-shape relationship between labor income tax rates and the 
relative size of the aged due to a rise in the political power as a result of higher share of retirees 
and empathy towards them in the given family structure. The critical mass is achieved when 
retired people represent just 8.4% of voters unlike Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) whose critical 
mass is 50%. The old may become politically powerful much sooner than previously thought. 
     The empirical analysis finds support for our theory and Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) to an 
extent that the association found between the labor income tax rate and the share of retirees is 
U-shaped. It implies a rise in the share of retirees initially decreases labor income tax rate but 
the correlation between the two variables changes into positive once the retirees reach a certain 
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benchmark. This threshold is rather fragile but closer to our theory and less than what Razin, 
Sadka and Swagel (2002) predicted. 
     Extension of the empirical analysis is done taking children as dependent variable. There is 
evidence for a U-shaped correlation between labor income tax rate and the share of youth. 
     In addition, the empirical analysis is also extended taking the government size, measured by 
total tax revenue as a share of GDP, as the retirees may be more concerned about their overall 
expenditures. Our results are in agreement with what we find for labor income tax rate. When 
we enlarge the sample size including three more OECD countries, the results do not change.   
     The relationship between composition of taxes and income inequality in a median voter 
model is analysed in the third chapter. The hypotheses related to income taxes are consistent 
with Meltzer and Richard (1981) though the hypotheses related to expenditure taxes are new. 
     Expenditure taxes are relatively less redistributive than income taxes in nature but yet they 
still embody a redistributive impetus. So we propose that at lower levels of inequality the 
expenditure taxes will rise with inequality. However, once inequality attains a certain benchmark 
the expenditure taxes will decrease with further rise in inequality. The rationale follows from 
that the median voter who is generally poor in the median voter model gets worse off from 
redistribution through consumption taxes at higher levels of inequality and strongly prefers 
income taxes. 
     To empirically test the theory we collect cross-country data covering 129 countries. There is a 
positive correlation between the ratio of income to expenditure taxes and inequality. 
Furthermore, income taxes positively correlate with inequality whereas expenditure taxes are 
negatively correlated. We also find an inverted-U shape correlation between expenditure taxes 
and inequality as well as direct taxes and inequality. In general the theory is supported by 
empirical results. In addition the empirical findings lend substantial support to our theoretical 
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framework for countries with higher levels of democracy. Though the results for the whole and 
less democratic samples represent the same relationship the coefficients are weakly significant 
but this is consistent with a model of median voter preferences. 
     Given that the voters are myopic, we also estimate how changes in inequality affect deficits 
and debt. The empirical results confirm our hypotheses that higher income inequality will lead 
both deficits and debt levels to rise. 
     We also extend empirical analysis using panel data and controlling for non-stationarity in the 
data. For weak democracies, there is evidence found for theory related to direct and indirect 
taxes. The theory is also supported when we investigate non-linear association between direct 
taxes and inequality as well as indirect taxes and inequality. Moreover, results related to public 
debt also confirm tentative hypothesis. These findings with panel data estimation reconcile with 
cross-sectional results. 
     Following the Armey Curve (1995) we empirically estimate the optimal size of government for 
economic growth in the fourth chapter. Using data from 1981-2010 for 79 countries and taking 
five years averages, we find evidence for the presence of the Armey Curve (1995) across non-
OECDs. At low levels of government expenditures, increases in government spending increases 
economic growth. Nevertheless, once government expenditures represent 23.99% of GDP then 
any increase in the government size is estimated to hamper economic growth. Across weak 
democracies, the empirical results also reconcile with the hypothesis of Armey curve. The results 
for the OECD countries and the full sample are mixed as we find a U-shaped and an inverted U-
shape relation in these casesthough the coefficients lack robustness. The OECD countries are 
found to sustain larger governments. In addition, the possibility of spuriousness of results 
relating to the Armey curve cannot be eliminated as they may suffer with potential endogeneity 
problem. 
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     Following Ghosh and Gregoriou (2008), the total expenditures are de-composed into current 
government consumption and public investment. Relating to government consumption, there is 
substantial evidence found to support the hypothesis of Armey curve across the OECD countries 
as well as strong democracies. With regards to public investment the results are rather fragile. 
On the contrary, with 2SLS estimation, a U-shaped relation is suggested by the coefficient 
estimates between both policy variables and economic growth. 
     The empirical analysis is also extended following Cashin (1995). He finds a positive correlation 
between direct transfers and economic growth. We rather investigate the efficient level of direct 
transfers through testing non-linearity between the two variables. An inverted U-shape 
association between economic growth and direct transfers is found that confirms the presence 
of Armey curve across the sample. 
     In addition, how changes in the government size affect GDP per capita is also examined. We 
find support for the presence of Armey curve between the two variables when we apply 2SLS in 
first differences estimation for the full sample. For the sub-samples, however, the results are U-
shaped. 
 
5.2)   Directions for Future Research 
     Our analyses have several limitations. In the second chapter, we find support for our theory 
and Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002) as the estimated correlation between labor income tax rate 
and the share of retirees is U-shaped. However, the coefficient estimates are insignificant. We 
actually lose enough information when we difference the data. Moreover, we collect data for 
labor income tax rate which also includes taxes on profits on individuals. The data are not 
available that solely tax labor incomes. Were the data available and also for a longer time period, 
the findings would have been rather more robust and accurate. 
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     Besides, retirees may also be concerned about other sources of taxes that may affect them. 
The analysis in our chapter does not deal with other instruments of taxation. For example, Razin 
and Sadka (2007) also analyse how dependency ratio affects capital taxes. They find a negative 
association between the two variables. Similarly, the analysis how demographic structure, after 
decomposing dependency ratio into retirees and children, affects capital income taxes can be 
offered in future. 
     Moreover, there are other factors that may potentially affect income taxes which are not 
controlled for in our analysis since all the countries included in our sample are strongly 
democratic. Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) find a positive correlation between taxes and 
democracy. Similarly, the empirical analysis in second chapter may be extended including less 
democratic countries or developing countries for that matter. 
     We explore the relationship between composition of taxes and inequality in the third chapter. 
The empirical results support our theory as we find positive association between direct taxes 
and inequality as well as negative association between indirect taxes and inequality. The model 
of third chapter could be improved by decomposing direct and indirect taxes into various types. 
These instruments may include trade taxes, poll taxes, fee and toll taxes, effective taxes and 
other taxes. For example Borge and Rattso (2003) empirically test the hypothesis of Meltzer and 
Richard (1981) by including poll and property taxes. 
     In addition, the question of fiscal capacity can also be researched further. As is found by 
Besley and Persson (2014) that low income countries collect taxes between 10%-20% of GDP as 
compared to high income countries as their collection is almost 40% of GDP. They argue that 
fiscal capacity constraints in low income countries substantially limit their ability to collect taxes. 
For example, informal economy, weak institutions, fragmented politics, a weak sense of national 
identity and sociological and cultural factors are some characteristics which may stifle the tax 
revenue collection. Taking fiscal capacity into account may help the model improve considerably. 
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     Furthermore, Atkinson (1977) and Cremer, Pestieau and Rochet (2001) investigate the 
optimal tax composition. Likewise, chapter three can also examine optimality of tax composition 
since it only analysed how inequality is related to tax composition. 
     In general, the second and third chapters are based on Median voter model where policy 
choice is with the decisive voter. The empirical findings in general support our theories and 
hypotheses in these chapters. Nevertheless, there are also some results which contradict our 
theories. This may raise some questions about how effective median voter models are in a wide 
range of majority rule and policy making decisions. 
     Quite contradicting literature about the median voter model is present. For example, Down 
(1957) and Black (1958) favoured median voter model. According to them, these models were to 
an extent accurate representation of public sector output. On the other hand, there is literature 
that rules out median voter models as true representation of public sector output. Niskanen 
(1974) used median voter model as the basis of his demand side model. Nevertheless, the 
conclusion of his research was so at odds with the median voter model that his work actually 
proved to be a critique of the median voter model. Similarly, Mckelvey (1976) rather argues that 
political issues are multidimensional as opposed to one-dimensional. Thus, he finds median 
voter model not the true representation of policy making decisions. In a nutshell, the median 
voter model that was so popular in early 1970s could not seek similar acceptance only in a 
decade’s time. It can, therefore, incorporate multidimensional political issues rather than one-
dimensional policy objective. Nonetheless, it is too ambitious and not easily manageable to deal 
with multidimensional characteristics in one model. 
     Similarly the fourth chapter also offers few areas of research for future. Lack of evidence 
regarding the presence of Armey curve (1995) in the OECD and strong democracies raise further 
questions. These countries seem to have enlarged fiscal capacity for government expansion 
which may help them sustain larger governments. However, there must be a point after which 
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even stronger democracies reach their optimal government size. Research in the future could 
also be dedicated to explore the threshold where the size of government becomes optimal in 
these countries. May be, as for chapter three, instead of cross country estimations we should 
opt for within-country estimations. Within-country estimation offers more homogenous setting 
in terms of institutions and policy making. For example, Meltzer and Richard (1983) test their 
theory collection data for 50 US states. Data for countries having many states can also be 
explored further. 
 
5.3) Policy Recommendations 
     All three chapters are related to fiscal policy. Most of the results support our hypotheses in all 
chapters though few of them either do not support our theory or lack robustness. However, 
there are policy recommendations that we can offer based on the findings of this thesis. 
     In practice, policy makers do not only analyse the demands of median voter but also are 
influenced by their own agendas and self-interests. Therefore, political mechanism driving the 
fiscal policy should be reduced. For example, Macroeconomic literature favors counter-cyclical 
fiscal policies as the effective tool that policy makers can use to manage the economy efficiently. 
Nevertheless, in reality, there is strong evidence for pro-cyclical fiscal policy especially in 
developing countries. Talvi and Vegh (2005) and Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) find fiscal policy to be 
pro-cyclical in developing countries. The finding in second chapter that indicates an inverted U-
shape association between labor income tax rate and the share of retirees may be the 
demonstration of grey power and diminishing returns. In addition, politicians are socially 
influenced to retain their constituencies. There involves self-interest as well since they will be 
old tomorrow. Based on this, they may opt for raising the size of welfare state to receive more in 
the future irrespective of what policy actually should be. 
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     Given the negative consequences of an alarming rise of aging societies on public expenditures 
in the EU countries (as we mentioned in the motivation of this thesis), social security can be 
suggested to be privatized. This may decrease the burden on public exchequer and would 
provide individuals with better rate of return. For example, Moore (1997)asserted that 
“privatization offers a much higher financial rate of return to young workers than the current 
system... if Congress were to allow a 25 year old working woman today to invest her payroll tax 
contributions in private capital markets, her retirement benefit would be two to five times higher 
than what Social Security is offering”. Nevertheless, the literature opposing these claims also 
exists as there may be welfare concern. For example, Kotlikoff (1999) finds that there are 
positive effects of privatizing social security funds in the long-run but at the cost of existing 
generation. 
     There may be favourable effects of privatizing social securities in the long-run but the 
incumbent policy makers take the current generation more into their consideration as their re-
election depends on them. Moreover, they also safeguard their own self-interests as they will 
also grow older. Having established that policy making is influenced by political opportunism we 
recommend to reduce the political intervention from policy decisions. Cusack (1999) finds a 
reduction in partisan character on policy making in recent decades. However, fiscal policy still 
needs to be made more independent. 
     Likewise, instead of optimizing tax composition (research question of chapter 3) policy makers 
rather find it easier to debt-financed redistribution. As the voters are assumed to be myopic, 
they support a rise in both deficits and debts for redistribution to be financed. In this regard, 
countries in the European Union signed Maastricht Treaty (1992). Its aim was to bind EU 
countries to keep their debt share at 60% of GDP. It witnessed moderate success as, on average, 
the debt levels of EU decreased. Nonetheless, due to political opportunism through economic 
policies the results that were designed could not be achieved. We can substantiate our analysis 
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by quoting figures from the WDI data agency. Public debt as a share of GDP was 127.16% for 
Italy whereas for the UK it was 97.16% in 2012. Similarly it touched to 94.28% for the US. 
     In the fourth chapter, we find efficient level of government size around 30% of GDP whereas 
the public expenditures in the OECD or advanced countries are already beyond these estimated 
thresholds. For example, in UK, the government expenditures constitute even more than 40%.46 
Similarly, in the US, proportion of GDP consisting of government expenditures is about 40%.47 
These levels of government spending obviously indicate political interference in the decision 
making. Debrun, Hauner and Kumar (2009) argue for the political involvement in formulation of 
fiscal policy that can be analysed through deficit bias, pro-cyclicality and pursuit of unsustainable 
policies. 
     We, therefore, recommend policymakers that their goal should be to formulate fiscal policy 
which is counter-cyclical and sustainable. As Corsetti, Kuester, Meier and Muller (2010) find that 
fiscal sustainability and macroeconomic stability could be achieved with effectively planned 
counter-cyclical fiscal policy. In addition, Padogan (2009) and Schick (2003) also find counter-
cyclical fiscal policy to be effective at attaining two-pronged fiscal objectives such as fiscal 
sustainability and macroeconomic stability. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 The WDI data suggests it to be 46.11 in 2010. 
47 The WDI data suggests it to be 41.06 in 2010. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A1 
Labor Income Tax Rate = Data for the first dependent variable, the labor income tax rate, is 
calculated as the ratio of taxes on income and profits to labor income share. The OECD Revenue 
Statistics is used as a data source for taxes on income, profits and capital gains whereas OECD 
Statistics is the source to collect labor income share. The data spans from 1991 to 2012. 
Tax revenue as a share of GDP = It is taken from the OECD Revenue Statistics. 
Public debt as a fraction of GDP = It is taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). 
Dependency Ratio = The dependency ratio data, measured as 1 minus the total population aged 
15-64 as a share of total population, is collected from the WDI Database. 
Population 65 and above = World Development Indicators database are a source for population 
aging 65 and above. 
Population 0-14 = World Development Indicators database are a source for population aging 0-
14. 
Trade = Openness to trade is measured by summing imports and exports as a fraction of GDP. 
These data are also from the World Development Indicators database. 
GDP growth per capita = Data for GDP growth per capita is taken from the WDI. 
Inequality = An updated inequality database of Deininger and Squire (1996) is used to derive the 
data for income inequality. 
Unemployment Rate = The data for unemployment rate is taken from OECD Revenue Statistics. 
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GDP per capita = It is collected from the World Development Indicators. Its log is taken following 
Person and Tabellini (1999) to measure the level of development. 
Note: All these variables collected from 1991-2012. 
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Appendix A2 
Proof that 𝑡𝑦 < 1 
Using (9), then 𝑡𝑦 < 1 requires that 
 
(𝑚 − 1) (𝛿𝑦 +  𝛿𝑐 +  (𝑚 − 1)) < 𝛿𝑦𝑚 [𝛿𝑦(𝑚 + 1) − 𝛿𝑐(𝑚 − 1)] 
In turn this implies: 
(𝑚 − 1) (𝛿𝑦 +  𝛿𝑐 + (𝑚 − 1)) < 𝛿𝑦𝑚 [𝛿𝑦 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝑚(𝛿𝑦 −  𝛿𝑐)] 
hence 
(𝑚 − 1 −  𝛿𝑦𝑚)(𝛿𝑦 + 𝛿𝑐) < 𝛿𝑦𝑚
2(𝛿𝑦 −  𝛿𝑐) −  (𝑚 − 1)
2 
Substituting in the minimum value 𝛿𝑦 −  𝛿𝑐 =  
(𝑚−1)
𝑚
 into the RHS then a fortifori, 
 
(𝑚 − 1 − 𝛿𝑦𝑚)(𝛿𝑦 +  𝛿𝑐) < (𝑚 − 1) (𝛿𝑦𝑚 −  (𝑚 − 1)) 
and 
(𝑚 − 1 − 𝛿𝑦𝑚)(𝛿𝑦 +  𝛿𝑐) < (𝑚 − 1) (𝛿𝑦𝑚 −  (𝑚 − 1)) 
Which must hold because 𝛿𝑦 −  𝛿𝑐 >
(𝑚−1)
𝑚
 strongly implies that 𝛿𝑦 >
(𝑚−1)
𝑚
 
 
Proof that 
𝑑𝜏
𝑑𝑚
> 0 
Differentiating (10) with respect to 𝑚 leads to the condition 
 
𝑚 (𝛿𝑦 −  𝛿𝑐) − 𝑚 − 1 − (𝛿𝑦 − 𝛿𝑐 − 1)(𝛿𝑦 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝑚 − 1) > 0 
Simplifying yields the condition 
𝛿𝑦 −  𝛿𝑐 + (𝛿𝑦 +  𝛿𝑐) (1 −  (𝛿𝑦 −  𝛿𝑐)) > 0 
Which unambiguously holds given 0 < 𝛿𝑐 < 𝛿𝑦 < 1. 
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Proof that 
𝑑𝑡𝑦
𝑑𝑚
> 0 
Differentiating (9) with respect to 𝑚 leads to the condition 
 
(𝑚2 − 1 +  𝛿𝑦 + 𝛿𝑐) 𝑋 − 𝑚 (𝛿𝑦 −  𝛿𝑐)(𝑚 − 1)(𝛿𝑦 +  𝛿𝑐 + 𝑚 − 1) > 0 
 
Where 𝑋 ≡  𝛿𝑦(𝑚 + 1) −  𝛿𝑐  (𝑚 − 1). After some algebra, this can be rearranges as 
 
2 (𝑚 − 1)𝑚 (𝛿𝑦 −  𝛿𝑐) + (𝛿𝑦 + 𝛿𝑐){𝑚
2[1 − (𝛿𝑦 − 𝛿𝑐)] + 2𝑚 (𝛿𝑦 −  𝛿𝑐) + (𝛿𝑦 + 𝛿𝑐)} > 0 
 
This unambiguously holds given 0 < 𝛿𝑐 < 𝛿𝑦 < 1 < 𝑚. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
198 
 
Appendix A3 
Taxes on Income, Profit and Capital Gains (% of Revenue) = It is collected from World 
Development Indicators from 1990-2012. 
Taxes on Goods and Services (% of Revenue) = It is collected from World Development Indicators 
from 1990-2012. 
Relative Taxes = It is the ratio of Taxes on Income, Profit and Capital Gains (% of Revenue) to 
Taxes on Goods and Services (% of Revenue). 
Income Inequality = Its source of collection is the University of Texas Inequality Project's 
estimate of household income inequality (Galbraith and Kum, 2005). 
Real GDP per capita = Data for this variable are collected from Penn World Table. It is measured 
in constant chained PPP US$. Its natural log is taken to measure the difference in the level of 
economic development across the sample. 
Deficit = Deficit as a fraction of GDP. These data are also from the World Development Indicators 
database. 
Public Debt = Public Debt as a fraction of GDP. These data are also from the World Development 
Indicators database. 
Trade = Same as Appendix A2. 
Polity2 = This variable represents the level of democracy. -10 Refers to the weakest democracy 
(dictatorship) whereas +10 refers to the strongest democracy. It is collected from Polity IV 
database. 
Note: All these variables collected from 1990-2012. 
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Appendix A4 
Real GDP growth per capita = Data for this variable is collected from Penn World Table. We 
collect PPP converted GDP growth, measured in millions, and then divide it by population, 
measured in millions, to get Real GDP growth per capita. Further, we take its natural log to 
measure the heterogeneity in the economic development across the countries. Data range for all 
the variables collected for chapter 4 is from 1981-2010. 
Government expenditures as a share of GDP = It is taken from World Economic Outlook – 
International Monetary Finance (WEO-IMF) to measure the government size. 
Current government expenditures = Data for current government expenditures are collected 
from International Monetary Fund: Government Financial Statistics (IMF-GFS). 
Public spending = Data for public spending are collected from International Monetary Fund: 
Government Financial Statistics (IMF-GFS). 
Direct transfers = It is also taken from World Development Indicators database. 
Real GDP per capita = Itmeasures the well-being of society better than economic growth. Unlike 
GDP growth, it takes into account the population size. Similarly, its natural log is taken. 
Initial real GDP per capita = It is calculated by taking the five year average of each data (time) 
points. 
Trade = This variable is the addition of Imports as a share of GDP and Exports as a share of GDP. 
Polity2 = Same as Appendix A3.1. 
Population Growth Rate = It is taken from World Development Indicators database. 
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Secondary School Enrolment Rate = It is taken from World Development Indicators database to 
measure human capital. 
Inflation Rate = It is also taken from World Development Indicators database. 
Note: All the variables are collected from 1981-2010. We take averages for 5-year time intervals 
to control for the cyclical effects in the data. We have six data (time) points for each country, 
averages over – 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010. 
Rule of Law = It is used to measure political stability and collected from World Governance 
Indicators. 
Bank deposits/ GDP = It is used to measure financial development and collected from World 
Governance Indicators. 
Investment/GDP = It is also collected from WDI. 
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